THE REVIEW OF RELIGION

Volume VII MAY, 1943 Number 4

EDITOR
Horace L. Friess

MANAGING EDITOR
Marguerite Block

EDITORIAL BOARD

Roland H. Bainton
Stephen S. Bayne, Jr.
W. Norman Brown
Eugene H. Byrne
Louis H. Gray
Evarts B. Greene
William E. Hocking
Arthur Jeffery
Raymond C. Knox
Clarence A. Manning
Ralph Marcus
James B. Pratt
Cyril C. Richardson
David E. Roberts
Herbert W. Schneider
Ryusaku Tsunoda

The Review of Religion is published bi-monthly during the eight months of the academic year (November, January, March and May). Subscription: $2.00 a year (foreign, $2.30); single copies 60 cents (foreign 70 cents). All subscriptions and business matters should be addressed to the publisher, Columbia University Press, 2960 Broadway, New York City. Manuscripts, editorial communications and books for review should be addressed to the Editorial Office, 401 Low Memorial Library, Columbia University, New York City.

The articles in *The Review of Religion* are indexed in the *International Index to Periodicals*, New York City.

COPYRIGHT 1943 BY COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS

ARTICLES

Notes on the Attitude of the Early Church Fathers towards Hebrew Psalmody . . . . . ERIC WERNER 339

Human Nature as Conceived by the Navajo Indians . . . . . GLADYS A. REICHARD 353

Conversion and Liberation . . . . ERNST MORITZ MANASSE 361

BOOK REVIEWS

Friedrich Solmsen: *Plato's Theology* . . . . . (JOHN HERMAN RANDALL, JR.) 384

William Foxwell Albright: *Archaeology and the Religion of Israel* . . . . . (I. MENDELSOHN) 389

Edward Langton: *Good and Evil Spirits* . . . . . (JOSHUA TRACHTENBERG) 392

Abraham A. Neuman: *The Jews in Spain* . . . . . (Luitpold Wallach) 395

John Amos Comenius: *The Labyrinth of the World* . . . . . (Otakar Odložilík) 398

Elbert Russell: *The History of Quakerism* . . . . . (D. Elton Trueblood) 401

N. S. Timasheff: *Religion in Soviet Russia* . . . . . (Clarence A. Manning) 403

Nels F. S. Ferré: *The Christian Faith* . . (Albert C. Outler) 405

Stephen Lee Ely: *The Religious Availability of Whitehead's God* . . . . . (Victor Lowe) 409

Radoslav A. Tsanoff: *Religious Crossroads* . . . . . (Harold Buschman) 415

Ralph W. Sockman: *The Highway of God* . . . . . (Raymond C. Knox) 418

Charles Clayton Morrison: *The Christian and the War* . . . . . (Charles S. Braden) 421

Book Notes 425

Alexander Heidel: *The Babylonian Genesis.* Lionel Giles, tr.: *The Book of Mencius.* Upton Close: *Behind the Face of Japan.* Swami Nikhilananda, tr.: *The Gospel of Sri Ramakrishna.* James T. Addison: *The Christian Approach to the Moslem.* Frank H. Meyer: *The Crux of Chronology.* Victor L. Dowdell: *Aristotle and Anglican Religious Thought.* Sidney E. Mead: *Nathaniel William Taylor, 1786-1858.* A. Campbell Garnett: *A Realistic Philosophy of Religion.* Edgar S. Brightman: *The Spiritual Life.* David Hume: *Diálogos sobre Religión natural.* Stewart Edward White: *The Road I Knew.*

Among the Periodicals 437

Index 443

NOTES ON THE ATTITUDE OF THE EARLY CHURCH FATHERS TOWARDS HEBREW PSALMODY

By Eric Werner

Lecturer on Jewish and Near Eastern Music,
The Hebrew Union College

I

The development of Christianity as a religion has proceeded hand in hand with the development of its sacramental music. Naturally, therefore, we elucidate the facts of musical history by citing the facts of religious history. But the converse—that is, tracing the development of Christian liturgy by noting the history of Christian music—is equally justified and equally rewarding. The present paper is a modest venture along this line. We shall aim to interpret certain phases of Christian liturgy by citing certain historical facts which have a bearing upon the liturgical music of the early Christian group.

After a period marked, more or less, by the propounding of hypotheses, studies along these lines during the last four decades have yielded surprising results and have disclosed many previously unknown sources valuable to the historian of religion as well as to the musicologist. Briefly I mention here the discovery and the deciphering of the Hymns of Oxyrynchos by Grenfell and Hunt,[1] the deciphering of the early and middle Byzantine church songs by Fleischer, Tillyard, and Wellesz,[2] the monumental studies of the Gregorian chant and its paleography by Peter Wagner and by the Benedictines of Solesmes,[3] the works on Syrian and Armenian church music by Dom Jeannin and others and, finally, Idelsohn's discoveries of the structural similiarities between the Gregorian chant and the songs of the Oriental syna-

1. B. P. Grenfell and A. S. Hunt, *The Oxyrynchos Papyri,* Part xv, (London, 1922).

2. O. Fleischer, *Neumenstudien* I-III, (Leipzig, 1895-1904). H. J. Tillyard, *Byzantine Music and Hymnography,* (Cambridge, 1923), *Handbook of the Middle Byzantine Musical Notation,* in *Monumenta Musicae Byzantinae, Subsidia* (Copenhagen, 1935). E. Wellesz, *Byzantinische Musik,* (Breslau, 1927); *Monumenta Musicae Byzantinae,* (together with Tillyard and C. Hoeg), 1935-39.

3. P. Wagner, *Einfuehrung in die Gregorianischen Melodien,* I-III, (Leipzig, 1907-22); *La Paléographie musicale,* I-XV, (Solesmes et Tournay, 1889-1926).

gogues.[4] The methods employed—virtually the common property of all musically informed theologians—consist of comparisons within the field of liturgical history, of paleographic investigations and, last but not least, of analyses and comparisons treating the structures of the music actually used in the ancient rituals and transmitted either orally or in writing. The recourse to liturgical history still is not fully employed, inexhaustible as the material is, despite the splendid output of Gérold, Gastoué, Leitner, and Reese.[5]

The problem which we confront in our present short study is that of observing, within the Christian liturgy, the motley interchange of Hellenistic and Judaic elements. As we can not go extensively into musical details owing to lack of space, we shall limit ourselves to a historical survey of the Church's attitude toward Psalmody, with special reference to Clement of Alexandria.[6]

II

We know that at about the time of Jesus three types of song were current; these are technically designated as psalmodic, melismatic, and hymnic song. The names refer to differing musical forms and practical usage. Psalmody, in its common sense, was the singing of the psalms both privately and in common worship. The term psalmody seems to have been applied originally only to psalms sung to instrumental accompaniment. An American scholar, O. E. Payne, in his work, *Instrumental Music Is Scriptural,* gives convincing evidence that the word *psalmody* originally conveyed the notion of psalms sung with instrumental accompaniment. St. Augustine says: "Those are called

4. Dom Jeannin, *Melodies liturgiques syriennes et chaldéennes,* I-II, (Paris and Beyrut, 1924-28); A. Z. Idelsohn, *Thesaurus of Hebrew—Oriental Melodies,* I-X, (Leipzig, Berlin, Jerusalem, 1914-31); *Jewish Music in its Historical Development* (New York, 1929).

5. Th. Gérold, *Les Pères de l'Église et la musique* (Strasbourg, 1931); A. Gastoué, *Les origines du chant romaine* (Paris, 1908); F. Leitner, *Der gottesdienstliche Volksgesang im jüdischen und christlichen Altertum* (Freiburg i. B., 1906); G. Reese, *Music in the Middle Ages* (New York, 1940); O. Ursprung, *Die katholische Kirchenmusik* (Potsdam, 1933).

6. Cf. my article on "Catholic and Jewish Musical Punctuation," in the *Hebrew Union College Annual,* XV, 335-37. That there does not yet exist any comprehensive work investigating the reciprocal relationships within the liturgies of Judaism and Christianity of the first millenium from a musicological point of view is to be regretted. The writer is at present occupied with the production of such a study.

psalmi, however, which are sung to the accompaniment of the psalterium."[7] And Cyril of Alexandria, in his *Lexicon,* states: "*Psalmos* means a musical utterance while the instrument is played rhythmically according to harmonic notes." In the course of time the content of the term psalmody became more general, and it is in this general sense that we use it today.[8]

The melismatic song, frequently equated with the "pneumatic song," is a type of melody which, through its ornate embellishment, becomes more or less independent of the single word.[9] The *Alleluja,* also called *jubilus* or *jubilatio,* is the prototype of melismatic music. It is an ecstatic song without words.[10] This ecstatic production of melody without the encumbrance of words is, according to Tertullian, a proof of the divinely inspired origin of song.[11]

Hymn was *originally* the designation of the "Thirteen Cantica," as we see in the Codex Alexandrinus. These Cantica were: (1) The Song of Miriam and Moses (Ex. 15); (2) The Prayer of Moses (Deut. 32); (3) The Prayer of Hannah (I. Sam. 2); (4) The Song of Habbakuk (Hab. 3); (5) (Isa. 26); (6) (Jonah 2:3); (7) The Prayer of the Three Men; (Dan. 3, Vulg. Version III, 52-90); (8) Azariah's Prayer; (Dan. 3, Vulg. III, 26-49); (9) The Prayer of Hezekiah (Isa. 38:9-20); (10) An Apocryphal Prayer of Manasseh (usually following the Book of Revelations); (11) The Prayer of Zachariah (Luke 2:68-79); (12) The Magnificat; (13) The Canticle of Simeon, Nunc Dimittis (Luke 2:29-32).

As to the term Hymn, it seems that as early as in the fourth and fifth centuries the distinction between Hymns and Psalms was not always clearly understood by the Fathers. Yet, Aetheria Silvia, in her famous *peregrinatio,* apparently knows the difference, for she notes frequently,

7. Augustine, *Enarratio in Ps.* IV.

8. There is a complete analogy between Greek and Hebrew, in the change of meaning of *Psalmos,* (from ψάλλειν, to pluck, to strike a string instrument), and the biblical *Mizmor,* from *zamar,* to pluck strings. Both nouns have lost their original connection with musical instruments and have become designations of a vocal performance of a sacred text, finally of the text itself.

9. Jerome, *In Ps.* XXXII, add (33). In general, the melismatic songs were considered to be the ᾠδαὶ πνευματικαί of St. Paul, (Eph., 5:19; Col., 3:16) and, consequently, as songs, inspired by the Holy Ghost.

10. Augustine, *Enar. in Ps.* XCIX. In the literature of the early Church even the term εὐλογεῖν seems to have had the connotation of "jubilantly singing", εὐλογία that of "hymn," as in Rev. 5:12.

11. Tertullian, *De anima,* 9, *Apology,* 39, *Liber de carne Christi,* 17 and 20.

"Dicuntur hymni et psalmi responduntur, similiter et antiphonae" (*Peregrinatio*, 81, 25; 83, 19; 84, 18; 86, 9ff). And although Didymus attemps to drawn firm lines between these two forms by speculating thus, "The man of practical life prefers psalmody; the man of theoretical (speculative) life prefers hymns." (*Expositio in Ps.* IV, 1), it was Augustine who termed this distinction as "frustra elaborata" and doubted that it actually could be demonstrated (*Enarratio in Ps.* LXVII, 1). In general, we may say that the hymns were more respected than the psalms. Chrysostom states that the "high powers" (angels), prefer the hymn to the psalm.[12] The difference between hymn and psalm appears to us more one of form than of content. The new type of metrical and syllabic composition, first created by Ephraem Syrus, disregarded to a considerable extent the classic Greek and Latin principles of quantity in the prosody, whereas Ambrosius in his hymns followed the traditional metrical structure and only occasionally admitted rhymes at the end of a stanza.[13] Eventually, however, the new and revolutionary form gained ground, conquering almost the entire Occidental world. Yet it ought to be remembered that Ephraem's free prosody followed patterns which were much older than is usually believed. We find in the apocryphal Acts of John (3rd-4th century) part of a Eucharistic hymn:

σωθῆναι θέλω καὶ σῶσαι θέλω ἀμην
λυθῆναι — — —λῦσαι — —
τρωθῆναι — — τρῶσαι — —

In the following passage (together with the preceding one),

δόξα σοι λόγε· δόξα σοι χάρις· ἀμην
δόξα σοι πνεῦμα· δόξα σοι ἅγιε· δόξα σοι τῇ δόξῃ· ἀμην

we recognize clearly formal elements strongly resembling the refrain-type of Psalms 118 and 136.[14]

12. Αἱ γὰρ ἄνω δυνάμεις ὑμνοῦσιν οὐ ψάλλουσιν (*Ep. ad Col.* III, 9, 2).

13. Cf. W. Meyer, "Anfang und Ursprung der lateinischen und griechischen rhythmischen Dichtung", in *Abhandlungen der Bayrischen Akademie der Wissenschaften* (Munchen, 1885), pp. 270-450. Before Meyer, it was Bickell, who stated that the Greco-Roman system of meter was abolished under Judeo-Syrian influence, to be replaced by "natural accentuation." (G. Bickell, *De re metrica Hebraeorum*, in his *Carmina veteris testamenti*, [Innsbruck, 1882] pp. 219-36).

14. Cf. *Forschungen zur Religion und Literatur des Alten und Neuen Testaments* (Göttingen, 1921), pp. 110 ff.

Concerning their musical rendition, it was well known how to distinguish between the various types of sacred poetry, that is, between *"Sprechgesang"* (a kind of recitative), Choir-Psalmody, and Melismatic Song. The rule of St. Paul and Stephanus (sixth century) says: "Ne quae cantanda sunt in ordine lectionem utamur, in tropis et cantilenae arte nostra praesumtione vertamus."[15] We find here a precise distinction between *Sprechgesang* from written texts (*lectio*), Psalmody (*quae cantanda sunt*), and Melismatic Song (*in tropis et cantilenae arte*). Hence, Psalmody must have been simple (whether sung in unison or antiphonally) and uniform, as is indicated by the mutually corroborating reports of the Church Fathers. It was quite distinct from the other forms of liturgical music.

In this connection, we mention the peculiarly shifting attitude of Augustine toward the liturgical music of his time. In his *Confessions* and elsewhere, he enthusiastically approves the use of Psalmody, even of Melismatic Song. On the other hand, his judgment of this music is sometimes harsh. Thus, for example, he praises Bishop Aurelius because he rejected the nightly musical service on account of its instrumental accompaniment.[16] In his famous utterance about the Jubilatio[17] he obviously refers to the mystical "speaking in tongues"[18] (λαλεῖν γλώσσαις), which played an important role in early Christianity. However, the subject of melismatic song, interesting as it is to both theologian and musicologist, cannot be considered here. Just one remark about the Halleluja: The entire idea of the melismatic song (the Halleluja) may be seen as the last remnant—but one jealously guarded—of an "organized form of Glossolaly," if this formulation is not a *contradictio in adjecto*. We find a revival of these "wordless" prayer-songs,

15. *Patr. Lat.* LXVI, col. 954; Eusebius: "ὁμόφωνον μέλος ἐν ταῖς ψαλμολογίαις ἀναπέμπομεν" (*Patr. Gr.* XXIII, col. 1172-74).

16. *Supra*, note 10, and Augustine, *Confessions*, IX, 33.

17. Augustine, *Enar. in Ps.* XXXII, 5. The term Jubilus or Jubilatio, the designation of those mystical pneumatic songs without words, display an interesting fusion of Latin and Hebrew words. (Hebr. *yobel*—ram, meton.—trumpet blast; thence jubilee-year. Latin *jubilare* to call a person, to shout joyously as a rustic does: "ut quiritare urbanorum, sic jubilare rusticorum," in T. Varro, (B. C. 116-27) *De Lingua Latina*, ed. Mueller, 6, 6, No. 68, p. 99). White and Riddle, *Latin-English Dictionary*, v. *jubilaeus*, hold that both words have the same Sanscrit root. Through the Vulgate these two entirely different words have been melted into one.

18. Cf. Paul, I. Cor. 12:30; 14:5; Acts 10:46; 19:6. Perhaps this highly disputed phrase is just a paraphrase of the Hebrew *dibarti bil 'shoni* (Ps. 39:14).

the *niggun,* in the world of Ḥasidism (Seventeenth and early Eighteenth century), a world which in many respects was strangely similar to that of Christianity before the fourth century.

In the postbiblical Hebrew sources we find a rich vocabulary for song, tune, and melody. The term *shira* seems to indicate a more solemn type of song comparable to the hymn; *neᶜima* refers to the sweetness of music.[19] So is *halila* (or *hallel*) obviously an ecstatic song of praise (melismatic),[20] while *zimra,* a less ornate song, is the chant used in the study of Mishnah and in the ordinary Psalmody.

It is Psalmody and its music which provides the most important link between the Jewish and Christian liturgies: (1) because of the close connection between word and music; (2) because of its central position in both liturgies; (3) because it offers the best and most numerous sources. Besides, there is the compelling fact that Jewish practice has preserved more of the plain Psalmody of the Synagogue than of the richer melismatic type, the tradition of which was forgotten soon after the destruction of the Second Temple, because of its complex and ornate nature. The grief centering about this tragedy dictated a preference for the more modest type of Psalmody. The Hymn proper was never used much except in the Temple, where the *shira* was a part of the liturgy. Its musical tradition disappears immediately after the Roman victory.[21] Moreover, a simple and modest style apparently was considered the only proper musical expression of prayer, if we understand the spirit of the statement in *b. Gittin 7a,* which refers to Isa. 24:8-9 and Hos. 9:1, by the interpretation of which all instrumental music was prohibited. The rabbinic hostility to secular music, which existed perhaps even before the destruction of the Temple, reached its

19. Compare the Greek μέλιγμα—sweetness, and μέλος—melody to the Hebrew *neᶜima*—sweetness, melody.

20. Cf. the talmudic statement: "Passover in the house, and the song of praise (the *Hallel)* bursts the roof" (*Jer. Pessahin,* 35 b), and Jerome: *"Sonabant psalmi et aurata tecta templorum reboans in sublime quatiebat Alleluia"* (*Epist.* 77, in *Patr. Lat.* XXII, col. 697). Yet, as we know, the Halleluja has undergone a considerable change of meaning away from its original Hebrew use. Its significance has increased and the liturgical music of all churches took cognizance of this fact. The word of Cardinal Pitra that the history of the Halleluja is a poem in itself, is certainly justified. (*L'hymnographie de l'Eglise Grecque,* [Paris, 1867], p. 35).

21. There is much discussion in the talmudic literature about the rendition of the hymn at the Red Sea, *(shira).* Cf. *b Sota* 30b and *bSukka* 38b, also S. Krauss, *Talmudische Archaeologie,* III, (Leipzig, 1912) 274, n. 15 and 16.

climax in an antagonism to all forms of instrumental music when the Greek *Kitharody* became popular among the wealthier classes of Jewry. The apostasy of so famous a man as Elisha b. Abuyah (Acher) is attributed to the demoralizing influence of Greek music. This antagonism toward the gayer secular music was due to a moralistic condemnation of the voluptuous musical orgies of the Greeks, to a nationalistic reaction against assimilation to Hellenism, and to a religiously motivated mourning over the loss of Temple and land.

The early Christian Church was engaged in a similar struggle against the immoral influence of the current secular music. In Christianity too, the plain Psalmody was originally preferred to all other types of sacred music. In general, religious music became a spiritual battlefield between Judeo-Christianity and Hellenism.

In general the Church displayed a preference for the principle and development of Psalmody, rather than for the melismatic and hymnic songs. Although the reasons for this attitude on the part of the Church Fathers were somewhat variable, the following three are among those most frequently cited: (1) continuity with the synagogal tradition and emphasis upon the early Christian doctrine of humility and modesty; (2) the struggle against Hellenistic music, particularly against instrumental music; (3) the necessity for musical uniformity throughout the World Church, which could only be achieved through the utmost simplicity. That the early Psalmody of the Church was extremely simple is borne out by the frequent statements of the Church Fathers to the effect that the masses of the people were able to sing it. Ambrosius even advocated that women be permitted to chant the Psalms along with the men of the community.[22] John Chrysostom relates that many of the Psalms were known from memory and were chanted by the congregation at the daily vesper service, also, that the evil inclination is afraid of Psalmody as the most potent weapon against it.[23] Clement of Alexandria reports that, in his time, Psalms were sung before and after meals and also before retiring.[24] That the musical settings of the Psalms were simple and easy to learn is evident from the fact that they were sung even antiphonally by the entire congregation. Antiphonal singing itself is an old Jewish institution. It seems to be referred to as early as

22. *Patr. Lat.* XIV, col. 968.
23. *Patr. Gr.* LV, col. 425; also Epiphanius in *Patr. Gr.* XLII, col. 827.
24. *Stromata* VII.

the time of Nehemiah.[25] Eusebius, quoting Philo, also indicates the use of antiphonal singing by the Therapeuts.[26]

The Church Fathers, following Theodore of Mopsuestia, attributed antiphony to Flavian and Diodor, monks of Antioch, and Augustine considered it to be an Oriental usage emanating from Antioch.[27] It must be observed, however, that this practice could have been learned by the Apostles when they took refuge from persecution in the ancient synagogues of Antioch, if, indeed, they had not known it before.[28] Antiphonal singing ultimately became a standard practice in the Church, and Basilius eagerly advocated it throughout the Near East. In the Occidental Church antiphony in the Oriental manner was introduced by Ambrosius, as is attested by his secretary Paulinus. Soon after it spread thoughout the entire World Church.

The position of Psalmody within Judaism after the destruction of the Temple was, as far as we can determine, apparently well stabilized. It was engraved in the eternal prayer book of the Jewish people as with a stylus of bronze. Hence the following four points are basic to our discussion. We set them forth here with some source material to reinforce them.

1. Psalmody throughout the Diaspora is an important part of the liturgy. This is evident from the discussion of the daily *Shacharith* service in b. *Soferim* (Ed. Higger (1937) ch. XVII-XX; Ed. J. Mueller, ch. XVIII-XX.), and other psalms are extensively treated in b. *Sukkah* 38 b and b. *Pesahim* 117 a, 118a.

2. Psalmody must have been very simple, because the entire congregation was able to sing it. This is especially evident from the *Baraita* in b. *Sotah* 30 b, *Soferim* XVIII, 2.

3. The Jews distinguished carefully between the various types of psalmodic music. The passage in b. *Sota* 30 b reports a discussion of the singing of the *Shirah* (Ex. 15) where a distinction is made between the

25. Nehemia, 12:27-41.

26. Philo-Eusebius, *Hist. eccl.*, II, 17; Philo, *De vita contemplativa*, ed. Mang, II, 471-86; also Wendland, *Die Therapeuten und die philon. Schrift vom beschaulichen Leben*, in XXII. Suppl. of *Jahrbuch für klass. Philologie* (1896), 695-772; also in P. Wagner, *op. cit.*, I, 23, and in F. Leitner, *op. cit.*, pp. 206 ff.

27. "Tunc hymni et psalmi ut canerentur secundum orientalium morem partium, ne populus maeroris taedio contabesceret, institutum est" (Augustine, *Confessions*, 9, 7).

28. Acts, 11:19-26; 17:1, 10, 16, etc.

forms of Psalmodic response (*roshe peraqim*), the Antiphonal Epiphonems (*zamre shehada* = echo), and the *Sprechgesang* (*haqriya* or *hiqra* = *lectio*).[29] The responsive practice is described in *Soferim* XIV, 9-10.

4. Psalmody was originally uniform throughout the Diaspora.[30] It must have been so, otherwise traveling precentors would have been unable to serve in foreign communities. Significantly, exceptions from the uniform rule are given particular mention, as in the case of Jericho, which had its own tradition for the recitation of the *Shema*^{c}.[31]

It is impossible to discover the exact nature of this psalmodic music through mere historical methods. Neither the Church Fathers nor the Rabbis say anything which sheds light on its technical details. A further question arises, namely the manner in which Jewish Psalmody was absorbed into the liturgical practice of the Christian Church. The Church itself proclaims the synagogal origin of many of its musical traditions. It is, therefore, appropriate to quote several Church authorities on this question.

Eusebius states, in the passage mentioned afore, that the Psalmody of the Jewish Therapeuts, as described by Philo, was absolutely identical with the Christian Psalmody of his own time. The complaint of Diodor of Tarsus, that the Church is imitating Jewish songs, confirms the above statements.[32] Justin Martyr traces the origin of Christian song back to a declaration of Jesus himself,[33] while St. Paul seemed to consent to the imitation of the synagogal usage concerning music.[34] Damasus and Coelestinus state that the Psalms have been rendered according to Jewish tradition.[35] Moreover, we learn from Jerome about St. Paula, his contemporary, that she achieved a complete mastery of the Hebrew language, "ita ut Psalmos hebraice caneret."[36]

29. *Soferim*, ed. Mueller, III, 10, (Vienna, 1878).

30. Cf. S. Krauss, *op. cit.*, p. 273, n. 6, where we read (*Cant. Rabba* on Cant. cant. 8:12): "They sing the *Shema*^{c} with one mouth, one voice, in one melody."

31. *b Pesahin*, IV, 8.

32. A. v. Harnack, *Texte und Untersuchungen, Neue Folge*, VI, 35.

33. *Contra Tryphonem*, 106.

34. Paul, Col. 3:16, 17.

35. Damasus: in *Patr. Lat.* CXXVIII, col. 74; Coelestinus: *Patr. Lat.* CXXVIII, col. 225. See also Jerome, *Ep. XX ad Damasum*.

36. Jerome, *Ep. 108*, in *Patr. Lat.* XXII, col. 902. Even Thomas Aquinas praised the ancient Jewish practice of Psalmody, although he opposed the use of musical instruments like those of the Temple, lest the Church become judaized (*Summa theol.*, 2, 2; *Quaest.* 91; *Art.* 2).

This intricate relation between Christian and Jewish musical liturgy has been acknowledged by such outstanding musicologists as P. Wagner, F. Leitner, H. Besseler, P. A. Gastoué, P. Johner, Wellesz, Tillyard, *et. al.*, to name only a few who agree as to the close connection of early Christian and synagogal music.[37] This being so, the more we are obliged to regard carefully all the patristic descriptions of Jewish Psalmody, for they indicate the nature of early *Christian* Psalmody as well.

Besides exegetical and poetic descriptions, the actual development of Psalmody up to the sixth century is still heavily veiled. A clear distinction was made between lector (ἀναγνώστης) and cantor (*psalmista*).[38] Accordingly, as early as the third century there must have been a well defined difference between lection and Psalmody, solo performance and choral singing. The development of the lectorate and cantorate, a difficult chapter in ecclesiastical history, shows certain close parallelisms to the Jewish institution of the *hazan*. This is—despite Harnack's contrary opinion—only natural, if we consider that both the *Didache* and the "Church Order" are works of Judeo-Christians, who introduced the Jewish function of the *hazan* into the Church. In the fourth century Epiphanius compares the ἁζανίται (Greek for *hazen*) with the Deacons of the Church.[39] Then, after the fourth century, the *scholae cantorum* consolidated the earlier musical traditions and crystallized the originally half improvised *modi* into clearly defined melodies which were not too difficult to sing from memory because of their still limited number.[40]

37. Although the evidence of the close and organic relationship of synagogal and early Christian music has become overwhelming in the last three decades, a comprehensive work about this important matter is still a desideratum. The writer has approached the subject in his study on "Jewish and Catholic Musical Punctuation," in the *Hebrew Union College Annual*, XV (1940).

38. Cf. O. Ursprung, *Die katholische Kirchenmusik*, (Potsdam, 1934) p. 9: "For him, (the psalmista) the creation of a special clerical rank was not necessary; for that rank was already in existence, derived from the synagogal cantorate, as many once Jewish cantors went into the services of the Church."

39. Cf. Harnack, *Texte und Untersuchungen, (Die apost. Kirchenordnung; Das Lectorat in der Kirche)* (Leipzig, 1886), p. 99, n. 92: "Typically oriental is the combination of the psalmist with the lector since the fourth century." There are some interesting remarks on the function of the lector also in Th. Schermann's *Allgemeine Kirchenordnung*, II (Paderborn, 1914), 209, 439, 214, 232, 462, etc.

40. The distinctions went so far as to differentiate between two kinds of improvisation, namely the ecstatic, often improvised hymns on occasion of the *agape*, and the more simple and "routine" improvisation of the psalmody. Cf. Tertullian, *Apology* 39, and Origen, *Contra Celsum* 8, 37 (*Patr. Gr.*, II, col. 1574).

III

In the *Paedagogus* of Clement of Alexandria, we find a passage which sheds a great deal of light on the musical nature of Jewish Psalmody. In the second chapter the following principles are stated:

> Further, among the ancient Greeks, in their banquets over the brimming cups, a song was sung called a *Skolion* after the manner of the Hebrew songs, all together raising the paean with the voice, and sometimes also taking turns in the song while they drank health round; while those that were more musical than the rest sang to the lyre. But let amatory songs be banished far away, and let our songs be hymns to God. . . . For temperate harmonies are to be admitted; but we are to banish as far as possible from our robust mind those liquid harmonies, which, through pernicious arts in the modulations of tones, train to effemnacy and scurrility. But grave and modest strains say farewell to the turbulence of drunkenness. Chromatic tunes (ἁρμονίαι) are, therefore, to be abandoned to immodest revels, and to florid and meretricious music.[41]

We see here the antagonism of Plato and Aristotle toward "Chromatism" transposed into early Christianity, an antagonism which Judaism also displayed, though not so systematically, and not under the influence of Greek philosophy.[42] Fortunately, Clement describes the mode of the old Greek drinking song (σκόλιον . . . Ἑβραικῶν κατ' εἰκόνα ψαλμῶν) as having been almost identical with that of Jewish Psalmody. Further on in the same section, this mode is designated as *Doric* and *Spondaic,* which corresponds exactly to the rule that the song accompanying the libation (σπονδεῖον) must be kept in the *Tropos Spondeiakos.*

What was this *Tropos Spondeiakos* which was considered to be almost identical with the Jewish Psalmody? Fortunately, we are in possession of very reliable and mutually corroborating sources, especially Plutarch, Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Aristides Quintilianus, and others. Plutarch gives a technical description of this mode by which, according to both Riemann and Westphal, the best authorities in the field of ancient Greek music, the *Dorian* scale is meant.[43] This cor-

41. Clement of Alex., *Paedagogus* II, ch. 4.

42. Cf. E. Werner, "Die Musikanschauungen des antiken Judentums," in *Musica Hebraica,* II (1939), 8-15, and Werner and Sonne, "The Philosophy and Theory of Music in Judaeo-Arabic Literature," in *Hebrew Union College Annual,* XV and XVI, (1941 and 1942).

43. Plutarch, *Scripta moralia,* ed. Duebner (Paris 1876-80). See also H. Riemann, *Handbuch der Musikgeschichte,* 2 md ed., I, 1 (Leipzig, 1922) 49 ff.

responds again to the statement of Clement that Jewish Psalmody was in the *Dorian* scale. Riemann has shown that the peculiarity of this mode lay in the omission of one note of the scale. (See illustration).

Thus the tonal framework of the *Tropos Spondeiakos* is actually a modification of the *Dorian* mode, a fact which is significantly hinted at by Plutarch himself.[44] The same explanation is given by Aristides Quintilianus in his *De Musica.*[45] Kathleen Schlesinger devotes several pages to an investigation of the *Tropos Spondeiakos* in her admirable work, *The Greek Aulos.*[46] She arrives at the following conclusions:

The *spondaic* song, an *auletic libation* hymn, is founded upon the *Dorian octave Harmonia* of seven notes, produced by *Determinant* 11. This mode is called by Plutarch the *Spondeiakos Tropos*; it is identical with the scale of the *Elgin aulos* (the straight one) in the Graeco-Roman department at the British Museum. . . . There are ample grounds for identifying the interval of ration 11:10 with the *Spondeiasmos,* as rising interval on *Hypate Meson* in the *Dorian Harmonia.*

Moreover, in confirmation of these statements, we actually possess an ancient Greek *aulos,* still playable, which Kathleen Schlesinger has proved to be tuned in the *Doric Spondaic* mode.

Hence it becomes a basically important problem to rediscover that *Tropos Spondeiakos* which must have played so important a role in Jewish Psalmody. The writer succeeded in tracing this most characteristic mode in the Gregorian song, as well as in the traditional synagogal songs of the Yemenite, Moroccan, and Persian Jews, and even in certain important liturgical tunes of the Ashkenazic Jews. Similar traces are also found in the Psalmody of the Syrian and Byzantine Churches.

(1) The framework of the *Tropos Spondeiakos*:
e . . . g a b (c) d e or e (f) g a b . . . d e
(2a) Gloria of the fourteenth mass. (*Liber usualis* p. 53)
(2b) Gloria of the mass *In Festis Simplicibus* (*Lib. us.* p. 55)
(3a) *Sof Pasuq* of the Yemenite Tora cantillation. (Idelsohn, *Thesaurus of Hebrew-Oriental Melodies* I, 44)
(3b) Tora cantillation of the Yemenite Jews. (*Idelsohn,* II, 46)

44. Plutarch, *op. cit.,* ch. 11.

45. Cf. Arist. Quintilianus, *De Musica,* ed. Meibom, (London, 1652) p. 28; also ed. Schaefke (Berlin 1937), p. 204.

46. Cf. K. Schlesinger, *The Greek Aulos,* (London, 1939), pp. 205-12.

(4a and 4b) Motifs of the cantillation of the Moroccan and Central-European (Ashkenasic) Jews. (Idelsohn, II, 52)
(5) Haftarah cantillation of the Lithuanian Jews (Idelsohn, II, 52)
(6) Tefilla psalmody of the Moroccan Jews. (Idelsohn, II, 73)
(7) *Nishmat* of the High Holydays of the Babylonian Jews. (Idelsohn, II, No. 58)
(8) Tefilla psalmody of the Yemenite Jews. (Idelsohn, I, No. 86)
(9) Psalmody of the Jacobite Church. *"Teshbuhta"* (Dom Parisot, *Rapport sur une Mission, etc.*, p. 238, No. 344)
(10) Syrian psalmody; *" 'Unita' "* (Parisot, No. 335)
(11) Medieval Byzantine Hymn of the 11th-12th century. *Stitchera Anastasima.* (Tillyard, *Byzantine Music,* pp. 55 f.)

The *Amen* in 2a which represents a so-called *pneuma* (melismatic group) deserves special attention, for it contains *in nuce* the essence of most of the following examples. From the striking resemblance of these items to one another we see how widespread the use of this mode must have been. Since the Yemenite Jews never contacted the Roman Church, nor the Lithuanian or South German Jews the Jacobite or the Byzantine Church, our mode must have been used almost as common property.[47] Compare here the striking similarity of the examples 2a, 6, and 7. All these facts seem to warrant our conclusion that the *Spondeiakos* originated in the early Hellenistic world of the Near East, under whose spell were both Judaism and the Churches.[48]

The texts of our examples convey throughout a laudatory and majestic attitude. This fact corresponds again to the *ethos* of the *Tropos Spondeiakos,* which, proceeding in stately, spondaic rhythms, is described by all Greek authorities as dignified, quiet, and highly solemn.

47. Cf. E. Werner, "Notes on Catholic and Jewish Musical Punctuation," in *Hebrew Union College Annual,* XV (1940), 354-59.

48. This wide propagation of the *Tropos Spondeiakos* may account for the often repeated view that the music of the ancient Synagogue and of the early Church was pentatonic to a considerable degree. It is true that the *Tropos Spondeiakos* bears a certain superficial similarity to pentatonic scales; it is also true that parts of both the Gregorian and the European-Jewish chant contain pentatonic elements. But all these elements are of much later origin. Neither the ancient Greek hymns, nor the famous hymnus of Oxyrynchos of the third century A.D., nor the oldest strata of Gregorian, Ambrosian, Oriental-Jewish, and Arabian chant show pentatonic tunes, unless the mode of the *Tropos Spondeiakos* is being mistaken for pentatonics, as was done by some scholars, particularly Mr. Yasser, in his *Medieval Quartal Harmony.*

Thus, Dionysius of Halicarnassus praises its noble simplicity.[49] Iamblichus tells an interesting story of a furious flutist (*auletes*), referring to the effective *ethos* of our mode, in which Pythagoras is said to have soothed a mad flute player by making him change his tune from the orgiastic *Phrygian* to the calming *Dorian Spondeian* mode.[50]

Clement, whose statement caused us to consider the *Tropos Spondeiakos,* desired that all chromatic and non-diatonic scales be banished from sacred music on account of their voluptuous character. This would leave only the *Dorian* and *Phrygian* scales. As the cithara, the instrument most frequently used for the accompaniment of Psalms and one to which not even Clement had any objection,[51] was tuned in the *Dorian* scale, all indications point to that ideal conception of the noble and simple Doric style which Plato designates as *Semnotes* and praises as the most appropriate for the education of the manly individual.[52] Let us not forget: the Platonic concept of music is not primarily one of aesthetics but of ethics and state philosophy. With Clement, who otherwise follows mostly the rigid Platonic ideology, the Church supersedes the state. It is well worth while to contemplate for a moment the chief functions of music within the cultures of antiquity: by the Greeks of the Aristotelian school music was considered a servant of the state, by the Jews an instrument of either holy ecstasy or unholy temptation, by the Church Fathers a handmaid of the Church. We have here a good illustration of how Judaism, Hellenism, and the early Church fought their battles for the soul of man in the fields of religion, art, and music. In later centuries music gained supreme importance as the most significant accessory of the liturgy. It was the great merit of the Church Fathers to have purified zealously the secular music of their times, until it became worthy to form an integral part of the Divine Service.

49. Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *De compositione verb.*, ch. 17; cf. also H. Abert, *Die Lehre vom Ethos in der griechischen Musik,* (Leipzig, 1899), pp. 133 ff.

50. Cf. K. Schlesinger, *op. cit.*, p. 117.

51. The question of whether or not an instrumental accompaniment of the Psalmody be permissible, became the playground of all ascetic polemics and concepts in early, particularly Eastern, Christianity. The general view, held by the Eastern Fathers, was, that God had permitted the Jews to use instruments as accompaniment to their psalms as a kind of harmless, if sometimes childish play. Adult Christianity would and should renounce, therefore, these undignified toys and should concentrate on purely vocal hymns and psalms. Clement's view in *Paédag,* IV, II.

52. Plutarch, *op. cit.*, ch. 17, adds to Plato's words the following commentary of his own: Ἐπεί, ὥς προείπομεν, πολὺ τὸ σέμνον ἐστι ἐν τῇ Δωριστί, ταύτην προυτίμησεν (ὁ Πλάτων).

TROPOS SPONDEIAKOS.


(1.)
or
(2a.)
(2b.) Cum sanc-to spi-ri-tu, in glo-ri-a Dei - Pa-tris. A - - - - - - men.
Glo-ri-a in ex-cel-sis De-o. Et in ter-ra pax ho-mi-ni-bus bo-nae vo-lun-ta-tis
etc.
(3a.) Lau-da-mus te Be-ne-di-ci-mus te, A-do-ra-mus te, Glo-ri-fi-ca-mus te.
(6)
3
(4a.) Sof pa-suq.
(6.)
Ka - - doš - - - .
(5.) Ye-ba-re-ḥe-ḥa. Sof pa-suq. 'At-naḥ. Te - bir, Tar-ḥa; Kad-ma v'aslā; Sof pa-suq.
(6.) 'At-naḥ; Paš-ta; Se-gol - - ; Te - bir; Tar-ḥa; Kad-mā' re-'aslā; Dar-gā' ; Sof pa-suq

HUMAN NATURE AS CONCEIVED BY THE NAVAJO INDIANS

By Gladys A. Reichard

Associate Professor of Anthropology, Barnard College

A great deal has been said about imitative and sympathetic magic, but there is very little to explain how primitive people believe it affects the human body. It may be that magic is an explanation of itself, or that various people who practice it feel no need to put into words their belief in its efficacy. The Navajo Indians, however, are not satisfied with the mere practice of magic,[1] and have set up a system of dogma into which it fits completely. Ritual is to these Indians an absorbing activity, a cure-all for affliction, and an indispensable opportunity for social intercourse. Although for them ritual is primarily magical, in that it represents compulsion through orderly procedure, the theory behind it is animistic, for they believe that every element in the universe has specific supernatural power which is related to that of every other element, and that all are co-ordinated for the good of man.

The balance of all things may break down because of man's own behavior in breaking taboos, because of ghosts and witchcraft, or because of foreign influences, all matters which are considered as being "out of order." Evil is most often manifested by the illness of an individual, although terrestrial disaster, such as drouth or crop failure, may be considered due to similar causes affecting the cosmos. Since most rituals are performed "over" persons to drive away the evil which affects their bodies, it is instructive to consider the channels the Navajo have conceived as means by which such harmful elements can get in their work.

Since the great majority of rituals are performed for curing, an important phase of the religion is its interpretation of disease. It is a mistake to consider either disease or curing from a medical point of view, for there is almost no aspect of Navajo treatment which has a scientific

1. I use the words "magic" and "magical" to indicate controlled technique for inducing and attracting supernatural power, in short, for "white magic." Instead of evil or black magic, I use the words "sorcery" or "witchcraft." The Navajo techniques for both types are quite similar, but are differentiated and directed by the purpose for which each is performed.

basis. Occasionally some phase of medical knowledge seems to be astonishing in its accuracy, but upon investigation, it proves to be scientific only by accident, for its ultimate basis is homeopathic. For this reason disease is to be understood as affliction, misfortune, or contamination, as the discussion which follows will demonstrate.

The following description of man's body and the effects of external factors upon it is based upon the writer's linguistic analysis of the words used in the extensive mythology which interprets Navajo dogma, taken in connection with direct observation of, and participation in, the rituals on the part of the writer.

Man is a being consisting of bone, flesh, mind, spirit, sound, and senses, which moves, thinks, and wills. All of these parts concern his "anatomy." The body has as its foundation a bony framework or skeleton. The internal body is divided into two large cavities, the thorax and the abdomen, each containing soft parts. Soft parts, bones, and flesh are held together by ligaments and sinews (expressed by a single word in Navajo). All of these parts make up the "internal body." The "external body" is made up of skin which has pores and hair. Between the internal and external body are spaces which, from the Navajo point of view, are particularly susceptible to injury, for ghosts which enter the body travel through them, and when a body harbors a ghost or ghosts it cannot be healthy.

All parts of the body are restored and purified by blood-vessels which are classified as those belonging to the trunk, and including the jugular, and those belonging to the head and limbs. Most other parts of the body have specific names which may be quite satisfactorily translated by the usual English words.

Man identifies himself with the supernatural by means of prayer, which furnishes an excellent clue to what the Navajo considers essential in himself. Such details are as often intangible as tangible. For instance, a prayer invokes blessing for "my breast, my back, the soles of my feet, my head and the *tip of my tongue.*" The last symbolizes "my speech," and means "may I have the power to speak all necessary words of formula, prayer and song in proper order." By implication it means also "may my speech be so controlled that I will not say anything not needed or use words which may attract evil or danger."

Most Navajo prayers begin with requests for restoration, proceed to

list the various steps by which restoration is brought about, and end with a summary of the ideal, which is expressed as an accomplishment. Lines extracted from the prayer of the First Dancers of the Night Chant[2] demonstrate some of the body's needs:

39. My feet restore for me
40. My limbs restore for me
41. My body restore for me
42. My mind restore for me
43. My voice restore for me

50. Fortunately the interior of my body has become cool
51. Happily my eyes are restored
52. Happily my head has become cool
53. Happily my legs are restored
54. Happily I hear again
55. Successfully the spell is taken from me
56. Happily I move again

In addition to actual body parts, "mind, voice, hearing and motion" are mentioned. These are merely illustrative of many other attributes which are believed necessary to make the body complete.

The difference between life and death is the breath and, in a sense, breath is life itself. Navajo dogma is not by any means satisfied with this. There is one word for breath which means quite literally "blowing." Another word designates a single breath, or puff. Strangely enough, it is difficult to divide "breath" and "sound," for other words designate some phase of both. Breath as the manifestation of life contains the notion of breathing with sound, "moaned breath." It may be used to indicate that a person at the point of death is still breathing.

A general word means to emit sound of any kind. A specific word is the characteristic sound of a living being, "meow" of a cat, for instance, or "ba-a-a" of a sheep. I shall call this the "breath sound."

A word often used in ritual means the life and power of a being as well as his breath. This word in a sense has nothing to do with man's original physical or spiritual nature, but includes the "power" which he has secured by ritualistic means. In another sense it seems to distinguish that part of existence which is desirable and profitable from

2. W. Matthews, "Navaho Legends." *Memoir American Folk-Lore Society*, v (1897), pp. 270, 274.

its opposite. I shall call this "breath power." A culminating and symbolically summarizing rite, in a sense a benediction, involves the inhaling of this breath power with a sucking sound of the lips to signify acceptance of all the ritual has done for the patient, and his identification with the supernatural powers involved. Because of the identification, the word which designates "breath power" may also mean "namesake," for "name" may be an essential part of a person, not natural to him, but conferred upon him.

This word has an opposite which designates the evil, injurious, even poisonous element in breath accompanied by sound. The following illustration of the difference between the "breath sound" and the "breath-poison" was volunteered by the Navajo informant. If an auto were alive—a situation quite acceptable to Navajo thought—"breath sound" would be its natural sound, the sound of the horn accompanied by (or caused by) the expulsion of wind; "breath poison" would include the noxious puff of gas from the exhaust and the abnormal sound of a backfire. The "breath poison" of an animal may kill a person. "Once a girl was chased by a cow. She escaped and took refuge between two rocks. The cow never touched her, but she died anyhow because it had been near enough for her to feel its breath."

Originally the first man and woman were transformed, rather than created, from ears of white and yellow corn. Throughout the Navajo mythology persons dead or in a faint are restored by imitating the ritual originally used for that transformation. A necessary element of the rite is the introduction of wind. Wind is the deity which furnishes the breath of life. It originally entered the body at the various orifices, particularly the ears, and came out at the tips of the fingers and toes where "today we can see its trail in the lines of the fingerprints." Since sound is a part of essential breath it is not difficult to understand why hearing should be kept intact, or why the prayer should request the restoration of the voice.

Quietness and immobility are symptoms of misfortune or death, hence the normal human body must manifest sound and motion. Just as important to man as his legs is his means of motion, or gait, for without this his limbs would not do him any good. It is interesting in this connection to note that the colors of one sandpainting of buffalo deities represent motion: black, the motion of mountains; white, the motion of rocks; blue, the motion of clouds; yellow, the motion of water.

The parts and powers of man's body, anatomical, mechanical, and spiritual, are held together and kept functioning by his mind, which furnishes him with ability to think with awareness and volition. The mind co-ordinates all the senses and makes possible awareness and judgment. Man moves, but he moves at will.

Man is a composite of stuff (bones, flesh, skin, hair, and other body parts); of channels through which run blood and other types of moisture and air, as well as ghosts and evils; of sound, which must be registered by the ears and which is essential to awareness and life; of breath, which not only represents a physiological function but also includes acquired as well as essential goodness and evil; of motion which keeps all parts, spiritual as well as tangible, going; and of mind which co-ordinates all of these and experience as well.

An essential reason for considering man's make-up is, of course, his well-being. As a single entity he could have no existence, but secures it through his relationship to all other forms of nature, from his own individuality to the numerous elements represented as helpers and powerful deities, and to the total essence of all these which is "universal destiny." To establish this relationship it is necessary to extend man's idea of himself beyond the limits of his own body and mind and to include ideas which depend upon magical control and behavior, the ultimate purpose of which is to identify man with the ultimate good. This means that well-being is a function of man's constitution, and the degree to which the extension of the non-tangible is carried varies considerably according to the person and circumstances. There are, however, certain extensions, necessary to all, which are so general as to be formulated in simple words.

One of these is the name which is linguistically closely related to the words for "breath power" and "breath poison." The name here referred to is ceremonially given and constitutes a formula which will help a person to get out of trouble, in other words, it is a form of magical control, and one which must be considered in calculating man's power. There are also two psychological terms, one which defines a person's ability or behavior, and the sum total of his manifestations as a person, but does not include his physical characteristics. The other word summarizes his physical and spiritual traits and his ability and behavior. These two words are best translated by "personality." Perhaps the first represents "temperament," which I find difficult to define satisfactorily in English.

The grand total of all of the details already described is life, which means being alive; or life, a different word, used in the more general sense to include existence, behavior, experience, career, and outlook on life.

Reference has already been made to "universal destiny" or "ultimate good." These are translations for a concept of something impersonal which is the ultimate goal of the universe and all that it contains, a goal which man seeks along with other cosmic and terrestrial phenomena. It supersedes all the deities, no matter how powerful they may be. When man dies and his body disintegrates, it "becomes one with" the earth and this universal destiny. For this reason he has no individual immortality, but his entire being, physical, mental, and spiritual, is absorbed into the cosmological whole. Because of this highly generalized conception of man and his identification with nature, it has been impossible to discover a Navajo equivalent of the Christian "soul" or of "immortality," and our necessary use of our own words has obscured the highly speculative Navajo conception of mortal and immortal relationships. Ultimate destiny is the harmony or balanced relationship which exists among all things, of whatever kind they may be, and of experience from and to all eternity.

Although Navajo dogma rises to the heights of speculation in conceptualizing a condition described as "universal destiny," it nevertheless realizes that neither man nor cosmos has yet reached the ideal of perfection, and recognizes shortcomings, what might be called a residue of evil. This is ascribed to faulty knowledge. Man has not yet learned to control everything, consequently evil may unbalance a harmony which at best is only delicately preserved, and even a part of man's spirit, that portion which has not assimilated to the greatest ideal, may bring harm to others still living. This is most powerfully indicated by fear of the dead, and the common interpretation of the word that indicates it is "ghost," although this translation is by no means adequate. It is this part of man and of his enemies, even of the cosmos, which may at any time cause illness or misfortune. It is perhaps best expressed as "evil," although evil has other manifestations as well.

Just as there is left a harmful residue after all good has been conceived and expressed, and as lack of knowledge causes failure in certain forms of magical control, so there are effects of the body which, potentially at least, give rise to evil, effects which make man vulnerable to the

evil powers surrounding him. There is a word for dirt and filth (*'atcin*) which is general in that it defines natural but displaced dirt. It would be used to describe a child's dirty face or soiled clothes. A modification of this word by augmentation (*'atcxin*) means body offal or filth which may be harmed by sorcery, and includes perspiration, dead skin, phlegm, tears, hair, nail-parings, in fact, all excretions and sometime parts of the body. A wizard, able to get hold of any such parts of a person may, by working harm to them, do the same harm to the owner. Consequently such body effects are carefully guarded and disposed of so that no one desiring to do evil can get them into his power.

When such ideas are held there must always be the question as to how far they are extended. If a person can be harmed by manipulation of his perspiration and dead skin, then, too, evil can be brought upon him by obtaining a portion of his clothes to which these wornout parts of his body adhere. Obviously underclothes are most susceptible, but many a Navajo cannot afford underclothes. Consequently his outside clothing may become a source of danger. This reasoning explains one of the most frequent antipathies of Navajo who work for white people, for such service usually includes laundry work. The worst effects of a dangerous, because alien, person are in his clothes. In washing the clothes the Navajo comes in contact with the unfriendly power which to him signifies contamination, and not only does he touch it but he "breathes it in" through the steam. No wonder many a Navajo, however sophisticated, has to return home at intervals to have evil removed by ritual.

Personal possessions are designated by a word which means "equipment," or "junk," in a slangy but not necessarily derogatory sense, although the stem used means "bad" or "spoiled." By the use of the same augmentative device used to distinguish "filth" from "offal subject to harm," a differentiation is made between ordinary possessions and those which may be harmed by witchcraft. The last may include, not only what a man wears, but even his saddle and his horse, his medicine bundle, or anything which he values greatly and uses frequently.

The performance of ritual, and the dogma which sustains and explains it, show further the ideas of the extension of man's personality into space. In a sense space does not exist, for what occurs in the Land Beyond the Sky may affect a person on the earth just as surely as do the actions of his brother or son. Similarly, success in hunting depends as

much upon the behavior of the wife at home as it does upon that of the man who stalks the game. However, in another much more practical sense proximity is important, for although theoretically ritual is effective over indefinite space, its control begins with the individual. Ritual concerns him most intimately by driving from him through purification (emesis, sweating, brushing, bathing) the evils which may have attacked him. After they have been expelled from his body, they are driven out of the lodge or shade where the ritual is held, further and ever more indefinitely from the space around the house, and eventually "so far that they will not want to come back." After evil has been repulsed, good is encouraged. This is done by inducing deities and supernatural helpers of all kinds to be present, and by causing the patient's body to absorb the power of various symbols of deific power. Bringing supernatural power near to him is instrumental in absorption and identification, the most fundamental feature of the dogma which seeks to make a man one with all the supernaturals concerned in the ritual prescribed for his restoration.

Anything which disturbs the physiological, social, or supernatural balance causes disease. Misfortune may be dispelled by chasing ghosts out of the body, by cleansing the alimentary tract, by ceremonial bathing of the external body. The farther and more widely they are dispersed the more impotent they become. The notion of the body may be extended quite indefinitely too, depending upon the imagination of the individual. If he protects his clothing and equipment from the powers of sorcery, he will have less trouble than if he is careless, and he will be the more successful the farther he keeps evil from him.

Thus Navajo dogma connects all things, natural and experienced, from man's skeleton to universal destiny, which encompasses even inconceivable space, in a closely interlocked unity which omits nothing, no matter how small or how stupendous, and in which each individual has a significant function until, at his final dissolution, he not only becomes one with the ultimate harmony, but he *is* that harmony.

CONVERSION AND LIBERATION

By Ernst Moritz Manasse

Professor of Latin and Philosophy, North Carolina College for Negroes

Most interpretations of St. Augustine's views concerning liberty and free will have centered round the theoretical discussions in his various writings. It has not, however, escaped the interpreters that these theories to a large extent depend on Augustine's reflections upon his personal experiences. It was observed that these views refer to a Before and After which clearly reflects the Before and After of Augustine's conversion to Christianity. The interpreters, therefore, compared Augustine's biographical narratives with these views. Where differences were seen, one tried to explain them by reference to Augustine's spiritual development, which supposedly could be learned from the chronological order of his writings.

Among the autobiographical records, the *Confessions,* of course, attracted most interest. The whole work seems to be centered about the fact of the conversion. But though there are plenty of studies which touch this problem, never—to the knowledge of the author—has it been asked: what exactly are the explicit or implicit assumptions concerning choice and free will *in this work*?

In the following, the attempt will be made to answer this question. From the *Confessions* a picture will be drawn of what Augustine went through in the crisis known as his conversion, with emphasis upon the role and nature of the will. Such interpretation will be limited to a philosophical outlook and will not discuss theological questions. Where Augustine, in the causal *regressus,* arrives at the statement of an acting divine quality, the analysis will deal only with the effect of which the divine is said to be the cause.

Since the conclusions of this analysis show a definite parallelism to the thoughts of Søren Kierkegaard, a comparison of both authors will be made, which should be useful because it will furnish new categories with which to make Augustine's position clearer. It will also help to clarify the meaning of a purely philosophical interpretation of a primarily religious phenomenon.

In the first two parts of this paper, the *Confessions* will be used as a documentary source for the knowledge of a historical reality. There

will be mentioned, however, other reflections upon the same reality which differ in important features. The thesis of this paper is thereby confronted with the famous controversy about the historicity of the *Confessions*. In a third part, a limited discussion of this problem will explain and justify the stand taken in this paper.

I

Augustine in Milan: After the shaking of his soul by a series of heavy blows, one day Augustine retired to the garden of his lodgings. Alypius, closest of his friends, followed him. The struggle continued in Augustine's soul, driving him to steal away from Alypius to a more solitary place. In deep agitation he prayed, he cried, he lay down on the ground. Suddenly he heard the voice of a child chanting the words "Take up and read!" Taking these words for a divine sign, Augustine went back to Alypius and opened the book which he had left there. His eyes wandered to a verse of Paul's Epistle to the Romans, in which the Apostle warns the Christians to "put on the Lord Jesus Christ," forsaking all lusts of the flesh. The reading had a tremendous effect. Augustine did not continue beyond the one verse. "No further would I read; nor needed I."[1]

In this moment Augustine's final decision to become a Christian was made. The decision had been preceded by a prolonged and profound struggle. Seeing no end to this, he had become more and more despondent. It is true that many experiences had accumulated to precipitate the decision, but apparently they had had no effect upon the forces that fettered him inwardly—till the moment came which changed everything.

In the *Confessions* Augustine expresses the consciousness that this event is more extraordinary than anything which he had ever experienced or heard of. He acknowledges that something has happened in his soul which has greatly surpassed his own forces. It was an event which could have been effected only by God's own gracious power. It was, he would have us say, a miracle.

What kind of an experience was this? What led Augustine to the be-

1. *Confessions,* VIII, 19 ff., 29. Here and in the following I have used the English translation of the *Confessions* by E. B. Pusey (Rivington, 1838, reprinted in the Everyman's Library in several editions since 1909). In a few cases I have slightly changed parts of Pusey's wording.

lief that in this moment God had acted? The purpose of the following analysis is to find an answer to this question.

But is not the thesis itself exposed to criticism? It has been the tenor of many earlier interpretations that conversion is the content of the *whole* of the *Confessions* up to the end of the eighth book. Is not, accordingly, the crisis in the garden at Milan only the result of Augustine's hesitation before the final step, for reasons which, in view of the entire problem, seem rather accidental? Was Augustine not substantially a Christian already, when he entered the garden, when he prayed for his redemption? The example of Antonius and others had raised in him the conviction that he, too, would have to start a life of chastity when his hour of decision came. Though he was longing for this hour, it was the demand of chastity which once more led him into the depths of a desperate struggle. But was there any alternative choice left to him?

The answer to such questions must be:

(1) Notwithstanding so many acts of preparation, nothwithstanding the fact that, at last, no other decision seemed conceivable even to Augustine himself, the change which actually took place in him meant a complete break with his past and an absolutely new beginning.

(2) Whatever the causes of Augustine's demand upon himself may have been, so much is certain, that he considered his resolution to live in chastity as his conversion by God toward God. What delayed his decision was his unwillingness to receive the yoke of Christ. A modern reader is, perhaps, inclined to consider conversion merely as the outcome of intellectual experiences, doubt, and illumination. In Augustine's case nothing would be more misleading. His conversion, and especially its last, decisive phase, suggest quite a different perspective.

At about the same time of his completion of the *Confessions*, Augustine wrote the little book, *De catechizandis rudibus*, in which he discusses the following problem. It is a frequent experience of teachers to feel insufficient just when they try to explain things which they believe they see with absolute clarity. How is that possible? Augustine suggests this answer: A teacher often has to give long explanations for a very simple fact, but he cannot point to it directly; he has to wait until the pupil is prepared to grasp it, for then it comes like a flash (*rapida coruscatione*).[2]

2. *De catechizandis rudibus*, 3.

There seems to be something similar in Augustine's description of his conversion to the psychological phenomenon just described. In both cases a sudden event occurs in the soul. Moreover, the image of the sudden flash corresponds to another image in the autobiographical narration. A light, he says, immediately spread through his heart and dispersed all doubts. Is not the conversion, one may ask, simply another example of the sudden grasp of an intellectual truth?

If this were so, the singularity of the conversion experience could no longer be maintained. There were, for instance, the impressions that Cicero's *Hortensius* had made on Augustine in his youth. At that time a new range had suddenly (*repente*) opened before his mind; so great was the effect that all his vows and desires changed, and, more sincerely than before, his prayers turned toward God. In fact, this event has been called Augustine's first conversion.[3] Without entering into a discussion of the term, I shall try to show the difference between this and the later event.

In the former case the mind suddenly becomes aware of a truth which had always existed, though hitherto it had not been observed. Knowledge which is gained in such a moment may, like any other knowledge, bear upon the decision of the will—supposing that this will is actually free. The miracle in this case is the fact that the knowledge arises instantaneously.

In the conversion at Milan, however, the miracle consists in the fact itself, not in the knowledge thereof. Something happens by which more than the knowledge of a subject becomes changed. A transcendent power is not recognized in its essence, but is felt in its actions. In the midst of natural forces it suddenly begins to act. The "miracle" here means not only that an event which might be otherwise expected takes place in a moment, but that there is actually a new beginning. The content of the moment, rather than its form, appears as the miracle. In comparison with such an event, an intellectual act, even if it is of the highest penetration, loses something of its importance.

There is here a conception of a different kind of knowledge—a knowledge quite peculiar to the Christian doctrine. Since its early beginnings the Church had offered to its confessors the Christian truth in the form

3. Cf. M. Rebers, "Augustins erste Bekehrung," in *Harnack-Ehrung* (Berlin, 1921), pp. 195 ff.

of faith. Faith can be accepted or repudiated; more than the merely cognitive faculties seem to be involved. It is true that the conception of faith had changed from the apostolic age to Augustine's time. No longer was it considered the highest form of knowledge. Now, faith was only the initial step toward the true wisdom of God. But still it was the point at which Christianity and paganism separated. No conversion was possible without faith. Could there be faith without conversion? It was so in Augustine's case. Two points may be emphasized in this connection.

(1) For Augustine faith was *not* the result of a sudden decision. Faith had been growing in him for a long time. Never he had been able to give wholehearted support to a teaching which despised the name of Jesus. He admits that his early ideas about Jesus had not been clear and needed to be purified. Nevertheless, they were the first expression of a growing faith, even if he did not know it. When later a profound study of Paul had cleared all wrong conceptions from his mind, it was an alteration, not a conversion.

(2) This is emphasized by the fact that, according to the *Confessions*, the actual conversion does not coincide with this rectification of his faith. Even the right faith did not end Augustine's despair. There was something else that interfered. "Nor did I desire to be more certain of Thee, but more steadfast in Thee."[4]

Faith was an attitude that included moral as well as cognitive elements. Looking at Augustine's report it must be admitted, however, that he is primarily concerned with its cognitive role. But where does he let the moral forces enter? "And this was all: to nill what I willed, and to will what Thou willedst."[5] The will decided. When the truth

4. *Conf.* VIII, 1. It should be noted that only the role of faith in Augustine's development until his conversion was here to be discussed. Later Augustine also became aware of the full miracle of faith. Cf. *Conf.* I, 1, and *Soliloquia*, I, 5. f.

5. "Et hoc erat totum: nolle quod volebam, et velle quod volebas," *Conf.* IX, 1. By putting a colon after *totum* (instead of a comma), I slightly change the punctuation of Labriolle's text (2nd. ed., Paris, 1937). Strangely enough, Labriolle's own translation, "Et cela revenait à ne plus rien vouloir de ce que je voulais. . . ." suggests a different punctuation, like that of Skutella in the latest Teubner-edition (Leipzig, 1934): "et hoc erat totum nolle, quot volebam, et velle, quod volebas." Whereas here, *totum* is understood as the direct object of *nolle*, I prefer the former interpretation, which takes both infinitives as explications of the nominative *totum*, principally on account of the stronger parallelism thus effected, which seems to me more congruent with the style of the *Confessions*.

had already become manifest to Augustine, he was still prevented by his will from starting a new life, for the will had been perverted. The will had awakened passion, the passion had become habit, and the habit had become a fetter. So the will opposed the truth which demanded complete devotion and abandonment of pleasure, vanity, and vocation. It is true that, since Augustine's belief had become pure, a new will had been born in him, a will to emulate the humility which his faith had embraced. But this new will had not replaced the old will. Rather it had marched beside it. There followed a struggle between the two, but the new will never succeeded in obliterating the old one. The old will always found a refuge—until that moment when suddenly the extreme tension ceased, and the new will won, breaking the power of the old one for all time.

So conversion means an act of the will? He who draws this conclusion must be careful to avoid a misunderstanding. "For Thou convertedst me unto Thyself,"[6] Augustine says to God, indicating that he considers his conversion rather as a passive event by which he was overcome than as an act of his own will. Such an explanation, of course, is based upon a certain assumption concerning the problem of free will. Consequently, an investigation of Augustine's stand in face of this problem must precede further discussion of the conversion.

In the *Confessions* there is no doubt that the victory of the new will is to be considered as final. Augustine, therefore, distinguishes between the two periods by the different attitudes of the will. During the first one, the old will is dominant, first being alone and later keeping the new will down. By one moment this period is separated from the second one, which is characterized by the breakdown of this old will and the triumph of the new one.

Such a contrast corresponds to an old pattern in Augustine's thought. In the first book of *De libero arbitrio* he simply speaks about the good will and the bad will. He professes to know from his conscience that a good will exists. He is certain that he himself, as well as Evodius, the partner in the discussion, is led by such a good will. The same proud consciousness, though sometimes troubled by doubts, is revealed in many of Augustine's early writings. There must have been a feeling in him, during the first time after his conversion, that he was on the

6. *Conf.* VIII, 30. Cf. *De gratia et libero arbitrio,* 10.

right path, that he had found the true philosophy, that a true love for the good was now glowing in his soul.

When in *De libero arbitrio* Augustine calls this desire "will," will means something steady, not subject to further fluctuations. In Aristotelian terms, this Augustinian will would include habit as well as choice. For Aristotle himself the single act lies between choice and habit; and the habit, once it has grown strong, may well resist the will. Augustine, on the contrary, assumes that, at any moment, one decision is adequate to qualify a person as good.

How is it possible to attain a good will? Just by willing it. "For what is so much subject to the will as the will itself?"[7] This certainly is a circle, but only in the circle the picture becomes complete. Even if the will is habit, it is at the same time spontaneity. The habit itself is attained by a spontaneous decision. For Augustine, the connection between the two is so close that he thinks the good will is to be obtained very easily, and he wonders why so few people have obtained it.[8]

Now let us turn back to the *Confessions*. The fact that there are two rival wills, for Augustine, means nothing less than a "monstrosity." While there is a definite gap between the orders of the will and their execution by the body, such a gap does not exist in the moral sphere. Will itself, there, already implies the executive power and action. But nevertheless, recollecting his previous state of mind, Augustine has to say: "more easily did my body obey the weakest willing of my soul, in moving its limbs at its nod, than the soul obeyed itself to accomplish in the will alone this its momentous will."[9]

The thesis of *De libero arbitrio* that will only depends on will itself is here, obviously, abandoned. That does not mean that another cause of the act of will is already apparent. That which hinders the will is

7. *De libero arbitrio,* I, 26. Cf. III, 7.

8. In the third book of this work, the free will to do the good is restricted to the original state of man before Adam's fall. Cf. especially III, 52. In the *Retractationes,* Augustine emphasizes this restriction and other sentences of the second and third books in order to show that the opponents of his doctrine of grace cannot use his former writings for their argument. (*Retr.* I, 9, 4 ff.). Since, however, the analysis in the first book is based on Augustine's and Evodius' (his interlocutor's) own experiences, it is hardly compatible with such restriction and has been interpreted apart in the text. This appears the more justified since the second and third books were completed many years after the first one. (*Retr.* I, 9, 1.)

9. *Conf.* VIII, 20.

also a will. But can a will be called free when it is effectively resisted in its willing? Liberty, if it still exists at all, here demands quite another interpretation than in the earlier work.

Free choice, in the sense that the soul is in an equilibrium between good and evil, and that the will can equally choose between both sides, does not explain the situation. In several writings, mostly attempts at Exegesis of the Pauline Epistles, written between *De libero arbitrio I* and the *Confessions,* Augustine tried to save the role of the *liberum arbitrium* in a restricted form.[10] But then it appeared as a rather powerless desire, unable to exercise any influence upon man's decisions. Prevalent in the soul is another power, characterized by Augustine as concupiscence. By it man is fettered, and free choice becomes powerless.

The image of the two wills is but another explication of the same phenomenon. That the old will is concupiscence, the sinful habit, Augustine repeatedly states. And what about the new will? Does this not mean the actual growth of freedom? Indeed, the name and even the description of the successive steps may suggest such an interpretation. Still this new will is characterized as a mere powerless desire, and therefore appears to be essentially unfree. If it were different, a gradual defeat of the old will would be a natural solution, i.e., the conversion would become a natural event. All supernatural aid would be unnecessary and superfluous, and no reason can be found why Augustine came to such conclusions.

But is not the reference to the supernatural aid a last and final denial of freedom? Is freedom not finally excluded if conversion is understood as effected by God? Augustine's answer to this question was suggested by Paul, his guide in all these investigations. Over and over again Augustine had returned to the seventh chapter of the Epistle to the Romans, the chapter in which the Apostle describes human insufficiency before the moral law. But Paul had taught that man, who was unable to accomplish his justification before the law, could be justified by the divine grace. The *homo sub lege* can be converted into the *homo sub gratia.* The decisive conception is found at the end of the chapter, where Paul asks: "O wretched man that I am! Who shall deliver me from the body of this death?" And where he answers: "The grace of God through Jesus Christ, our Lord." In these words Augustine found

10. Cf. H. Jonas, *Augustin und das Paulinische Freiheitsproblem* (Göttingen, 1930).

the clue to his solution. Much more significant than the concept of freedom is that of liberation. Augustine twice quoted Paul's words in the *Confessions*.[11] Now let us hear how he interprets his own conversion.

"But where through all those years, and out of what low and deep recess was my free-will (*liberum arbitrium*) called forth in a moment, whereby to submit my neck to Thy easy yoke, and my shoulders unto Thy light burthen, O Christ Jesus, my Helper and my Redeemer? How sweet did it at once become to me, to want the sweetness of those toys? And what I feared to be parted from, was now a joy to part with."[12]

Thus there had been a time when Augustine had not been able to dispose of his *liberum arbitrium*.[13] Free will, therefore, is no natural[14] gift, at least not in this sinful world. Where free will exists, man's natural condition has already been changed again. Consequently, before the *faculty* of freedom the *event* of liberation has to be analyzed. Augustine met with his freedom in a certain moment; that is the amazing fact which leaves every speculation far behind. Augustine had experienced a change in his will which he could not trace back to the will itself. Neither could he ascribe it to any of the partial wills. For while, to the *old* will, the change means complete conversion, i.e., surrender (to "nill" what it willed); to the *new* will it means liberation from the impotence which had been its lot. The former was too much contrary in direction, the latter too weak, to be considered as a possible cause of the happening.

Freedom, thus, finally proves to be the result instead of the cause of the conversion. In *De libero arbitrio I*, Augustine had been correct in assuming that will is free and that it is easy to will. But it was an illusion to assume that the easiness of willing which originated *through* the change was its condition. On the contrary, what he had "feared to be parted from, was now a joy to part with."

Is this speculation? But Augustine started from experience. Is it mysticism? But liberation lives on through freedom. Can freedom be

11. *Conf.* VII, 27, and VIII, 12.

12. *Conf.* IX, 1.

13. This is a rather significant exception from Augustine's general use of the term *liberum arbitrium*, as observed by E. Gilson, *Introduction à l'étude de saint Augustin* (Paris, 1929), p. 206, note 3. Cf. below, pp. 23 f.

14. "Natural" here refers to the condition in which men have been born since Adam's fall. Augustine himself acknowledges a twofold use of the word *natura*, cf. *De lib. arb.* III, 54. Cf. Gilson, *op. cit.*, p. 185, note 3.

analyzed by empirical psychology? But freedom is a metaphysical concept.[15] And yet, it is just the *experience* of liberation, of the fact of newly-won freedom, that is made the basis of Augustine's analysis.

It must be acknowledged that this is a kind of philosophy which cannot be described in traditional terms. The problem of freedom had found a solution in Augustine's thought through his discovery of freedom as a reality of his experience. Therefore he attributed to this experience the power of reaching facts outside the natural course of things. Or, as seen from a different point of view, he assumed that, in the reality of life, mutations of a transcendent character take place.

Windelband has called Augustine's philosophy a "metaphysics of inner experience."[16] But neither this phrase nor Windelband's analysis indicate what here appears to be essential. For Augustine not only explained the experience of his conversion in metaphysical terms, but it was, as he described it, an experience with a metaphysical content.

Freedom, though apparently only a formal conception, wholly depends upon the character of this content. Its substance, in terms of the conversion, was expressed by the new attitude of will (and "nill") as opposed to Augustine's earlier desires. In terms of liberation this substance is "love." Love is the will which is liberated so that it can follow its original trend.[17]

It is not the purpose of this paper to deal also with the material character of the liberated will. In the same way all theological conclusions which Augustine drew from his experience will be omitted. In this paper only the philosophical implications of the conversion should be investigated. Let us now turn to a comparative analysis of the thoughts of another thinker to further clarify this crucial problem.

II

In his book, *The Concept of Dread,* Kierkegaard—under the pseudonym of Vigilius Haufniensis—fights against a purely formal interpretation of freedom.

15. A purely psychological analysis of Augustine's *consciousness* of freedom would simply have to ignore its possible metaphysical truth.

16. Cf. Gilson, *op. cit.*, p. 299.

17. Cf. *Ibid.* pp. 162 ff. For the analysis of Augustine's conception of love, cf. H. Arendt, *Der Liebesbegriff bei Augustin* (Berlin, 1929); also A.T.S. Nygren, *Agape and Eros,* English Translation by A. J. Hebert, 2nd. ed. (London and New York, 1937).

To let freedom begin with a *liberum arbitrium* which can equally choose the good and the evil makes any explanation impossible from the beginning. To speak of the good and the evil as the object of freedom is to make finite both freedom and the conceptions of good and evil. For the freedom is infinite and rises out of nothing.[18]

To put it otherwise: Kierkegaard rejects a theory that would place man in a state of equilibrium which he at any time can give up by turning to the good or to the evil. Such equilibrium would be non-human. The fault of the theory is due to the misconception which contrasts freedom with necessity. Kierkegaard insists that the true contrast to freedom is guilt.

In the state of innocence, freedom is still unknown to the spirit, as the spirit is still ignorant and only dreaming of it as its future possibility. Kierkegaard interprets this dreaming presentiment of freedom as "dread."

On two points of this theory, Kierkegaard puts special emphasis. First, the character of the innocence which precedes the guilt is ignorance. This ignorance may in its final phase become ignorant dread, but by no means a *liberum arbitrium* (in the above sense). Second, there is nothing in this preceding stage that can be considered as actual *cause* of guilt. No theory can ever find a reason why the transition from innocent ignorance leads to guilt or—dogmatically spoken—to sin and not to freedom. Indeed, there is no metaphysical necessity for this. "Sin as well as freedom are presupposed by themselves and cannot be explained by the preceding stage."[19] The transition from innocence to sin, therefore, is a "qualitative leap." As such, it is to be repeated by each individual self anew.

Although there is a difference between Kierkegaard and Augustine in the dogmatic interpretation of sin,[20] Kierkegaard's thought seems to be helpful in clarifying some essential features of Augustine's self-interpretation. First, there is here the clear acknowledgment that freedom is no merely formal conception, but is also determined by a definite content. Freedom is the good, freedom is the opposite of guilt. More-

18. *Begrebet Angest*, cf. *Samlede Vaerker*, IV (Copenhagen, 1902), pp. 380 f.

19. *Ibid.*, p. 380

20. Whereas Augustine, in accordance with the Catholic tradition, assumes that all mankind participated in the single event of Adam's fall, Kierkegaard believes that the original sin is renewed by each individual.

over, the categories of an "origin from nothing" and of a "qualitative leap" seem helpful to understand the phenomenon of liberation, though this is not the topic of the *Concept of Dread.*

Dread not only exists in the self while it is in the state of innocence, but also appears again after the individual has fallen. In this case dread becomes sin itself. Kierkegaard describes the attitude of the demoniac as a special form of this type. A demoniac, according to Kierkegaard, is afraid of the good, i.e, of liberty. Kierkegaard contrasts such a demoniac with a man who lives in religious temptation. Declaring that both types can become very similar to each other, he says: "He who lives in religious temptation strives toward that from which the temptation will keep him away; whereas the demoniac himself with his stronger will (the will of unfreedom) strives away from it, and only a weak will within him strives toward it."[21]

Kierkegaard obviously thus discusses in systematic analysis what Augustine experienced before the great decision. The unfree self is divided between its diverse volitions, the struggle towards the good being checked by its opposite. True, Augustine's description is concerned with conversion, and he contemplates a gradual shift of the forces. But never does such approximation alter the importance of the "qualitative leap," as was shown above.

Does this interpretation give one the right to apply Kierkegaard's category of dread to the analysis of the *Confessions*? Augustine occasionally says that it was fear of death that kept him in the chains of sin for such a long time. But fear of death (which is also a dogmatic category) does not yet correspond to the full meaning of Kierkegaard's conception. Kierkegaard distinguishes fear from dread, and sees the characteristics of the latter in the fact that it has no distinct object. Dread, in the proper sense, is the attitude of a freedom which has not yet been realized and therefore is afraid of its own possibility. Was such a phenomenon ever recognized by Augustine? With reference to the last stubborn resistance before the conversion, he confesses: "But I, still under service to the earth, refused to fight under Thy banner, and feared as much to be freed of all incumbrances as one should fear to be encumbered with it." And similarly: "For I feared lest Thou shouldest hear me soon, and soon cure me of the disease of concupiscence, which

21. *Op. cit.*, p. 409, note.

I wished to have satisfied, rather than extinguished."[22] I think this will suffice to justify the use of the term "dread" for Augustine's condition prior to his conversion.

Finally, there is the question: How can liberty, which we lost by falling into sin, be regained? With this problem Kierkegaard deals in the *Philosophical Fragments,* published under the pseudonym of Johannes Climacus. The crucial category in this book is the "moment." Kierkegaard starts from the question: How can truth be taught? He who will answer this question is confronted with two possibilities. First, the truth is and has always been present in the learning subject. In this case, "the temporal point of departure is nothing; for as soon as I discover that I have known the truth from eternity without being aware of it, the same instant this moment of occasion is hidden in the eternal . . ."[23] The chief representative of this attitude is Socrates. His theory of *anamnesis,* as interpreted in the Platonic *Meno,* is the best illustration.

The second possibility is that the truth has to be put into the learner. In this case, "the moment in time must have a decisive significance, so that I never will be able to forget it either in time or in eternity; because the eternal which hitherto did not exist came into being in this moment."[24] It is the analysis of this second possibility which offers new analogies to Augustine's words.

First, it is obvious that no man can bring the truth to another who has not yet possessed it, not even "in the form of ignorance." Furthermore, he will also lack the condition of understanding the truth. A teacher, under such circumstances, has actually to re-create the learner. Only God himself can do this.

How can man, who was created by God, come to need to be re-created? Apparently he must have been deprived of his original gifts. But God could not deprive him thereof. It must have happened by his own guilt that he became separated from the truth. This means that he is unfree. For "to be free from the truth, and to be exiled by one's own self is to be bound."[25]

22. *Conf.* VIII, 12 and 17.

23. *Philosophical Fragments or a Fragment of Philosophy,* English Translation by D. F. Swenson (Princeton, 1936), p. 8.

24. *Ibid.*

25. *Ibid.,* p. 11.

But can he who lost his freedom not set himself free again? Not "by the terms of our hypothesis," i.e., if the *moment* is to have decisive significance. Thus, in order to regain his freedom, he depends on a teacher who, at the same time, is his "redeemer." By meeting with such a teacher the disciple "becomes another man; not in the frivolous sense of becoming another individual of the same quality as before, but in the sense of becoming a man of a different quality, or as we may call him, a new creature." With reference to the "truth," such an event means a change of direction. "In so far as he was in Error, he was constantly in the act of departing from the Truth. In consequence of receiving the condition (viz., to understand the truth) in the moment, the course of his life has been given an opposite direction, so that it is now turned about."[26] As the last expression in Danish already means "conversion," Kierkegaard in the following takes it up and stresses its particular fitness to describe the character of this change.

Liberation and conversion thus appear, once more, to be different aspects of the same event. Although Kierkegaard's explanation of the term conversion seems first to express a cognitive relation, the emphasis is placed upon the direction from or toward the truth. What else does this picture signify but Augustine's "will" and "nill," what else but freedom and sin in the full material sense of these terms?

And how about the moment? Expressions such as "immediately" (*statim*)[27] or "at once" (*subito*),[28] by which Augustine characterizes his experience of conversion, may not suffice to prove that he was conscious of the meaning of the "moment." Indeed, similar expressions had been used by him to describe other experiences.[29] That, nevertheless, the true phenomenon of the moment is implied in Augustine's analysis can be proved by another reference.

In the eleventh book of the *Confessions,* Augustine has given a very thorough discussion of the problem of time. Skillfully he has used biblical verses to illustrate his thoughts. After having analyzed the common attitude toward time as a distraction (*distentio*) between memory

26. *Ibid.*, p. 13.

27. *Conf.* VIII, 29.

28. *Ibid.*, IX, 1.

29. Cf. *ibid.*, III, 7: *repente*; also VII, 27: *ictus trepidantis aspectus.* The last words, obviously, reflect the *ictus oculi*, the Latin version of Paul's ῥιπὴ ὀφθαλμοῦ (I Cor. 15: 52; cf. *Conf.* VII, 1). Kierkegaard also refers to the Pauline expression.

and expectation, the proportion of which is steadily changed by the present attention (*attentio*), Augustine confronts this analysis with what he, in the meantime, had experienced as a new possibility. From the distraction in which he had lived God's hand has taken him forth to the effect that he may be "re-collected." Memory and expectation of things which have passed, or which will pass, are to be given up. Instead of future things which will pass, he is now directed toward that which lies ahead (*ea quae ante sunt*); the mood of this direction is no longer distraction (*distentio*) but intention (*intentio*).[30]

Augustine explains the Pauline expression of "the things which lie ahead" by combining it with quotations from the Psalms. Having been taught by God in this manner, he exclaims: ". . . I follow on for the prize of my heavenly calling, where I may hear the voice of Thy praise," to which Augustine adds from his own: "neither to come nor to pass away" *(nec venientem nec praetereuntem),* for, to him, the eternal means the eternal present. Nevertheless, it lies ahead, and signifies a goal. The eternal present to man living in this world is still a category of the future. To those sustained by God's hand, it is the actual future that they are longing for.

But was it not the moment to which the analysis should lead? That there is a close connection between the moment and the conception of eternity has again been seen by Kierkegaard. He emphasized that the Socratic thesis excludes the future character of the eternal as well as the "moment." For the theory of *anamnesis,* the eternal is "presented" as the past. The decisive significance of the moment, on the other hand, demands the eternal in the mood of the future. The moment is decisive as giving birth to freedom. The freedom is the possibility of the eternal —the possibility which lies ahead.

Thus, the category of the "moment" again connects the essential elements of the liberation. Though Augustine did not analyze it, it may also be introduced on the basis that, in the description of the experience, the analysis of it was already implied. It is the advantage of such interpretation that the difference between Augustine's conversion and the previous "turning points" of his life is thereby defined in philosophically adequate terms. The moment means not only that

30. *Conf.* IX, 38 f. For the interpretation cf. especially J. Guitton, *Le temps et l'éternité chez Plotin et saint Augustin* (Paris, 1933), pp. 191 ff. J. Chaix Ruy, *La perception du temps chez saint Augustin,* was inaccessible to me.

there is a sudden change from a former to a later stage, but that the sense of time is being changed as time reaches for eternity.[31]

For Kierkegaard, as for Augustine, conversion does not mean *only* liberation. For both the Catholic Father and the Protestant critic liberation is also identical with the full and unconditional acceptance of the Christian dogma. *That* they both presupposed, notwithstanding all differences concerning content and form.[32]

Is this agreement merely one by chance? That cannot be answered by a historical discussion. Within such a discussion the agreement must be considered as the ultimate justification of the entire comparison. It was observed above that the outlook of this paper is purely philosophical. What that means, perhaps, can be now stated more clearly. By isolating the philosophical aspect, the deep penetration of Augustine's and Kierkegaard's analysis should be made available to the philosopher, who may find it useful. If he does use them, however, he is confronted with the unescapable alternative, either to accept the whole, philosophy and religion, or to divide them, transforming the isolation into a separation. Either one can he do at his own risk, by his own philosophical effort. This paper is intended only to prepare for such a step. To take it means to transcend the given limits.

31. The consequence of such accentuation is a dialectical tension between the time which takes its origin in the moment and the moment itself. As the moment, in a certain sense, includes the whole future of the individual, one can also say that only the whole future is the full realization of the moment. I think, therefore, that it is no refutation of the above interpretation when Augustine, confronted with the infinite task of the aftermath, says: "Sane ista renovatio non momento uno fit ipsius conversionis sicut momento uno fit illa in baptismo renovatio remissione omnium peccatorum" (*De trinitate* XIV, 23).

32. It must be emphasized that heretofore only such passages from Kierkegaard have been quoted which directly contributed to the interpretation of Augustine's thought. For an independent comparison of both authors, their differences would, of course, deserve as much attention as their agreements. Here two points may be singled out: (1) While it was shown that for Augustine conversion was no immediate consequence of the right faith, for the Protestant Kierkegaard no such division exists. For him the paradox of will implies (or is implied in) the paradox of faith. Augustine's greater simplicity, here, facilitates a philosophical adaptation. (2) On the other hand, the Catholic Father attributes much greater value to the significance of the sacrament. At least in his dogmatic-polemical writings, Augustine conceives conversion and baptism as two factors of equal importance (Cf. *De baptismo* IV, 32). Kierkegaard says, "for while it is indeed possible to be baptized *en masse*, it is not possible to be born anew en masse" (*Philos. Fragm.*, p. 14).

III

When confronting the *Confessions* with *De libero arbitrio I,* it was assumed that Augustine's self-understanding was due to a definite development. Since there has been much controversy about this development,[33] it will be useful to point out the position of this paper more explicitly.

It was submitted that in Augustine's early writings his conversion was regarded as result of his own free will. This opinion seems to be implied when Augustine, after his conversion, still defended the natural power of free will. The *Confessions,* on the other hand, took quite a different view. No longer was the conversion traced back to such natural freedom; instead it was now taken as the actual promoter of a freedom which was anything but natural. The above observations went as far as this point. Now the controversial parties may ask what follows for their problem. Where does the center of Augustine's development lie? Is it, as the *Confessions* suggest, in the conversion? Or is it to be fixed at a much later point, so that for this problem the *Confessions* do not constitute a reliable source?

A methodological note may precede the following attempt at an answer. As the problem has heretofore been put, it is obvious that an evaluation was implied. He who discusses what is the center within the development of an individual transcends purely empirical conceptions and applies normative standards. Likewise, if it has been questioned whether conversion and baptism were sufficient to make Augustine an actual Christian, and if it has been assumed that still the neophyte was closer to Platonism than to actual Christianity, this conception of an actual Christianity is no less normative.

The following discussion will try to avoid any such conceptions. At the same time, it will be limited to pointing out what has been implied in the above interpretations. A difference between the *Confessions* and some earlier expressions of Augustine was observed. It is only asked what does this difference mean?

Can it, perhaps, be explained by supposing that, in the *Confessions,* Augustine did not simply describe his conversion as it took place but combined the recollection of it with that of other, perhaps later experi-

33. For the bibliography of this controversy cf. Gilson, *op. cit.,* pp. 312 f. In 1930 appeared W. J. Sparrow Simpson, *St. Augustine's Conversion* (New York), and H. Gros, *La conversion de saint Augustin* (Paris).

ences? M. Wundt was certain that there was a "turning point" in Augustine's development even after his conversion, and that from the recollection of this last event Augustine derived certain characteristics which, in the *Confessions,* he ascribed to the conversion.[34] Wundt believes that this turning point can be placed at the beginning of the year 391, when Augustine became ordained as presbyter. What he felt on this occasion Wundt sees reflected most clearly in Augustine's twenty-first letter. The principal point adopted from the later experience, for Wundt, is the arrogance of knowledge and the humility of faith. When Augustine, in the *Confessions,* reviewed his connections with Neoplatonism, he did, indeed, point to the same contrast in order to show the lasting difference between this doctrine and Christianity. But here only the Before and After are characterized. As to the How of the transition, the problem of *De libero arbitrio,* no new insight is found in the documents which Wundt mentions. Thus, even if correct, Wundt's thesis can be disregarded in what follows.

This does not mean that the general importance of this period in Augustine's spiritual growth can legitimately be overlooked. H. Reuter has observed that in the years following his ordination, Augustine's fundamental theories concerning grace and predestination began to form in his mind. This process left definite traces in the *Confessions.* That this autobiographical narration has also a doctrinal bearing (*une portée doctrinale*) has been admitted even by one of the most outspoken defenders of their historicity.[35]

Augustine's dogmatic studies at this time centered about the exegesis of the seventh chapter of the Epistle to the Romans. As we have noticed the influence of the same passage on the *Confessions,* the question arises what is the relation between Augustine's Pauline theology and his self-interpretation. Is the latter, one may ask, just the application of a theory to a fact of his own experience?

One of Augustine's most characteristic writings of this period is the first book of *De diversis quaestionibus ad Simplicianum.* The first problem discussed here is just that crucial seventh chapter of the Epistle to the Romans. By no means, however, can liberation be called the central

34. "Ein Wendepunkt in Augustins Entwicklung," in *Zeitschrift für Neutestamentliche Wissenschaft* (1922), pp. 53 ff.

35. Cf. Ch. Boyer, *Christianisme et néo-platonisne dans la formation de saint Augustin* (Paris, 1920), p. 15.

point in the discussion. The freedom which only grace can bring about here does not mean to Augustine freedom of the will. On the contrary, free choice is here interpreted as that impotent desire that achieves nothing. On Paul's verse, "for to will is present with me; but (how) to perform that which is good, I find not," Augustine notes that the first part (that "to will is present with me") points to the "easiness"; "for what is easier to man living under the law than to will the good and to do the evil?"[36]

The phenomenon which in the *Confessions* is interpreted as the struggle between the partial wills, here is differently analyzed. True, here as in the Confessions, Augustine refers to sin as the factor which fetters one. But as it is regarded neither as a part of the will nor even as actually interfering with it, will itself almost appears to be indifferent. And the liberation? If not referred to the will, it remains a purely theological concept without any possible philosophical meaning. The great discovery of the philosophical problem involved still lies ahead for Augustine.

Neither was in the next step. After the interpretation of the seventh chapter, Augustine turns to a problem of the ninth chapter of the same Epistle. The Apostle's words about God's unexplainable choice, by which Jacob already in his mother's womb was elected before Esau, drives Augustine to further conclusions. The theory of predestination is here already clearly outspoken. The category of conversion has no special significance in this connection. It is but one step in the fulfillment of the divine plan.

And how about the liberation? What is the role of the will in this context? To Rom. 9:16, Augustine says:

> This the Apostle seems to have not only said because by God's help we arrive at that which we wish; but also in that intention in which he at another place said: "with fear and trembling work out your own salvation! For it is God who in you works out will and operation for the goodness of (his) will." Here he sufficiently shows that also the good will in us is done by the operation of God.[37]

This is no longer that easy and powerless will that is free in its desires but unfree to act contrary to desire. Instead, this will (that is operated by God) can be fairly compared to the liberated will which is

36. *De diversis quaestionibus ad Simplicianum*, I, 1, 12.
37. *Ibid.*, I, 2, 12.

will and power at the same time. And yet, the conceptions of liberation and of that genuine kind of freedom here are missing. Is this just by chance? Or is it because at this moment Augustine actually was far from such knowledge? If taken literally, the divine operation of the human will seems rather to exclude its freedom. Is such a view possible? Indeed, the whole context of this chapter points to that conclusion. Moreover, this view appears again in such later books as some of Augustine's writings during the Pelagian controversy.

In the same anti-Pelagian writings this view is also again combined with what may be considered as the remnants of an earlier concept of free choice. Both views, which at first seem to exclude each other, still prove capable of being connected. Even when Augustine now attributes the struggle between will and act (Rom. 7) to the life of man under grace (because the good will even in this form is already God's work),[38] he still admits some co-operation—however small—of the will by its consent.[39] Free choice to desire and to consent, *and* a supernatural freedom to act—these, perhaps, would appear to constitute Augustine's ultimate solution, *if* we did not have the *Confessions*. For, through the *Confessions,* even those late writings appear open to a deeper understanding. What then makes them so singular?

It can hardly be conceived that Augustine's approach to the Pauline doctrine dealing with such urgent problems was achieved without the author's steady reflection upon his own past experiences. It seems, however, that as long as the problems were presented to him primarily from the theological point of view, Augustine did not arrive at a comprehensive appraisal of all factors that had influenced him. The optimistic view of *De libero arbitrio I,* apparently, could not stand against the severe truth which he found in Paul. More and more he became convinced that he had been chosen, where he had first believed that he chose. But had this consciousness altogether betrayed him, in such a moment when it had been so deeply aroused? If so, how could he trust to any other consciousness? Was, perhaps, theology the judge where consciousness had erred and where not? Indeed, sometimes Augustine seems to have been inclined to think of the truth in the strict terms of pure dogma.

38. Cf. Jonas, *op. cit.,* pp. 34 ff.

39. Cf., for instance, *De spiritu et littera* 60: consentire autem vocationi Dei vel ab eo dissentire . . . propriae voluntatis est.

Still there are the *Confessions*. By this book we also know what, at least once, led Augustine from speculation and dogma back to the consciousness of the self. In the midst of his theological endeavors he recalls that once he "became a problem to himself" and felt the need to find out "who he had been" and "who he now was."[40]

In this work, therefore, Augustine's consciousness again fills an important role. It is no longer the primitive consciousness of immediate experience, but a consciousness that has gone through the criticism of Augustine's religious knowledge and faith. This means that the experience as such is neither denied nor altered, but its causal connections are capable of a new exposition. Augustine has always been conscious of his free will as manifested in his conversion. That he could not erase, as long as he was sincere. But this kind of consciousness seemed to him true only in its most general form. His faith taught him that his freedom had been spoiled and had been unable to save him by its own power. If, nevertheless, it had been present, it had to be introduced by an outward agent. Thus Augustine now conceived that his freedom only *originated* in the moment, and this time he did not separate freedom and free will. Thus the starting point of the analysis was given. Both now appeared to be true: he had been chosen and he had chosen himself; both constituted, as he now understood it, the true freedom. Augustine was now in a position to see the possible and actual combination of the two facts, for now he found both in his consciousness.

Thus it would be due to a new consciousness that the philosophical implications of the *Confessions* so greatly differ from those of his earlier autobiographical remarks. But what does this consciousness mean? Kierkegaard saw that consciousness is a character of the self. "The more consciousness" he says, "the more will," and "the more will the more self."[41] Does this interpretation work in Augustine's case too? Kierkegaard thinks that man's will (either in defiance or in faith) is the stronger the more he understands the alternatives which confront him. Is not Augustine's case of exactly the same kind? Does not greater consciousness, here too, mean better knowledge of the possibilities of the will? Has not Augustine's will become stronger, since he knows what has become his last chance?

40. *Conf.* x, 50 and 6; cf. also iv, 9.
41. *Samlede Vaerker,* xi, p. 142.

Up to this point we have regarded the author of the *Confessions* only where he deals with his past. Here let us once look at his attitude toward the present. "Give me what Thou enjoinest, and enjoin what Thou wilt!"[42] These words which aroused the anger of Pelagius may be taken as an index of what Augustine now felt. What do they say? Everything seems to be given to God and nothing to be left to man. However, this is no theoretical statement. These are words of prayer. Does this not oblige one to give them a different interpretation? These apparently are the words of a man willing to bring his whole existence as a sacrifice. Only one who is resolute and beyond all wavering speaks thus. Far below are the hopes and fears of curiosity, which perhaps were still noticeable in Augustine's early writings.

Kierkegaard's equations between consciousness and will and between consciousness and self, thus seem to be applicable to Augustine's case also. It is *in this sense* that this paper also arrives at the conclusion that a definite development took place in Augustine between his conversion and the completion of the *Confessions*.

Nothing has yet been said about the actual significance of the conversion. The emphasis put upon this event by the *Confessions* still needs an explanation. Mere reference to later consequences would scarcely appear satisfactory. Just such early writings as *De libero arbitrio I* make it appear more likely that Augustine already lived under the impression that an all-important decision had been reached. Could he think of anything else but the conversion?

One might try to make the following construction: In the analysis of his conscience, Augustine arrived at the liberation as the "moment" in which his will and freedom were grounded. In the effort to make this very clear, he found a symbol of this event in the historical moment of his most significant act. In such an attempt the priority of the philosophical problem would be presupposed. It goes without saying that such presupposition cannot be based upon any historical evidence. Again

42. *Conf.* x, 40 and several times in the following. In the *Soliloquia,* Augustine had prayed, "Iube, quaero, et impera quidquid vis . . . ," and, "Si fide te inveniunt qui ad te refugiunt, fidem da, si virtute, virtutem, si scientia, scientiam . . ."; similarly, "Fac me, pater, quaerere te etc." (*Solil.*, 1, 5 f.). Though by such expressions the *Da quod iubes* seems to be anticipated, they still are chiefly directed toward the illumination of the intellect. No emphasis is yet placed upon the absoluteness of the *acting* God. Augustine says in the same context of the *Soliloquia,* "Nihil habeo nisi voluntatem."

the border between empirical history and a purely philosophical solution has been reached. Again it may signify the limit which in the present inquiry is not to be exceeded.

SUMMARY

(1) Conversion in Augustine's *Confessions* at first appeared to mean an event of the will. The observation that it nevertheless was described in terms of a passive happening led to an investigation of Augustine's views concerning the freedom of will. The image of the two wills, fighting within the soul, implied that there could not have been a proper freedom in Augustine's state before his conversion. On the other hand, freedom was the immediate gain of the new convert. Thus conversion had to be interpreted as liberation.

(2) A comparison of these views with those of Kierkegaard showed both authors agreeing in essential points. Some of Kierkegaard's categories helped to clarify the implications of Augustine's thought. (a) Kierkegaard determined the material implications of the concept of freedom (is opposite being guilt, not necessity). (b) Kierkegaard's analysis of the concept of "dread" offered a comprehensive perspective of Augustine's status before his conversion. (c) By tracing the possibility of liberation back to the nature of the "moment," Kierkegaard pointed out the general horizon in which liberation takes place.

(3) The difference between the *Confessions* and Augustine's earlier references to his conversion could not be explained by the assumption that the narrative in the *Confessions* had been blended with features of a later experience. Also, the general development of Augustine's speculative thought offered no satisfactory explanation. Without the *Confessions* this development could be imagined more easily and more simply. The following assumption seemed to be most likely: In connection with his speculative interests, but beside and beyond them, Augustine's self-consciousness was altered as well as deepened. The *Confessions,* in a magnificent analysis, show to what depths Augustine finally penetrated. Past experiences played a different role in this analysis than that which they had played in the immediate consciousness of earlier years. The question where the greater truth lies cannot be answered by an empirical discipline.

Plato's Theology (*Cornell Studies in Classical Philology*, Vol. XXVII). By FRIEDRICH SOLMSEN. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1942. xi 201 pp. $2.50.

Professor Solmsen, a student of Jaeger, perhaps best known for his work upon the *Organon*, makes full use of recent English and American as well as Continental Platonic scholarship in presenting a rounded account of Plato's "theology," in relation to the more central phases of his philosophy and to the development of Greek thought in general. Solmsen starts from the position that "there is a Platonic Theology distinct from the Theory of Ideas," and that its various strains are brought together in their maturest expression, though not combined in a comprehensive and unified theory, in the tenth book of the *Laws*. He admits that "the phase of Plato's philosophy which proved in the long run the richest source of inspiration for theological doctrines and creeds was his theory of Ideas and philosophy of true Being," utilized by Neoplatonism and by Christian theology. But he makes the illuminating suggestion that Plato's own theological views were largely carried on in Stoicism, in its religion of the Cosmopolis and of natural law and the World Reason.

For Professor Solmsen holds that Plato's discussion of the nature of the gods and of man's attitude to the deity is controlled by the context of his political thought; his final approach to religious problems is the consummate, as well as the last, expression of that Greek civic religion which identified the gods with the City. Plato's answer to the disintegration of the old moral order is to enshrine the Laws of the Polis in the heart of the Cosmos. Yet his very attempt to give renewed religious consecration to the life of the City led beyond the City to the larger human loyalties of the coming age.

Book X of the *Laws* has offered a standing problem to students of Plato. How could the author of the *Republic* have so far forgotten his own inspired insights as to seek to bind with such chains the soaring human spirit he had once known so well? Modern feeling is apt to agree with Sabine's judgment: "Certainly the rather extended development of religious law in the tenth book of the *Laws*, while not without the impressiveness that goes with intense conviction, is the most lamentable thing that Plato's genius produced;" and to assign

with him to that book "the bad pre-eminence of being the first reasoned defense of religious persecution." Men have sought psychological explanations for this instance of the folly of experience; they have found in it the curse of disillusioned idealism, which, beginning with a flaming vision of the new day, encounters the stubborn obstinacy of human nature, and ends with the Ogpu.

Solmsen cannot gloss over these facts; it is no extenuation to urge, "What Plato meant to do was to safeguard his city" against political subversion. We have had much experience of late with such practices of political religions; they have convinced Americans anew of the soundness of their traditional separation of Church and State. But by placing Plato's final "theology" in the context of the immemorial civic religion of the City-State, the core of which Plato's desperate apologetics was trying to save through drastic reconstruction, Solmsen provides the frame of reference for understanding both Plato's futile defense of a decaying order, and the direction his ideas actually took in later hands. For Plato's theological apologetic suffered the usual fate of all such attempts; it transformed what he was trying to defend. Solmsen is most suggestive in pointing out that in *Laws* 903 Plato "thinks of the cosmic Whole in terms of the ideal Greek city and that this most radical formulation of his teleology has derived its essential features from his political philosophy." The passage runs: "Every creation is for the sake of the Whole, and in order that εὐδαιμονία may accrue to the life of the Whole." Solmsen finds here the prototype of Stoic teleology: "Plato prepared the way, though he did not tread it himself, for the Hellenistic escape from politics into the Cosmos. The passage . . . is cosmopolitan, if to think of the Cosmos in terms of the Polis is cosmopolitanism."

Thus Solmsen offers a brilliant analysis of the combination of archaism and innovation which is found in the religious reconstruction of Book X.

> There is an archaic atmosphere about the work. There is no room in it for intellectualism, for newfangled cleverness, rationalistic construction, or individualistic speculation. Piety and profound reverence for time-honored custom characterize Plato's attitude throughout the work. In comparison with the *Laws* even the *Republic* strikes us as too exclusively rational, inspired by excessive confidence in human capacities, and indifferent—at least on the surface—to the powers of tradition. . . . Plato's attitude to religion is at the same time

archaic and Hellenistic. While he tried to revive the past he prepared the way for the future. While he was anxious to restore the original unity of religion and political life, he became the founder of "natural theology."

Solmsen first devotes three chapters to the background: to the civic religion of the City-State; to the destruction of this old religion through the rebellion of the individual against the political order and its moral sanctions, and through the rationalistic questioning of the gods; and to the attempt to defend and reconstruct the religious basis of the Polis. For the first time the existence of the gods became a matter of discussion; there appeared an intellectual and "progressive" group who "believed" in propositions about the gods, who had a "theology," a "theoretical" foundation for their religious practice. It is with these poets and dramatists, these conservative innovators in religious criticism, that Solmsen judges Plato the "theologian" is to be placed, rather than with the Pre-Socratic nature-philosophers.

Solmsen then examines Plato's different approaches to this problem of the critical reconstruction of the religious foundations of the City. He emphasizes the wide variety of contexts from which the different approaches are made, and cites Plato's own warning: "The father and maker of all this Universe is past finding out, and even if we found him, to tell of him to all men would be impossible" (*Tim.*, 28c). Plato worked upon the problem of the nature and activities of the Divine as a "reformer," counseling expurgation of the myths and insisting on the goodness and immutability of the Divine. But while in the *Republic* he finds the Ideas to be the standard of what is good, he is still left with the problem of bringing it about; as Solmsen puts it, the Ideas are the formal cause, but there is needed the gods as the efficient cause—there is needed god as the mediator between the intelligible and the sensible worlds. So Plato was led to approach the Divine in a second way, through the philosophy of movement. Following Stenzel, Solmsen finds in the *Sophist* the recognition that "Life, Motion, Change, and Process cannot be absent from 'Being in its fullness.'" Motion and Change are rehabilitated as essential phases of Being, and a scientific physics is now possible. The regular motions of the heavenly bodies represent Being in the world of Becoming. Hence, there is need of a source of Motion, which Plato finds in Ψυχή or Life, the Divine principle on which all Becoming depends. The God reached through this natural theology is not an Idea: "he is the prin-

ciple through which the physical world of Becoming partakes of the qualities of Being."

The Craftsman of the creation-myth of the *Timaeus* Solmsen treats as the climax of Plato's approach to the Divine through teleology, through the way in which all things "imitate" the Good. Solmsen does not try to identify this Demiurge with the World-Life of Book X. Indeed, he finds that while the Craftsman is essentially Mind, using the World-Life as his instrument, in Book X the World-Life is responsible for what is good, and "takes Mind along." Both are ways of conceiving the Divine, but both are mythical, stated in the "language of probability."

In the comprehensive picture of Plato's religious views in Book X Solmsen finds the same unwillingness to arrive at any clear-cut conception of a "God." The refutation of "atheism" is primarily a vindication of the primacy of Life and Mind against the materialists and "evolutionists." Plato's new colony is to be founded on religion, but on neither the Olympian gods nor the civic religion of the Polis. Ψυχή or Life is not a single entity, as in the *Timaeus* myth, but rather a generic principle, the "exponent and representation of the whole intelligible order," immanent in the Cosmos and clearest in the stars. Below the heavenly bodies the World-Life is opposed to another "bad" Life; the "Necessity" of the Timaeus has here become, as in Persian thought, a second type of Life. But neither these star-gods of natural theology, nor the World-Life itself, are concerned with man. Plato's defense of Providence, which, as in the *Timaeus,* takes mythical form, starts from the goodness of the Divine, which is by nature creative and dynamic—what Lovejoy has called "Self-Transcending Fecundity." This Providence is directed, not to individuals, but to the perfection and εὐδαιμονία of the Whole—there is as little particular Providence in Plato as in Aristotle. Indeed, when Plato forsakes myth, the Divine appears neither as Demiurge nor as star-gods, but as Law—the Law of the City, which is at one and the same time the Law of the Cosmos, "begotten by Mind," and the manifestation of the World-Life among men. It is in this moral conception of "natural law" that Solmsen finds Plato's theology culminating. Thus is a moral and religious basis provided for the Polis.

The State and Law may well be founded on Nature, if in Nature herself the mental, intellectual, and moral values have a fixed and distinguished place,

if Order, Rationality, Harmony, and Cooperation are in ascendance, and if the Good itself has a cosmic status. . . . Taken as a whole *Laws* X represents a most powerful and comprehensive defense of the spiritual world *in toto*, and this spiritual world includes the political sphere and all moral and political values. . . . Reason, Regularity, Order, Form, Harmony are not limited to the sphere of τὰ ὄντα. They permeate the realm of Becoming. It is God who makes them extend their rule over it.

Solmsen goes on to show, with some rather dubious history, that Aristotle and the Neoplatonists, escaping from the City into the Cosmos, transformed Plato's immanent World-Life into a transcendent First Mover and Supreme Being. It was the Stoics who preserved those parts of Plato's theology which were abandoned by Aristotle. Above all, they carried on his notion of the Cosmic Polis, and developed more consistently than he himself the implications of his natural theology for man as a citizen of ἡ τοῦ κόσμου πολιτεία.

Solmsen's analysis is for the most part brilliant, and fertile with suggestive insights. His mastery of the relevant Platonic scholarship is impressive, a mastery best revealed in his refusal to let it dominate his reading of the Platonic text. There is the inevitable tendency to take Plato's subtle and ironic thought a little too literally, but on the whole Solmsen is tolerably immune to the snares of undue systematizing and harmonizing. His main thesis, that Plato's religious explorations are to be understood best in the political context of the moral foundations of the City, is suggestive and illuminating.

Paradoxically, however, it remains a question whether Plato had any "theology" distinct from his "theory of Ideas" and of "the intelligible world as a whole"—whether he had any conception of the nature and function of "God." The tradition may have been wiser than the resources of modern scholarship. Solmsen himself starts by reminding us that "the father and maker of all this Universe is past finding out;" he must needs continually insist that Plato employs no final or fixed dogmatic conceptions, that he speaks in the language of myth and probability; and in the end Solmsen has to fall back on "the spiritual world *in toto*" as what Plato means by the Divine. That Plato passes easily back and forth from "god" to "the gods," from "the good World-Life" to "Life"—that Ψυχή is a generic principle, a realm of Being, rather than "God"—all this Solmsen brings out well. That the intelligible world is divine, that it has many aspects, many relations to man-

kind and to the world, many different functions to perform—of this Plato was convinced. That it has such relations and functions he tried to indicate and emphasize in a variety of ways. But whether the many images and myths in which he attempted to express this "mediation" between the intelligible and the sensible world are to be taken as indicating that he had developed the conception of a "God" as a "mediator," is another question. The Plato who could write the passage in the *Phaedrus* about "mythology" (229C) may have become, in Book X, a literal-minded "theologian." But is it not more credible that the Plato who in the *Republic* discoursed of "royal lies" should have advanced in the *Laws* to imperial whoppers? On this point Professor Solmsen appears to have debarred himself as an impartial judge through his rather literal-minded acceptance of the Platonic mythology, in the curious passage on pages 145 and 146.

JOHN HERMAN RANDALL, JR.

Columbia University

Archaeology and the Religion of Israel. By WILLIAM FOXWELL ALBRIGHT. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1942. XII + 238 pp. $2.25.

Only recently Professor Albright published his monumental volume *From the Stone Age to Christianity,* which has become an indispensable guide to students of the Ancient Near East. It has now been followed by another volume on the importance of archeology for history, and particularly for a clear understanding of the religion of Israel. Though dealing with the same subject matter, *Archaeology and the Religion of Israel* is in no sense a repetition or recapitulation of the author's earlier book. It is rather a supplementary treatise amplifying and extending our knowledge in a restricted field. It should prove of great interest to the layman because of the lucid exposition of intricate problems, and to the specialist because of a number of original contributions.

The first chapter, entitled "Archaeology and the Ancient Near-Eastern Mind," consists of a general discussion dealing with: (1) archeology, history, and religion; (2) archeology and man's aesthetic and imaginative faculties; (3) archeology and the affective faculties of man; and (4) archeology and the reasoning faculties of man. It traces

the development and unfolding of the human mind as it expressed itself in graphic art, in literature, and in logical thinking in Mesopotamia, Syria, Phoenicia, Palestine, and Egypt from the early Chalcolithic onward. Of specific benefit to the student of the Bible is the very valuable inquiry into Canaanite music and poetry and their effect on Old Testament prosody. In the second chapter, entitled "The Archaeological Background of Old Testament Religion," Albright describes the principal types of unwritten and written materials now available for the study of the religions of the Ancient Near East. The vast erudition of the author and his capacity for synthesis are best displayed in this section of the book. The sources of Syria and Palestine, Mesopotamia and Persia, Egypt and Ethiopia, Asia Minor and the Hittites, Arabia, Cyprus and the Aegean are examined and evaluated. As is to be expected, the results of the excavations at Mari (on the Middle Euphrates), and the epoch-making discoveries at Ugarit (on the coast of Northern Syria), receive the attention to which they are entitled.

"Archaeology and the Religion of the Canaanites" is the subject of the third chapter. Albright maintains that the Phoenicians were Canaanites, that is, both were really one people who spoke the same language and possessed the same cultural tradition; that the Canaanite language can be traced back to the beginning of the second millenium B.C., and that their ancestors had lived in Phoenicia and in Palestine in the third millenium B.C. The Canaanite pantheon is described in detail and the observation is made that the myths related at Ugarit were the common possession of all the Canaanites. Stress is laid upon the personification of natural forces and the deification of patrons of culture, while, in contradistinction to Mesopotamian and Egyptian religions, solar and moon deities played a surprisingly secondary role in the Canaanite religion. The paragraph on Ugaritic mythology is the most succinct the reviewer has yet read and should be of value to everyone interested in the history of religion. These rather crude and sensuous but, nevertheless, vivid and realistic legends are placed in an intermediate position among Mesopotamian, Egyptian, Anatolian and Aegean mythologies. The view that Yahwism was only slightly influenced by Canaanite religious beliefs, a theory stressed by the author repeatedly in his writings, is also most effectively maintained here. An additional, and highly instructive, reason for this extraordinary phenomenon is found in the fact that the Canaanite culture "in the

thirteenth century seems to have reflected the lowest religious level in all Canaanite history, just as it represented the lowest point in the history of Canaanite art." While the essence of Yahwism remained untouched, some outward adaptation did take place. In the domains of religious architecture, cultic symbolism and sacrificial practice, poetic language, and temple music, Canaanite influence was strong and lasting.

The fourth chapter, entilted "Archaeology and the Religion of Early Israel," is "a survey of the religious history of Israel from the conquest to the end of David's reign." Albright's well-known position on the historicity of Moses and his role as founder of Yahwism is again vigorously affirmed, with an additional telling argument on the difference between camel-nomadism and ass-nomadism. The Hebrews before entering Palestine were ass-nomads and, therefore, cannot be compared with the modern nomadic Arabs who are camel-riding nomads. The difference in the mode of life between these two groups is of paramount importance for a clear understanding of the religious outlook of the early Hebrews, who were of mixed origin and included among them both ass-nomads and sedentary groups. A highly suggestive theory, but not wholly acceptable unless more cogent proofs can be found, is that the institution of the high priest already existed in the pre-monarchic period. On the other hand, the author is most certainly right in maintaining that the Levites represented a class (not a tribe) of people who were either pledged or dedicated to a deity. The fifth chapter, entitled "Archaeology and the Religion of Later Israel," presents an illuminating survey of the economic and political background of the age of Solomon and the dual monarchy. Albright deserves great credit for emphasizing the significance of the economic factor (a subject which has hitherto been somewhat neglected) in the study of religion. In discussing the pagan influences in the period of the dual monarchy and particularly in Judah, the author reaches the conclusion that this religious retrogression was primarily due to Aramaic and Assyrian and not to Canaanite sway.

If it be permissible, the reviewer would borrow a current political term in saying in conclusion that *Archaeology and the Religion of Israel* should be put on the *must* list of books to be read not only by students of the Old and New Testaments, but by everyone interested in the history of religion and in the history of the Ancient Near East.

I. MENDELSOHN

Columbia University

Good and Evil Spirits: A Study of the Jewish and Christian Doctrine, Its Origin and Development. By EDWARD LANGTON. London: S.P.C.K., 1942. XVI + 324 pp. $4.00.

The most fruitful approach to an understanding of New Testament ideas is by way of the contemporary Jewish background. The Jewish element in early Christian thinking has been increasingly stressed in recent decades, and its elucidation has helped immeasurably to an understanding of New Testament terms and concepts which assume their true meaning only in their Jewish context. The present work utilizes this approach to explore the important subject of New Testament eschatology and arrives at the to-be-expected conclusion that, except for the implications of the resurrection of Christ, "the teaching given is clearly that which was current at that time in Jewish circles" (p. 296). "References made to the Messianic Kingdom, the final judgment, the intermediate state, and the resurrection show that the earliest Christian preachers had no new teaching to give upon these subjects" (p. 297). All the more important, then, is it to analyze the current Jewish conceptions in the light of their development. The contribution of the book is in its over-all view of a consistent development of Jewish thought from primitive notions and the conceptions of ancient historical peoples through biblical times, with special attention to the apocryphal and apocalyptic writings of the immediate pre-Christian period.

This study, however, must be regarded as an introduction to the author's major theme, the Jewish-Christian doctrine of good and evil spirits, which is to be presented in a forthcoming volume. Here he considers the evolution of the concepts of spirit and of the soul of man, here and in the hereafter. In its entirety, then, the work should provide a survey of the complete doctrine of the spirit world and its denizens.

The first section of the book is devoted to a brief but useful summary of anthropological thought and research on the origin and nature of primitive religion, with reference particularly to the concept of spirit, from animatism and animism to the belief in higher gods. Having thus sketched in the primitive background, elements of which persisted among the Hebrews in later times, the author turns his attention to the concepts current in the Near East among Greeks, Egyptians,

Babylonians, and Mazdeans, which contributed their share, to a greater or lesser degree, to the evolution of the Jewish beliefs. His material is drawn exclusively from older secondary sources. It is unfortunate that the recent archeological finds, such as the Ras Shamra texts which might throw some much-needed light upon the Canaanite patterns of thought in this field and thus clarify the problem of direct Canaanite influence upon the Hebrews, are neglected.

The most rewarding chapters in the book are those dealing with the progress of ideas concerning the soul and its survival after death in the Old Testament and in the apocryphal and apocalyptic literature. During biblical times there gradually emerged, under prophetic influence, a belief in the extension of Yahweh's power into the dismal realm of the departed, a differentiation in the condition of the departed, a new view of the immortality of the soul as distinguished from a characterless persistence of the spirit at or near the grave, and finally the doctrine of resurrection, though in a limited sense. Langton demonstrates effectively how these developments arose from the prophetic conception of God and the consequent rise of religious individualism: "The special contribution of the Old Testament to the doctrine of a future life is thus its insistence that this is guaranteed by the character of God and the spiritual fellowship that men may experience here and now" (p. 198). It is significant that this development occurred altogether without benefit of foreign influence, which is so often dragged in to explain every new turn in Old Testament thought. "As a matter of fact . . . the highest point of Old Testament teaching upon the subject of the future life results naturally, and we may say almost inevitably, from the special genius of the Yahwistic religion" (p. 198).

All this, however, is background. The author's main concern is to assemble the materials thus far gathered in a frame that will adequately display the ideas of the New Testament. The two centuries before and the first century of the Christian era saw a marked increase of interest in the subject of the after-life, and introduced many significant new thoughts and variations upon old ones. This is the crucial period which fixed the pattern of New Testament thinking. It produced a wealth of literary speculation in the apocryphal and pseudepigraphic works centered primarily upon the theme of the soul and its fate after this life. The writer analyzes this literature and brings

out its views on such new subjects as Paradise and Gehenna, on the intermediate state of departed souls, judgment and resurrection. And with this as his frame he paints in the parallel eschatological ideas of the New Testament.

But the frame is not complete. This literature grew out of the fermentation of ideas that accompanied the rise of Pharisaism, yet the author ignores both the movement and its most authoritative voice, the rabbinic writings. It is curious that he should dismiss these with a cavalier reference to "considerations of space" (p. 210), when he has found room for everything else—including an analysis of such works as the Wisdom of Solomon, which is a product of Hellenistic Judaism and out of the main line of the tradition that was accepted in Palestine. The New Testament allusions to the Sadducean position on resurrection render it pertinent and important to inquire what the differences between the Pharisees and Sadducees were; moreover, within the Pharisaic ranks there were marked differences between the Hillelites and the Shammaites on this point. For all the difficulty of extracting earlier views from the comparatively late rabbinic literature the effort is imperative, especially since this material has been made available in a number of excellent recent studies. Use of the rabbinic literature, too, would have helped the author assess his material better. Current views do not always make their way into current literature; they often come out only in later time. When we find Persian influences in Daniel we must recognize them as having prevailed for some centuries before the second century B.C. The polypsychism that finds expression in early rabbinic writings is just as reliably to be traced back to much earlier times in Palestine. The author, through neglect of this literature, has thus failed to take into account an element of Jewish thought which he considers to have been characteristic only of the Egyptian. Similarly, heaven as the abode of God, the angels, and the righteous, was a commonplace of contemporary Jewish thinking, and such a mode of address as "our Father which art in heaven" was a stereotype of prayer. Reference to "the cylinder containing Bible texts which is still hung at the doors of houses in Palestine" (p. 111) is quaint indeed, coming from a student of early Judaism, who might be expected to display greater familiarity with the *mezuzah*. On the subjects of Paradise and Gehenna, and the condition of departed souls in these places, the early rabbinic material is especially useful and important.

Langton has failed, also, to consider the social and political conditions that produced this speculation, a subject implicit in the development of Pharisaic thought, and essential to a complete understanding of these ideas. They were not mere academic abstractions, as one might suspect from Langton's treatment, but the expression of very real religious and social needs experienced by the common people. To neglect their basis in life is to miss their living significance. Since the aim of this work is to present ultimately a complete picture of the Jewish-Christian doctrine of good and evil spirits, a highly controversial and complex subject with important social implications, it seems all the more relevant to stress the necessity of taking into consideration the objective conditions and the rabbinic texts which shed light on the period of the emergence of Christianity.

JOSHUA TRACHTENBERG

Easton, Pennsylvania

The Jews in Spain: Their Social, Political and Cultural Life During the Middle Ages. By ABRAHAM A. NEUMAN. 2 vols. Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society of America, 1942. XXXI + 286 pp.; XI + 399 pp. $5.00.

Since the appearance of Fritz Baer's monumental source work, *Die Juden im christlichen Spanien* (1929-1936), it has been quite obvious that the history of the Jews in medieval Spain is in urgent need of being rewritten. President Neuman's opus, in its general conception and final formulation, is a striking achievement in integration and synthesis of the unwieldly bulk of Baer's source material, which consists mainly of documents from the calendars of the Acts of the Spanish kings, with contemporary *responsa* by Spanish rabbis. Based upon these two supplementary sources,

> the attempt has been made, as far as possible, to penetrate beneath the outward appearance and the coloring of the Spanish background and to view Jewish life from the standpoint of those who lived it, to make clear their problems and to seek the deepest motives of the lives in the fund of ideas and ideals which were their ancient heritage. Spain furnished the conditions; the Kings dictated the terms; the Church imposed its will (I, xxviii).

Thus, the social, political, and cultural life of the Jews of the Iberian Peninsula during the Middle Ages is unfolded in two vol-

umes, divided into twenty-two chapters, and embellished with excellent illustrations. There is a glossary of the Hebrew, Arabic, and Spanish words occurring in the text, and a bibliography. The index seems to be quite reliable, although an expulsion from a community (II, 17) appears s.v. Expulsion, from Spain (II, 381). Following the widely accepted proposal of Moritz Steinschneider, the Arabic equivalent for "son" in Hebrew names is pronounced *Ibn,* but since Kèsra in Spanish-Arabic is pronounced as *Fetha,* the pronunciation should evidently be *Abn* (cf. Carl Brockelmann, *Grundriss der vergleichenden Grammatik der semitischen Sprachen,* I [Berlin, 1908], 210).

The first volume, subtitled *A Political-Economic Study,* devotes ten chapters to the political foundation of Spanish Jewry. The reader is overwhelmed with masses of well arranged details which present a deep insight into the royal law of the land and the legal autonomy of the Jews. Such subjects as the internal organization of the Jewish community, its authority and right of taxation, the administration of taxes and the functioning of Jewish courts, the relationship to Spanish municipalities and to the royal courts, as well as the points of conflict arising from overlapping legal spheres, are dealt with from the broad basis of rabbinic and Spanish sources. The treatment of economic conditions lays special stress on loans, interest, and monetary institutions.

The second volume, bearing the subtitle, *A Social-Cultural Study,* offers at the very beginning an "index of the social morality" (p. 3) of the Jewish group. The collective conscience of the organized Jewish *aljama,* with its established criteria of moral conduct, furnishes a basis for dealing with moral conditions, courtship and marriage, marriage customs and ceremonies, domestic life, schools, curricula, and educational ideals. The author's special interest in cultural aspects appears in his treatment of the prolific rabbinic culture, the organization of synagogues and auxiliary institutions such as charities. The two final chapters describe the social relations between Jews and Christians, and the brilliant record of Jews in the service of king and state. But the great services rendered by the Jews to the Spanish Crown, the high level of their life and culture, and their many contributions to Spanish civilization, did not prevent their final doom, culminating in the expulsion decree of March 31, 1492.

In the portrayal of the glory and the tragedy of Spanish Jewish his-

tory, it caused the author much pain to present the role of the Church in this human tragedy (I, vii). This quite positive statement as to the origin of the fate meted out to the Jews is in contradiction to the author's expression of doubt of the existence of any general theory on which the Spanish Kings decided the status of the Jews in their realm, or of a policy pursued in accordance with established conceptions (I, 3). The well-known inseparability of Church and State in medieval Spain, the frightful persecution of the Jews by the Church in the form of the Inquisition, enforced conversions, and auto-da fés, testify unambiguously to the existence of an established general attitude toward them. Along with the Moors, they were regarded as heretics, and, as soon as Ferdinand and Isabella had successfully concluded their war against the Crescent, they signed the edict expelling from Spain every Jew who refused to deny his faith. Thus they freed their state of the last heretics to be found on Spanish soil. And just recognition of the brilliant record of the Jews in the service of their country was sacrificed to the Church-dictated principle of a *raison d'état* culminating in the concept of a totally Christian Spain.

When one Joseph Kimhi said that the truth of a religion is proved by the morality of her adherents (II, 3), he undoubtedly expressed the attitude of his coreligionists towards a Spain whose reactions baffled them, being in conflict with their own loyalty. The inability of justified moral claims to determine the *raison* of a total *état,* or to control religious persecution, becomes obvious in the history of the Spanish Jews. For though they had helped their country in the final war against the Moors, the absorbing conviction of the supreme importance of the Christian doctrine prompted the two Catholic Majesties to get rid of them as the only remaining unbelievers in Spain. Thus the religious war, waged for many centuries, came to an end,—a war waged in Spain against heretics ever since Tarik defeated the Visigoths in 711. The contest between the Spanish Christians and the Arab infidels, following an earlier one between the Franconian Trinitarians and the early Spanish Arians, had lasted for eight centuries, and was more of a religious crusade than a war for political independence. When finally Granada, the last Moorish bastion in Spain, fell in 1492, Christian rule was reestablished on Spanish soil, and an ardent belief in the totality of the heretic issue now demanded the removal of the Jews by conversion, expulsion, or by the persuasive methods of the Inquisition. Thus the

history of the Jews in Spain seems, from the very beginning, to be nothing more than a chain of unsuccessful attempts at loyal service on their part, which were doomed to failure when the heretic issue as a whole became dominant in the course of Spanish history.

Dr. Neuman's work as a whole is one of the most valuable of recent contributions to Jewish history. It displays immense erudition, but what is even more admirable is the skill with which the author uses numberless facts to illustrate each other. His is a history of men and manners, a great picture of the mode of life of the Jewish community in medieval Spain. This is an imposing book and one likely to become and remain a standard work for many years to come, because it is the work of a distinguished historian.

LUITPOLD WALLACH

Florence, Alabama

The Labyrinth of the World. By JOHN AMOS COMENIUS. Translated by MATTHEW SPINKA. Chicago: National Union of Czecho-Slovak Protestants in America, 1942. vi + 170 pp. $1.50.

On the occasion of the three hundred and fiftieth anniversary of Comenius' birth, Professor Matthew Spinka published a translation of a book which is one of the masterpieces of Czech literature. It was written in Czech during the fifth year of the Thirty Years War, in a remote place in the eastern corner of Bohemia. It reflected the anguish of soul and the tragic experiences of a young minister of the persecuted Unity of Bohemian Brethren. Moreover, it was conceived as a mirror of contemporary society, of its shortcomings and vain labors, indicating, at the same time, a safe path out of the turmoil.

The book is composed of two parts, as indicated by its full title: "The Labyrinth of the World and the Paradise of the Heart." A dedicatory epistle, addressed to a prominent member of the Unity, Lord Charles of Žerotín, characterizes the work as follows: "The first part depicts figuratively scenes and vanities of the world; how, despite the exertion of all its power, it accomplishes nothing and how miserably everything finally ends, either in ridicule or in sorrow. The second describes, partly allegorically, partly objectively, the true and secure happiness of the sons of God; how truly they are blessed who, leaving the world and all the mundane things behind, adhere and firmly cleave to God alone."

Scholars who have paid special attention to Comenius' knowledge of both medieval and early modern literature, point out his indebtedness to some authors of the preceding period. A detailed comparison of *The Labyrinth* with writings of a Lutheran divine, John Valentine Andreae, has led to the assumption that Comenius, before conceiving *The Labyrinth,* became thoroughly acquainted with the ideas of his eminent contemporary and even modeled some chapters of *The Labyrinth* on corresponding passages from Andreae's works. The practice of quoting freely from outstanding writings or of reworking older materials, which was current in the Middle Ages, was only slowly giving way to modern concepts of originality of an artistic or literary work. *The Labyrinth* should not be compared only with Andreae's writings. It is to be studied also in connection with such masterpieces as Dante's *Divine Comedy,* Bacon's *Atlantis,* More's *Utopia,* Campanella's *Civitas Solis,* or Bunyan's *Pilgrim's Progress,* since it had been inspired by the unquenchable desire of the human soul to overcome the fallacies and miseries of this life and discover a haven of peace, be it an earthly paradise or the eternal home.

Comenius has drawn a picture which differs considerably from the above mentioned books. His description of wanderings through the labyrinth of the world betrays an intimate knowledge of conditions in war-torn Europe and a deep insight into the causes of the conflict. Thus, the first part of his work must be treated not as a mere allegory. Various passages can be confronted with historical sources and their documentary value established. Such confrontation leads to the conclusion that the allegorical form and the flowery style often cover sober facts, which were, as a rule, discouraging and stimulated the author's search for the paradise of the heart. To a modern reader who has experienced the division of mankind into two fronts, as well as the decline of moral standards and heroic virtues, some passages from *The Labyrinth* sound like a familiar tune. In one street of the labyrinth the pilgrim sees the governing class, people addressed as "honorable constable, honorable mayor, honorable burgomaster, honorable magistrate, honorable regent, his lordship the burgrave, his lordship the chancellor, his lordship the vice-regent, honorable judges, his grace the king, or count, or lord, and so forth." He soon perceives that they gained their positions partly by bribery, partly by importunate solicitation, partly by flattery, while some usurped them by force. A passage describing the military calling also may be quoted as an example of the

author's effort to weave into the allegory personal experiences and observations—let us bear in mind that his home had been destroyed by Spanish mercenaries in 1621. The following is his eyewitness description of a battle:

> Suddenly the drum beats sounded, trumpets blared, and a tumult and confusion of cries arose. The soldiers jumped up and seizing their daggers, dirks, poniards, or whatever else each had, began to thrust them into each other mercilessly till blood spurted all around, for they cut and hacked each other worse than the most ferocious beasts. The deafening din spread in all directions: the beat of horses' hoofs, the clang of armor, the clash of swords, the booming of cannon, the whizzing of shots and bullets by the ear, the blare of trumpets, the beating of drums, the outcries of those urging on the battle, the shouts of the victors, the shrieks of the wounded and the dying, resounded all around. In one place one saw a terrible hail of lead; in another, a frightful lightning of fire and thundering. Here a soldier lost his arm, head or a leg; there one after another the soldiers were struck down, all writhing in pools of blood.

The second part of the book is so organized that the pilgrim proceeds from the gate of the Castle of Wisdom through various stages to the throne of the Almighty. As the translator appropriately stated in his preface, the two concluding chapters "furnish a climax of the theme without which the work would become merely an expression of unrelieved and thoroughgoing cosmic pessimism and despair, or at best a witty satire."

Though not without predecessors and parallels, Comenius' work deserves wide attention as a bold and individual attempt to arrive at a satisfactory solution of the eternal theme of visionaries and reformers of society. Like Dante's *Divine Comedy*, it points out the way from the turmoil of the world to the Creator's throne. Thus it differs from utopias based on the assumption that an ideal order could exist under the sun only if it were planted or discovered by searching souls.

Professor Spinka's translation follows the critical edition of *The Labyrinth* in the *Collected Works* of Comenius. The translator's decision not to imitate the archaic text is all the more laudable in that it has made the work easily accessible to modern readers. The translation is faithful, reliable, and adequate both to the imaginative power of Comenius and the riches of his vocabulary.

Otakar Odložilík

Columbia University

The History of Quakerism. By ELBERT RUSSELL. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1942. xiii + 586 pp. $3.00.

A new one-volume history of the Quaker Movement is interesting for several reasons. First, the Society of Friends, in spite of its numerical smallness, and partly *because* of its numerical smallness, is important to great numbers of thoughtful outsiders. The very fact that Quakers are few keeps the Society of Friends from being one of the competing denominations, and places Quaker interests on denominationally neutral ground. Moreover, the great part which Friends have repeatedly played in social pioneering means that thoughtful people everywhere, concerned with the possible progress of moral sensitivity, dare not neglect the Quaker experience.

A second consideration which makes such a study interesting is the fact the Quakers have long been exceedingly careful in the historical portraiture of themselves. The Society of Friends has been in existence a bit less then three hundred years, and the practicing members have seldom exceeded one hundred thousand in the entire world, yet the libraries of Quakeriana are large indeed. Not only did Friends in the seventeenth century preserve carefully the records of their "sufferings," but likewise subsequent generations have been meticulous about minutes of yearly, quarterly, and monthly meetings, and uncounted individual Friends have preserved for their posterity the journals of God's dealings with them. This autobiographical literature alone is so abundant that no single person has mastered more than a small portion of it. Since the Society of Friends has revelled in its own history, we have a right to look expectantly to any new history of Quakerism.

The most ambitious Quaker history of modern times is that which bears the name of the late John Wilhelm Rowntree, of England, and which, after his death, was carried to completion largely through the efforts of William Charles Braithwaite and Rufus M. Jones. This valuable work will not soon be superseded and needs little change in our time, but there has been a striking need for a single volume which might tell the entire story in a way interesting to the ordinary reader, and yet not popular in the sense of being unreliable or superficial. To this task Dr. Elbert Russell, Emeritus Dean of the Divinity School of Duke University, set himself. It must be said that his main intention has been accomplished.

Dr. Russell's qualifications for his ambitious task are many. He is a lifelong Friend, but not a Friend who has been so closely confined to Quaker connections as have many. He has spent his years, teaching outside, as well as inside, Quaker circles. He differs from many who have written on Quakerism in that his connections with western and southern Friends are close. Too often the story has been interpreted almost wholly from the point of view of London or Philadelphia. Some have written almost as though there were no Friends south of the Susquehanna or west of the Appalachians. Dr. Russell's residence in Indiana and North Carolina, as well as his visits to England, have given him a less provincial perspective.

The division of the story into three main parts seems natural and useful. The first part deals with the rise of Quakerism from 1647 to 1691. Here was the great burst of new life, beginning when George Fox was only twenty-three years old, and ending with the time of William of Orange, when persecution was over and Fox and Barclay were dead.

The second main period, called perhaps unwisely, the Age of Quietism, is from 1691 to 1827. The original burst of enthusiasm was already gone, yet lives of great beauty, such as that of John Woolman, were produced. What started as a movement had become a sect, both appreciated and satirized by Charles Lamb.

The third part of the book deals with the last hundred and fifteen years and is called "The Modern Revival and Reconstruction." This part includes the most unhappy chapters of the story, those concerned with violent separations, but it also includes some of the most hopeful chapters, depicting the modern rediscovery of the early Quaker message, the growth of splendid schools, the inauguration of foreign missions, and the beneficent work of the American Friends Service Committee, which has attracted such wide and favorable attention. Dr. Russell clearly hopes that the third phase of the movement may recapture some of the wonderful enthusiasm of the first phase, without its excesses.

Here in some five hundred pages is enough to make the studious reader understand the genius of Quakerism and appreciate the kind of experience out of which the Quaker social pioneering has grown. Though the volume achieves great success in this major undertaking, it is marked by several minor blemishes. For example, the opening sentence of the Introduction includes an unfortunate use of the past tense.

"Quaker history," it says, "involved many elements, each of which may conceivably be given the primary emphasis." Why "involved" rather than "*has* involved"? Quaker history is not something finished in the past. As an editor of our most venerable Quaker periodical, I find it somewhat surprising to read that "*The Friend* was found in 1827 and remained the organ of Orthodox Quietism." I am sure Dr. Russell does not mean to imply that *The Friend* is still the organ of Quietism, but he makes no qualifications or explanations.

This last illustration indicates what seems to me the most serious defect of the book, its pigeon-holing tendency. The kinds of Friends are too neatly separated and labeled. Though historical divisions may be necessary in telling a story, Dr. Russell takes his own divisions too seriously, and the result is that the account is over-schematized.

The strongest chapters of the book are those dealing with the separations of the nineteenth century. So well are these chapters done that no new reader need be mystified. They will not soon be superseded. All Friends, and all who feel a debt to the Quaker movement, are now in debt to Elbert Russell.

D. Elton Trueblood

Stanford University

Religion in Soviet Russia 1917-1942. By N. S. Timasheff. New York: Sheed and Ward, 1942. xiv. + 171 pp. $2.00.

This is a very important and fair study of the actual state of the Orthodox Church under the rule of the Soviet Union. In the early days of Soviet rule, there were several studies of the situation as it prevailed at that time, but the events of the last years have not received such careful treatment, and there have been almost no studies of the period of persecution and opposition to religion that took place in 1937-1938.

The book well deserved to be written, but it was especially hard to prepare in 1942 when the American people suddenly found themselves fighting against the Nazis by the side of the Soviet Union, and there is a pronounced tendency, therefore, to pass over as much as possible disagreements between the Soviet Union and the others of the United Nations in matters of religion and other important concerns. Yet it is to be emphasized that Professor Timasheff has definitely tried to ignore questions as to the success or failure of Communism and its nature, except

in so far as it deals with the question of religion. Even problems of morals which may have strange reactions he ignores almost completely.

His conclusions are careful, moderate, and balanced. He sees in the present situation, as evidenced by the response to the latest statements of President Roosevelt, no assurance that there will not be a return to a policy of a direct attack on religion and no certainty that there will be. "Conflicting forces are at issue and can give impetus to one or the other of opposed tendencies, either renewed persecution or continued leniency and compromise" (p. 162), and "Religious freedom in Russia, so long as Communism continues to rule, is impossible" (p. 157). These statements will suit the extremists on neither side of the Soviet question, but they are probably as judicial and scientific as can be made at the present time.

After such an approval it may seem ungracious to add a few criticisms of the work, but these relate rather to omissions than to insertions. First, as regards the Roman Catholic Church: its position in Russia was always unusual, as in most Orthodox countries; its adherents consisted in large part of Poles and Lithuanians and also of certain aristocratic families which naturally were eliminated or liquidated for political and economic reasons. Its very claims to universality conflicted in a special way with the Communist claims to the universality of membership of all laboring classes in the Communist state wherever they lived. Besides that, there have been repeated stories which may or may not be true that there is a secret Roman Catholic hierarchy in the Soviet Union, and the author mentions only in the Selected Bibliography M. D'Herbigny, whose writings and actions have apparently played a considerable role.

The author speaks again and again (cf. pp. 85, 127) of sects and independent groups. Many of these existed long before the Revolution (Dukhobors, Stundists, etc.), and some of their more unruly manifestations have multiplied since the Revolution. In some cases the groundwork had been laid previously for new developments. Thus the Baptists and other Evangelical groups maintained agents and missionaries throughout the early years in the country and may have fostered some of the newer ideas. In fact, the author is dealing chiefly with the Orthodox Church, and his comments on all other groups are extremely sketchy and incomplete. This is an important omission in view of his statement that these groups are attracting members from the Orthodox

Church. Yet if two thirds of the believers belong to the Greek Orthodox Church (p. 94), and if we accept the figures of Coneybeare and others that by 1900 there were at least 20,000,000 Old Ritualists, with a growing number of Stundists and Evangelicals, it is very possible that the actual percentage of religious people has not varied as much as the statements of Professor Timasheff might imply.

We might also take issue with a few statements such as this, "Later on they were called 'old-ritualists' (the usual translation 'old believers' is misleading)" (p. 19). "Old-ritualist" is the translation for *staroobryadyets,* a term often used, but *starovyer*—"old believer"—was even more frequent in Russian usage, and the translators must not be blamed for the confusion. Also, the index and the text refer to W. C. Emhard, but the name is correctly given, Emhardt, in the Selected Bibliography (p. ix). But these are minor defects and omissions. The book is a careful and well-balanced survey of the position of the Orthodox Church in the Soviet Union; and as such it is of unusual value and is today without a rival in its chosen field. Both the author and the publishers are to be congratulated on the work.

CLARENCE A. MANNING

Columbia University

The Christian Faith. By NELS FERRÉ. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1942. xv + 216 pp. $2.00.

The current renaissance of classical Christian theology has not yet produced a *Summa Theologiae* of its positive faith. Nevertheless, it has done us a two-fold preliminary service in advance of that. On the one hand, it has afforded a thoroughgoing criticism of "liberalism" and all its works, which has thus far had a rather bracing though largely negative effect. On the other hand, it has given us a number of books which essay the constructive task of sketching out the general form which an adequate substitute for "liberal theology" might take. Perhaps the most noteworthy of this group are Mackay's *A Preface to Christian Theology* and Whale's *Christian Doctrine. The Christian Faith* deserves a place alongside these. In his preface, Professor Ferré indicates that he is now at work on what he plans to be a ten-volume *Summa* which will present a full-orbed exposition of his theology. This present work is, presumably, a sort of preview or foretaste of the larger

work still to come. For the completion of much of the unfinished business of this volume (and there is much) we must await the fuller statement.

It is possible, however, to appreciate this book on its own considerable merits, apart from what one hopes Ferré may be able to add to the theological system adumbrated in it. It is an affirmative, warm-hearted, sincere book, with a clean fervor about it and real verve in the writing of it. The Christian faith is presented as a "gospel" to men, as the fulfillment of their needs and destiny, as the wisdom and power of God unto salvation. Much of the material in the book has been used in ministers' conferences and must have been very effective in such a context, stimulating and provocative in the hearing. Because it is a sketch rather than a full drawing, however, it is rather less impressive when looked at through the jaundiced eye of the technical theologian or philosopher of religion.

In texture, Ferré's basic thought is faithful to the Pauline-Augustinian-Lutheran tradition of classical Christianity. But he does not merely proclaim the tradition in opposition to all gainsayers. He has an irenic and mediating intent, to conserve or recover the pristine vitality of the tradition and, at the same time, to accept and utilize the results of modern historical and philosophical criticism. "We must strive not for fundamentalism or for liberalism, but for the fullest possible Christian truth and its best possible presentation" (p. 131). Few will dissent from such a sentiment, but it is obviously the envisagement rather than the achievement of the goal; and, actually, the acids of modernity have only etched a pattern on the surface of Ferré's orthodoxy.

His thesis throughout is that Christian faith is "ultimate." It is "the human ultimate," because it satisfies each and the sum of fundamental human needs. They are life, freedom and fellowship, and the sum of them all is blessedness. These are all secured by "self-giving love creative of fellowship" (p. 26) and "creative good-will concerned with the welfare of others" (p. 24). Since love and good-will are primary in Christianity, Christianity is the human ultimate. What is not made clear in such an affirmation is its actual, concrete proof. As it stands, it is a subjunctive claim.

Christianity, it is further urged, is "the historic ultimate," because it can include the values of all the other historical religions but cannot itself be transcended or transvalued. On this point, Ferré corrects the his-

torical relativism of C. C. Morrison and then goes on to formulate a double principle of inclusion and exclusion to mark the relation of Christianity to other religions. On the one hand, *"all things cultural, intellectual, moral, and spiritual which are consistent with a God-centered, sacrificial, creative goodwill as first fully revealed and made effective in Jesus Christ may be freely admitted into the Christian religion"* (p. 47-48). This would allow for a maximum of ethnic and cultural assimilation. Christianity could take over, for example, "African puberty rites and Mohammedan pilgrimages" (p. 49). On the other hand, whatever is inconsistent with Christianity, as defined above, "must be done away" (p. 51). There is radical discontinuity between Christianity and all other religions, but "there can be Hindu Christianity, Chinese Christianity, American Christianity. And each can use its own religious background to enrich its understanding of Christ" (p. 55).

Christianity is "the progressive ultimate, because it is the very purpose of God for man without which progress itself becomes an evil" (p. 78). The self-giving love and creative good-will which are the genius of Christianity constitute the dynamic for all true progress and the norm by which all apparent progress may be tested.

The Christian faith is, finally, "the religious ultimate," because its essential affirmations can be interpreted and re-interpreted within succeeding cultural and intellectual perspectives without becoming outmoded or jejune. In illustrating this claim, Ferré attempts a sketchy but original and suggestive reinterpretation of some of the more difficult items in the Christian faith, the essential meaning or value of which have been usually ignored or denied outright by the liberal tradition. These include the doctrines of the Trinity, Christology, the Virgin Birth, Atonement, the problems of miracle and natural law, the nature of sin and forgiveness, and the saving ways of God. On every point, Ferré acknowledges the difficulties which the modern spirit has found in these ideas but contends for an essential, unchanging truth in them which is not destroyed by criticism. Of especial importance are the sections on the Virgin Birth (ch. IV) and Atonement (ch. V). The master-key for all these locked doors is Ferré's now well-known *agapism*, the contention that *agape* is the substantial content or motif of Christianity. Sometimes his adaptation of Nygren's famous thesis contributes to real understanding; sometimes it seems a wand which

causes difficulties to vanish as though by magic. It is a very great truth, but can it be maintained as the *whole* truth about God and historic Christianity? Waiving, for the moment, both the usual objections to *agapism* (viz., that it is indifferent to the problem of love *and* justice, and that it tends to make love an *idea*), let us ask a further question. Can love be an essence or substance? It is, as Ferré himself points out, "an attitude which needs content" (p. 54); it is "a personal quality" (p. 82). Are attitudes and qualities essences? We are here thrown back into the ancient quarrel between voluntarism and intellectualism. In his intense voluntarism, Ferré has underestimated the difficulties in his own view and the strength of the opposing position. This whole problem requires much further exploration and clarification.

The concluding chapter of the book is concerned with "the meaning of the Gospel of Jesus Christ as it confronts sinful men" (p. 181). The emphasis is on the distinctive Christian interest in soteriology, redemption, transformation of human life, and the fruits of Christian living. Here are some of the most practical sections in the entire book. Ferré's idea of conversion as "at least a life-long process," as "a commitment to spiritual struggle *with* and not *against* God" (p. 202 ff.) is profoundly true and relevant. On the doctrine of forgiveness, he turns from the Lutheran *simul iustus et peccator* to a more genuinely moralistic (i.e., catholic) conception. There are wise words about the social gospel, modern preaching, and religious education, but they are only comments and suggestions rather than constructive and usable alternative theories.

The most obvious limitation of the book is the discrepancy between its title (and sub-title) and contents. From the former one is led to expect a rather complete and closely reasoned "inquiry" which carefully builds a system and patiently disposes of objections and difficulties. What we find is something different: a vigorous and hortatory presentation of a version of the Christian faith which nourishes the mind of faith, but which will hardly persuade the skeptic or the unrepentant liberal. It is definitely more of an "affirmation" than an "inquiry."

A second point of reserve is with regard to Ferré's tendency to oversimplify the difficulties and tensions between classical Christian ideas and the assumptions and methods of "theological liberalism." Throughout the book, but particularly in chapters IV and V, Ferré attempts an irenicon of opposing views. But it can fairly be doubted if many mod-

ernists will accept any such mediation, since its total effect is so clearly conservative. Nevertheless, the effort is valuable, and in the course of it many original and profound insights occur which deserve careful and critical attention by all who look with hope toward the recovery of the strength and truth of classical Christianity.

Again, there will be those who will object to the often over-emphatic and assertoric mood, which is always stimulating but not always convincing (e.g., p. 38). Finally, there is the grave question of Ferré's *agapism,* which does seem to require a radical reduction of the total Jewish-Christian tradition and a dubiously simple reconstruction of the history of Christian doctrine and the metaphysical scaffolding on which the greatest Christian theologians (save Luther, Schleiermacher and Ritschl) have stood as they worked on the building of that history.

For all this, Ferré's is a voice which needs to be heard in American theology. His unique background and training make him a useful interpreter of certain emphases of European (particularly Swedish) Protestantism to the present eager minds of American religious leaders. As a book for preachers and laymen (to whom it is actually addressed) it has a very significant contribution to offer, if it be not abused to sanction an intransigent fundamentalism. It is a book to stir, to suggest, to enrich. But the technical theologican, much as he will profit from its reading, will probably want to wait for the fuller exposition promised before he forms a settled judgment concerning Ferré's theological stature.

ALBERT C. OUTLER

Duke University

The Religious Availability of Whitehead's God; A Critical Analysis. By STEPHEN LEE ELY. Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1942. 58 pp. $1.25.

The purpose of Professor Ely's little book is to inquire whether the conception of God found in the metaphysics of Alfred North Whitehead "can serve religious ends" (p. 3); more especially, whether this conception is of any use to "modern liberal religious feeling" (p. 7). "Modern liberal religious feeling" is not defined; Professor Ely assumes that it requires a God who "wishes humanity well," with whom "man can cooperate to eliminate what man himself finds evil," and whose

values are fundamentally the same as human values (pp. 47, 44, 49). The conclusion of the inquiry, as might be expected, is in the negative; Whitehead's God has not these characteristics, hence he cannot be called good; he is in fact an aesthete of highly dubious moral character, not deserving of the name of God. Indeed, the differences between what religion means to Professor Ely and what it means to Whitehead, between what Professor Ely demands and what Whitehead has to offer, are on the face of things so great that one may wonder why the inquiry was undertaken in the first place.

But such inquiries are natural and will continue to be made, since Whitehead's God is even more obviously not the omnipotent God of Augustine or Calvin, and since he was suggested as relevant to an eventual new reformation in theology. Professor Ely's essay is significant because, whether the author so intended it or not, it expresses what is probably the prevailing Protestant reaction to Whitehead's proposal.

The essay is necessarily based on Whitehead's *Process and Reality*. But the book which followed that, *Adventures of Ideas*, deserves more than the passing references accorded it. And despite limitations of space, in an investigation on this topic it is really necessary to take into account Whitehead's latest book, *Modes of Thought*, and his papers published in 1941, on "Mathematics and the Good" and "Immortality."[1]

I should suggest that when Professor Ely's readers are drawing their conclusions from the demonstrated distance between him and his philosopher, they separate two questions. First, were the philosopher's initial demands on religion too slight, or the critic's initial demands too restrictive? Second, does the critic examine the relationship between God and the world that is actually set forth in Whitehead's metaphysics, or something else?

Under the first head, it should be remarked that the question of God's omnipotence (an attribute rejected by Whitehead) does not enter into the inquiry at all. Professor Ely's sole question is whether the God under discussion is "all-good." His demand is that God be proved "benevolent toward humanity," (p. 47) and benevolent, not in the sense of preserving human values in his own being—such a God would be merely selfish—but in our own being. This demand is not

1. The papers may be found in *The Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead* (Vol. III of *The Library of Living Philosophers*), edited by P. A. Schilpp, Northwestern University, 1941. "Immortality" has also been published in the *Harvard Divinity School Bulletin*, Vol. XXXIX, no. 14.

supported by argument; it is simply the way Professor Ely feels about God, or if not that, the way he feels other people must feel about God if they are to be called religious. A conception of God that does not meet this demand he considers "not available for religious purposes." What we have here is, of course, but one of the criteria of availability that have appealed to religious men and theologians.

Under the second head—the interpretation of Whitehead—it must be said, I think, that Professor Ely has not examined Whitehead's God, but one made of straw. The expository half of the book (pp. 8-12, 14-39) is excellently done,—a competent, highly readable description of the nature of Whitehead's God. The antagonism that finally comes out in Professor Ely's conclusion appears only in the pleasant garb of wit; it may be said that the discussion is on the whole careful and balanced. It is the more regrettable that a failure to get inside Whitehead's thought in respect to one central idea makes the main criticism simply beside the point. The idea is the one called by the technical name, "objectification," in *Process and Reality,* and by the more familiar "immanence" in *Adventures of Ideas.*[2] The heart of Whitehead's metaphysical enterprise is his proposal of an alternative to the traditional conception of individual substance in general; the distinctive character of his view on the interaction of God and the world is mainly due to that alternative. To put it briefly, the "philosophy of organism" endeavors to give us ideas in terms of which we can say that one individual, or a part of it, becomes literally a constituent in another individual, and that without ceasing to be itself. Professor Charles Hartshorne has called this the doctrine of "the compound individual."[3] As it is a relatively novel conception, in its first exposition it is necessarily by no means perfected; and if we were to assume that it has a future, still for a long time to come the ideas of individuality which now dominate our thinking would cause Whitehead's conception to seem a strange, perhaps an impossible, one. In the meantime, the critic who undertakes to test the utility of the new conception in some respect, must simply do his best to test *it,* and not a mixture of it and current conceptions.

Now, from a religious point of view the most important aspect of Whitehead's God is, as Professor Ely says, what goes by the name of his

2. Chapters 10-13.

3. In his contribution to *Philosophical Essays for Alfred North Whitehead* (Longmans, 1936).

"consequent nature." This is God as the end, receiving the individuals of the temporal world into his own being. Thereby God preserves all achieved values; more, in his experience everything, including what in the temporal world would be called mere wreckage, is enhanced in value through being integrated with its "ideal complement." Applying Whitehead's general conception of the mutual immanence of individuals, we must suppose that it is the temporal individuals *themselves* that here enter into God's being, and that in so entering they do not cease to be themselves. Whether such a state of affairs can be imagined is beside the point;[4] we may indeed say that if it is easy to imagine, then it is probably neither very valuable nor very novel, either in its religious quality or as metaphysics. The point is that we must make the supposition, or we are not testing the conception of God that is set forth in the philosophy of organism.

Professor Ely occasionally makes, but in his criticisms (pp. 40-56) fails to maintain, this supposition. Forgetting that according to Whitehead my experience becomes a part of God's—that God's "consequent nature" has indeed no content except for the completion of every passing and past occasion—he slips into the assumption that God's experience and mine are always separate things; if God in his experience preserves and enhances my values, that is all very well for him, but does not help me, is for me "at best, only a vicarious joy" (p. 50). It follows that Whitehead's God is a selfish creature who builds his gain on my loss; emphatically he is not available for my religion. Sometimes assuming (e.g., p. 49) that it is indeed I who enter into God's being, Professor Ely then forgets or denies (p. 49) Whitehead's conception of immanence, according to which I thereby lose none of my individuality. He assumes that if I do become part of God, I will be "merged" (pp. 36, 49, 49—the word is not used by Whitehead) in a vast impersonal system, transformed into a mere factor in the final aesthetic unity of the cosmos. But Whitehead writes of the "consequent nature" of God as "composed of a multiplicity of elements with individual self-realization," as "just as much a multiplicity as it is a unity."[5]

4. I infer from one passage (p. 49) that Professor Ely finds this state of affairs unimaginable.

5. *Process and Reality*, Part v, Ch. ii, beginning of § vii. On the preservation of our individualities in God, see also the last two paragraphs of that section. Attention should be called to the fact that the last paragraph does not appear in the American edition of the book, but is added in the English edition.

In short, Professor Ely spoils his examination of Whitehead by picturing God to himself as a being outside the world who observes the world and is jolly well obligated to see to things. From this point of view, of course, "It is no help for present ills to know that God sees them in such a way that they are valuable for him" (p. 41).

Professor Ely joins the company of those who have condemned Whitehead for considering beauty a more fundamental notion in metaphysics than either goodness or truth. Here again his criticism does not go deep enough. The general basis for the "aesthetic" orientation of this metaphysics is the fact that Whitehead finds in beauty, considered as "the mutual adaptation of the several factors in an occasion of experience,"[6] the key to the question, how to conceive of value, and of the differences in achievement that characterize the different types of existence. Since every existent achieves some such adaptation, every existent has in itself some positive value which may be called in this general sense aesthetic. Professor Ely, after writing a good exposition of this general point of view (pp. 23-24), in his criticism falls into the established habit of thinking of values as *either* aesthetic *or* moral (pp. 53), and furthermore as either positive or negative (pp. 36, 40, 44). Whitehead's God then seems to him to care for aesthetic values only and to be incapable of helping man in the battle between positive and negative values.

An inevitable question in connection with Whitehead's conception of God is: to what extent are the characteristics of this God necessary consequences of the metaphysical system, to what extent additions compatible with the system yet necessitated not by it, but rather by Whitehead's religious intuitions or predilections? In the nature of the case, it is very hard for anyone to go far toward answering this question. The natural temptation of a commentator is to force an answer by breaking up this part of the metaphysics, so as to distinguish several "functions" of God. Professor Ely distinguishes God's preservation of temporal values from his enhancement of them. However, I do not think this distinction of functions has much intrinsic importance in Whitehead's thought.

Professor Ely's final criticism is an effort to clap onto Whitehead's statements the old dichotomy between propositions that are metaphysically demonstrated and proportions whose credentials are intuitive. A

6. *Adventures of Ideas*, p. 324.

statement that, "There is nothing here in the nature of proof," is quoted to show that, on Whitehead's own admission, God's "saving" or preserving function is not "reached by philosophical analysis" (Ely, p. 56). Starting from here and assuming that this function of God is essential for religion, Professor Ely reaches the conclusion: "When Whitehead is speaking as a philosopher he has no right to the term God"; and when Whitehead is not speaking as a philosopher (either he *is* or he *isn't,* you know) he is merely expressing his own intuitions, intuitions which religionists will reject as insufficient in comparison with their own (pp. 56-57). But read the entire paragraph in Whitehead;[7] remember that the whole metaphysical scheme was set forth in the first place as an imaginative construction which takes suggestions from science and religion alike and aims to fuse the two "into one rational scheme of thought,"[8] and not at all as a "philosophical [implying, a non-religious] analysis" which attains this or that conclusion by demonstration; your confidence in Professor Ely's division of Professor Whitehead will disappear. About all you can say with reasonable certainty is that the Whitehead of *Process and Reality* seems to have more confidence in the "primordial nature" of his God (for without that there would be on his view no world-order)[9] than in the "consequent nature" (without which the temporal world would be the end of the story). You *may* also find it possible to drive a wedge between Whitehead's general theory of the mutual immanence of individuals and his application of this theory to the relation between God and the world. Perhaps the general theory does not allow for, perhaps it does not even permit, what Whitehead proposes: that the immanence I described above shall carry with it, in the case of God's relation to the world, retention of the subjective immediacy of the temporal individuals. That to my mind would be the way to begin your criticism of Whitehead. But Professor Ely does not work along this line.

As for the intuitive element in Whitehead—the use he makes of religious experience—I have no idea how much of truth may be contained here; but on reading part v of *Process and Reality,* and chapter x in *Adventures of Ideas,* I cannot but notice that this element in White-

7. The first paragraph of *Process and Reality,* Part v, Ch. ii, § ii.

8. *Ibid.,* p. 23 in Amer. ed., p. 21 in Eng. ed.

9. The "primordial nature" is roughly identical with the God Whitehead expounded in *Science and the Modern World* as "the Principle of Concretion."

head's thought has a rather challenging connection with the teaching of Jesus. This topic lies outside Professor Ely's discussion; presumably it has some bearing on the religious availability of Whitehead's God.

Investigations into the religious value of this God are desirable, but bound to be extremely difficult. One main reason for interest in the subject is doubtless Whitehead's denial of omnipotence to God, and the reader's thought that in this way the problem of evil may be solved. I suspect, with regret, that to most "liberal" religious thinkers the non-omnipotent God of William James, being designed especially to help man diminish evil, is much more congenial. James's God and Whitehead's, though we find them sometimes bracketed, are in reality poles apart.

James's God may be "available." I do not like the word as applied to Whitehead's. "Available" connotes "ready for use." Of course Whitehead's God is not ready for the common man's use. Is not the metaphysical achievement, the first systematic sketching of the idea, enough for one man to have done? In looking forward to use, we should ask if it be not true that "If you want to make a new start in religion, based upon ideas of profound generality, you must be content to wait a thousand years."[10]

VICTOR LOWE

The Ohio State University

Religious Crossroads. By RADOSLAV A. TSANOFF. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1942. xiv + 384 pp. $3.75.

"The understanding of religion demands grasp of its history and development." Such an understanding, however, is not achieved "by external inspection alone, no matter how competent. He who would probe it to the heart must himself be in search of a heart and center of spiritual values." Nevertheless, the historical study of religion saves us "from spiritual provincialism" and sets "before us significant alternatives for our own thought."

Except for possible picayunish quibbling about the word spiritual, most would agree with these general methodological remarks. Such agreement as to method, however, by no means assures agreement as to

10. *Adventures of Ideas,* p. 220.

what constitutes the essential character of religion, or what are the solutions of the important problems which "religious experience presents to reflective thought." And finally, though Dr. Tsanoff cautions readers against the traditionalist fallacy and the novelist fallacy, the problem still remains whether one may not be spiritually provincial as a result of a too narrow conception of the historical method.

Unlike even the most sophisticated of orthodox and neo-orthodox scholars who are reasonably conversant with the world-wide areas of historical fact, Dr. Tsanoff is sympathetic to and would learn of spiritual matters from all religious sources. Not only is he familiar with the history and methods of *Religionswissenschaft,* but he appears thoroughly at ease in the field of primitive and Oriental religions and their thought patterns. All that is very refreshing. Nevertheless, after beginning in an introductory chapter on "The Critical Study of Religion" in a truly universal and global fashion, which he continues throughout the book, evenly in some chapters ("Religion and Morality"; "Mysticism"; and others), unevenly in other chapters ("Recorded Religion: The Interpretation of the Bible"; "Sin, Salvation and Atonement"), he ends with a chapter on "Modern Thought" which restricts itself entirely to a discussion of the "Christian Position." Provincialism of this sort stands in vivid contrast to such an earlier work, for example, as *The Quest of the Ages,* by A. E. Haydon, in which a truly global point of view was effectively achieved. Even so, Dr. Tsanoff's work is so much less provincial than most that it will greatly contribute to an enlarged view of the study of religion.

A critical study of religion, it must now be evident, has failed to provide agreement with respect to the essence of religion. In some measure it might perhaps be agreed that religion relates to values, though objection may be raised that it deals, as Dr. Tsanoff joins others in holding, with the preservation of values. But to conclude that religion is man's "spiritual self-realization" and "a quest of the Divine" is to call forth the objections not only of those who might justly in some cases be charged with neglect of metaphysics, but of naturalists, who also base their work on a thoroughgoing grasp of critical methods of the study of religion. With these Dr. Tsanoff enters into no serious combat and, to that extent, weakens the extensive effectiveness of his work.

And finally, turning to reflective thought, to create a dualism of "inner spirit" of religion and its "outer shell" of ceremony, doctrine, etc.,

or, at least, to give undue importance to the former is to abandon no small part of the very historical body of religion, the meaning of which is to be grasped by the critical method. Such an extreme emphasis leaves religion virtually in a vacuum; religion's full-bodied reality involves no less those very aspects which Dr. Tsanoff depreciates. Then, after an excursion to far places, to identify this religious "inner spirit" first with Christianity and even more narrowly with "fatherly and brotherly love as God's word to man, the salvation of men in Him through each other" is to effect a philosophical provincialization of religion which one may safely predict will not be socially upheld by historical events in the future, any more than it has been in the past.

Even were there a general acceptance of Dr. Tsanoff's proposition that a "Higher Naturalism is required," one in which "God is again recognized as manifest throughout, but manifest as the supreme and ultimate significance and ideal of the world," the effort to resolve the conflicts within the "modern temper" simply by placing the "center of gravity of religion" in the "inner spirit" and then requesting orthodoxy to recognize growth in knowledge is but the effort to formulate a naturalistic substitute for the old idea of progressive revelation. Such a program labors under the same difficulty as its predecessor, so long as the dice are always loaded in favor of an already existing but profoundly challenged doctrine of any given religion, formulated and crystalized in the past. Progressive revelation, moreover, was challenged from the left not as *progressive* but as revelation. Likewise growing Christian-knowledge is challenged not as *growing* but as Christian-knowledge, something intolerably provincial.

Not only, however, is the passage from the "Higher Naturalism" to the "inner spirit" and its Christian-emphasized content achieved too easily, but the passage from the lower to the "Higher Naturalism" is likewise. Within the world of those who are still struggling in prolonged fashion both out of orthodoxy and out of that Modern Temper made famous in the twenties, the challenge of neo-orthodoxy and of science conceived only as a value system may be so convincing as to suggest the need for giving new life and direction to the efforts of the modernism of a few decades ago. But perhaps it is not without point to remind ourselves that the high hopes of secular religion are far from dimmed—are indeed dominant in the world viewed globally—and that science is being kept modest by the still continuing presence of matter

and of physical categories. To the men who are moving into the world of global religion in the spirit of free adventure, these challenges are not convincing. For them, Dr. Tsanoff's book will represent too great a turning to the *inner* spirit, and a far greater compromise with traditionalism than a global attitude can bear, or than the religious character of the non-traditional world makes necessary. And for them, too, a far more important task than "reconciling" Christianity (or for that matter all the traditional religions, Oriental and Occidental) and the Modern Temper is that of giving new religious forms to our emerging global cultures and assuring that these forms shall be as undogmatic as those which science provides. Either Dr. Tsanoff did not intend the special emphasis on Christianity which I have here imputed to him or his book, begun in the comprehensive and non-provincial spirit, is incomplete in that he did not bring up to date the other religions he had dealt with earlier in the work, and did not share with us what he conceived to be their ideal trends. But perhaps Dr. Tsanoff will do that for us in some later book which will contain the same great merits of insight, clear exposition, and fairness present in this volume. The book, like all of Dr. Tsanoff's works, is good medicine —for students, general readers, and colleagues generally who share with him the conviction of the importance of religion.

HAROLD BUSCHMAN

The University of Kansas City

The Highway of God. By RALPH W. SOCKMAN. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1942. ix + 218 pp. $2.00.

This book contains the addresses delivered by the Minister of Christ Church, New York, on the Lyman Beecher Foundation, at Yale University Divinity School. A lectureship established in 1872, and having on its list of speakers many eminent names, it has a reputation for excellence which is well maintained by the author of the book. Intended primarily to be of assistance to students preparing for the ministry, the published lectures have a range of interest which makes them widely attractive to readers generally.

The skill of Dr. Sockman as a preacher is shown at once in his selection of a significant incident related in the Gospels which gives him his theme, and also the framework of treatment. Serving as a

text, it is not used as a springboard to jump off into space, but as firm ground on which to build an impressive structure of exposition. The incident is the coming of messengers from John the Baptist in prison to ask of Jesus, "Art thou he that should come? Or look we for another?" Jesus' reply is given in the form of questions as to what men saw in John, leading up to His comment, "But he that is least in the Kingdom of God is greater than he." An illuminating parallel is then drawn by Dr. Sockman with the present confusion in men's minds, with the questions they are asking, their uncertainty in recognizing a prophet, and the necessity is made plain for building the highway of God that leads to the new order of the Kingdom.

As the lectures were delivered prior to the entry of the United States into the world war, the conditions of today are in certain respects different from those described. Youths who formerly were often bewildered and perhaps misled, are now showing that they have positive convictions for which they are willing to risk their lives. Nevertheless, what Dr. Sockman has written about a widespread confusion, as to the need that issues be clarified and a clear goal for achievement be seen, has a greater relevance and urgency.

That a preacher should not be a "reed in the wind" is discussed in a striking chapter. Necessary as it is that preaching should not be dull, desirable as it may be to attract large congregations, an extremely subtle danger to the minister is, that instead of leading men to build the highway, he will be a reed that bends to the passing wind of popularity. The writer of this review recalls a remark by Professor R. H. Tawney, that spiritual culture is not a matter of mass-production, nor does the Kingdom of God come by statistics. The minister must address his preaching to persons, to the needs of individuals, but, "The church will lose even its power of personal evangelism if, having once caught the social vision, it should go back to an individualistic gospel of merely saving men out of the world. . . . If we are to prepare a highway for our God, we must project the old personal virtues up to the new social frontiers" (pp. 45f.). And here the winds of selfish practices and defective ways of thinking will be met. Or, to change the figure, "The task of the preacher is to lift men above the low views of their times, to give them the elevation and outlook which enables them to distinguish currents from eddies" (p. 59).

Another discriminating chapter is on the prophet. His role is not

that of divination, nor primarily that of prediction, though he may justifiably predict. "To reveal God is the central and essential funcion of the prophet" (p. 101). While his own intelligence and insight must be used, he is one who speaks on an authority higher than his own, and in whose message men hear the authentic ring of divine truth. It is no less essential that men should recognize a prophet, and not fail to heed him, as men did John, leaving it to a later generation to build his tomb. The manner in which God speaks to men is not as though their minds were wax cylinders of a phonograph into which sentences are to be dictated, but through the inspiration and illumination of a spiritual fellowship with Him.

The Kingdom of God, led up to by the comment of Jesus on John the Baptist, is a major subject of the book. This theme Dr. Sockman discusses with clear comprehension and well-balanced judgment. He rightly emphasizes that it was "the focal feature of Jesus' message" (p. 157). After referring to various views as to its nature, he points out, "But amid all these fluctuations of interpretation we cannot forget that Jesus talked about the Kingdom of Heaven as a reality already here. . . . . Here was a reality not perceived by the senses, yet more real than the sensuous" (p. 162). While not of this world and extending infinity beyond it, the Kingdom is *for* this world; and the petition in the prayer given by Jesus, "Thy Kingdom come," is to be taken seriously and to be translated into action. The coming of the Kingdom is not accurately represented as in the extreme apocalyptic interpretation, which holds that it is to appear as a sudden act of divine intervention for which men have only passively to wait—a view that has been characterized in a paraphrase of a well-known hymn:

> Sit down, O Men of God!
> He will His Kingdom bring
> Whenever it may please His will;
> You cannot do a thing.

It comes not as something foreign to this earth interposed by divine intervention, nor as something to be built by man's efforts, but as a potential presence to be realized by removing the barriers and letting it spread (p. 168). Admitting that the complete and perfect rule of God as conceived by Jesus is an absolute never to be fully realized in history, nevertheless that ideal should serve to inspire social effort, not to paralyze it. . . . Believing that we are "workers together with God" for a Kingdom which can come on earth as in heaven, we

can the better "run with patience the race that is set before us, looking unto Jesus the author and finisher of our faith" (p. 171).

The book abounds in apt citations and illustrations which show the author's wide reading and close observations. Many of his concise summaries have the unforgettable quality of aphorisims. The book is one that is highly commended.

RAYMOND C. KNOX

Columbia University

The Christian and the War. By CHARLES CLAYTON MORRISON. Chicago: Willett and Clark Company, 1942. 145 pp. $1.50.

Few people have occupied themselves more with the subject of war and peace than Dr. Charles Clayton Morrison, and the *Christian Century,* which he edits, has been one of the most consistent foes of the war system in American life. The "outlawing" of war by the Kellogg-Briand pact, from which the world hoped so much, was influenced in no small degree by the active efforts of Dr. Morrison and the *Christian Century.* Indeed, the very article by Samuel Levinson which was basic to the idea of outlawing war was published by Dr. Morrison. All during the anxious months previous to the outbreak of the war the *Christian Century* and Dr. Morrison fought tenaciously against American intervention in the conflict. Probably larger space was given to the pacifist position by this magazine than any other periodical not itself specifically pacifist, and more active sympathy shown for the pacifist point of view than by any other influential religious publication.

Then came Pearl Harbor. What should the editorial policy of the magazine be now? In the introduction to the book under review here, which is simply a collection of editorials that appeared successively in the *Christian Century* in the weeks following Pearl Harbor, Dr. Morrison gives a glimpse of what went on in his own mind. The first editorial, "The Dilemma of Conscience," is a crystallization of the problems which the war brought. His own first reaction to it was that the war was an "unnecessary necessity."

He writes We too must accept the war. . . . "We see no other way at the moment but the bloody way of slaughter and immeasurable sacrifice. . . . We stand with our country. We cannot do otherwise. . . . Our country is at war.

Its independence and possibly its life are at stake. We have not illusions about what war can accomplish . . . but what we now confront is a condition not a contingency. The condition presents us with a tragic necessity. . . . The course that led to it was not a necessity. There is no easy way out of tragedy, and there is no easy way out of this tragedy, for the starkest tragedy is an unnecessary necessity."

Around these two concepts of war as unescapable necessity and tragedy Dr. Morrison builds the philosophy of war which the volume sets forth at considerable length.

Up until the moment when war was thrust upon us by the Japanese invasion of Pearl Harbor it was possible to take one attitude toward it, but once war had broken out a new situation had presented itself—a situation in which most of what was said before Pearl Harbor concerning war is irrelevant. There are three points of view from which war may now be regarded. These he calls the pacifist, the Christian militarist, and Christian realist positions, his own position being that of the Christian realist. By taking unto himself the name realist he asserts his conviction that both pacifist and Christian militarist take an unrealistic view of war, since they attempt to deal with a wholly new situation under moral and theological categories which are relevant only to the old. For once war has come,

the canons of right and wrong which are the criteria of ethical behavior in peacetime do not apply. . . . The argument over rights and wrongs prior to war is irrelevant. To insist upon dragging forward the discussion as to the relative right and wrong of ourselves and our enemy is to appeal to a standard which war itself has cast down. It obscures the real issue and clutters up the conscience of the citizen where stark reality presents him with an unescapable necessity.

Both the Christian pacifist and the Christian militarist are caught in the tragic necessity of war and can find no humanly righteous way out of it. But, declares Dr. Morrison, "there yet remains a Christian way through the tragedy." The Christian, he says, must carry this empirical necessity of war "up to the level of Christian faith and ask what it means in the judgment of God that war is neither right nor wrong but tragic." This leads to his discussion of God and the war and results in the interesting theological doctrine that war is the judgment of God upon man, and the corollary that war is truly Hell, not simply in the Shermanesque dictum, "war is hell," but in a profoundly theological sense.

To the affirmation of the Oxford and subsequent religious conferences that war is sin, Dr. Morrison replies that war is not itself sin but the judgment of God upon sin. It is rather the conditions that lead to war, the injustice, the inequalities, the exploitation, etc., that constitute the sinful act. War is God's judgment upon sin. Because man has sinned by his refusal to live co-operatively and share his goods with those who lack and to settle his differences by peaceful means, the judgment of God in the form of war is visited upon him. To quote the author,

> War is hell because it is God's judgment upon the nations for their sins, for having done those things they ought not to have done and having left undone those things they ought to have done. Hell is not sin, it is the punishment for sin. So war is not sin but the wages of sin. Whether one thinks of hell in the imagery of the old school theology or in terms of actual experiences in this world, its essential principle inheres in the fact that man has come under the condemnation of God because his will has come into collision with the will of God. This collision of man's will with God's will is what sin is, and its effect is hell, now or in some future life, and this is what war is.

Here is an interesting theological declaration which the theologians will doubtless debate for many a day. It is vigorously stated and vigorously defended. It represents, I think, rather a new religious interpretation of war. As such, it may be considered important to future Christian thought about war.

Whether one agrees or disagrees with Dr. Morrison and his thesis, he will agree as he reads the book that few persons have seen more clearly the utterly devastating nature of war and the utter impossibility for any one, pacifist, militarist, or realist, of dissociating himself wholly from it. All are caught up inexorably in it and can find no way out of some measure of participation if they continue to live. Dr. Morrison chose the way of supporting participation in the military struggle. He cannot himself take the pacifist way out, though he is sympathetic with those who do. It seems to the writer, who is himself a pacifist, that he underestimates the value of the pacifist protest against the institution of war, futile though it may seem to be during wartime, in determining national policy. One wonders if Dr. Morrison envisions in some distant future a time when war will not be. If such a time is ever to come, one wonders whether it can come if, when war has begun, due to a failure of pacific processes, all men accept it even momentarily as the way out

and lend themselves to war. Or will not the very strength of pacific processes during peacetime be determined to a considerable degree by the fidelity to conviction of that increasing number of pacifists who, in time of war as in time of peace, decline to participate in violence as a method of achieving their ends.

At any rate this is a highly stimulating book on the topic that more than any other holds the minds of men today.

CHARLES S. BRADEN

Northwestern University

BOOK NOTES

The Babylonian Genesis: The Story of Creation. By ALEXANDER HEIDEL. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942. xi + 131 pp. $1.50.

Dr. Heidel, of the Oriental Institute in Chicago, who has previously published an excellent Assyriological dissertation, has sought to serve the Old Testament scholar and the Christian minister by presenting the Babylonian sources dealing with the creation of the world in an up-to-date translation and discussing their bearing on the biblical Creation Story. As Research Assistant on the Assyrian Dictionary project, he has had the fullest lexicographical information available, and in addition has had the help and counsel of such a veteran Assyriologist as Professor Arno Poebel and of so able a scholar as Dr. Thorkild Jacobsen. Even the Orientalist will welcome these renderings and the footnotes in which they are often justified. Dr. Heidel gives us not only *Enuma Elish,* as the Creation Epic of Babylon is called, but the other known short texts dealing with this theme, together with the excerpts from Berossus and Damascius. The book has been reproduced from typewritten manuscript by a photographic process—doubtless a harbinger of the age of poverty now being inaugurated—but the appearance of the pages is not at all unpleasing.

Dr. Heidel devotes a whole chapter to the Old Testament parallels. His lengthy exegesis of the opening verses of Genesis seems an unnecessary departure from his main line and contains only what the better commentaries already offer. In his discussion of the relation of *Tehom* (the Deep) to the monster *Tiâmat* he considers the possibility that a form *Tihamat* may have existed in Babylonian literature (an astounding remark since this *h* sound is not found in Babylonian writing). He discusses Gunkel's theory of an older Hebrew cosmogony, in which the creation of heaven and earth was preceded by a conflict between the creator and a mythological monster, but arrives at a negative result. Here the viewpoint of the author strikes the reviewer as too narrow. That the O.T. allusions to a primeval combat are an echo of pagan mythology seems incontrovertible. The only fault in Gunkel's masterly discussion is its too definite a linking up of the Hebrew material with the Babylonian story of creation. The latter is a representative, not the sole source of the "mythological conflicts." One might wish that Dr. Heidel had omitted his discussion of the doctrine of inspiration, in the course of which he quotes Missouri-Synod Lutheran dogmaticians as high authorities. The pages wasted here, and in the aforementioned exegesis, might better have been devoted to a consideration of the bearing of certain passages in the Gilgamesh epic on Genesis 2 and 3; except for a discussion of the Adapa myth the author remains entirely centered on Genesis 1. In the literature quoted one misses Ebeling's *Weltschoepfungslied,* of 1921, the more since the author adopts the position first put forward in that work that *Enuma Elish* is a hymn rather than an epic. But such minor criticisms as are here offered must not obscure the fact that this is a very welcome book, for which the author is to be commended.

EMIL G. KRAELING

The Book of Mencius (abridged). Translated from the Chinese by LIONEL GILES. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1942. 129 pp. $1.25.

Mencius was one of the world's great literary artists. His permanent influence was achieved largely by the vivid expression of his thought. Stories such as that about the man of Sung who pulled at his corn to make it grow (p. 43) and the saying, "To hate dishonor and yet be content to lack benevolence is like hating dampness and yet living in a hollow" (p. 47), are examples of the forceful way he put his teachings. As a result, Mencius has been read and studied in China as has perhaps no other single teacher.

This translation, like the other volumes in the "Wisdom of the East Series," is of a popular rather than a scholarly nature. There is a very brief introduction (only eleven pages), which summarizes, sketchily, but, in general, soundly: Chinese history, the life and character of Mencius, the authorship and composition of this work, Confucian philosophy, and contemporary philosophical doctrines. The translation includes only a little more than half of what is found in the present book of Mencius. The notes are very brief, but assist in understanding the text.

Books of excerpts always have serious limitations. For popular consumption, they are, of course, useful. In this case, however, we miss quite a few interesting passages: V, II, iv, where Mencius interprets the poem declaring that the whole country should be under one sovereign; V, II, ii, his systematization of feudal services; IV, I, III, his assertion that the presence or absence of benevolence causes the rise or fall of dynasties; I, II, xiv, where he predicts for a line of good rulers the kingship of the whole country; V, I, vi, his explanation of why Confucius did not become the Son of Heaven; VI, I, vii, his statement of the difference between a sage and a common man; III, I, i, his assertion that all men are potentially sages; V, I, iii, his account of the mythical sage Shun's troubles with his vicious parents and brother; IV, II, xxiv, the story of the chivalrous Yü-gung Sz, who refused in battle to kill his archery teacher; III, I, v, Mencius' defence of Confucian funerary customs; II, I, vii, the criticism of his sumptuous burial for his mother; and I, II, xiv, other criticisms of him. These passages are by no means unimportant and should have been included.

This translation of the *Mencius* is not so much a new translation as an "englishing" of Legge's translation. Legge possessed a profound knowledge of Chinese and had unusually competent Chinese helpers, but he had difficulty in writing clear and idiomatic English. His translation is consequently very good, but not easy to understand. Giles has put Legge's translation into clear and forceful English. In this respect his translation is better than that of Lyall, which appeared in 1932. Legge's "vast, flowing passion-nature" is now translated by "spirit that is vast and sublime" (p. 42)—certainly a more understandable phrase, although perhaps "the purity of my spirit" might be better (it is supported by a third century authority). Legge's "Words which are simple, while their meaning is far-reaching" (VII, II, xxxii, 1) becomes, "Words concerned with the near yet pointing far away" (p. 125), a rendering that conveys the original meaning much better.

Yet Giles's translation is not always good. He has not made use of all the Sinological knowledge that has recently become available. The first emperor appeared in China only in B.C. 215, half a century after the death of Mencius, yet the term "empire" is frequently used in this translation—an anachronism produced by the translator. "Middle Kingdom" (pp. 60, 61, 62) was not the ancient meaning of *jung-guo;* the use of this term in the *Mo-dz* shows that it meant "the [northern] central [Chinese] states." Legge's "licentious" (III, II, ix, 10) is interpreted to be "lewd" (p. 69)—a mistranslation, for the context shows that *fang-yin* here means merely "outrageously wicked." Worst of all, in the parallel passages on pages 50 and 94, identical Chinese technical philosophical terms are translated differently: "shame" (*ch'a-wu*) in the first passage becomes "shame and repugnance" in the second; "feelings of right and wrong" (*shzh-fei*) becomes "moral discrimination"; and "good manners" (*li*) becomes "propriety." A careful translator would not have been thus inconsistent. It is to be hoped that Mencius will eventually find a translator who can write as forceful English as Giles, and who will attempt throughout to correct Legge's errors, instead of accepting them.

HOMER H. DUBS

Behind the Face of Japan. By UPTON CLOSE. New York and London: D. Appleton-Century Company, 1942. xii + 427 pp. $4.00.

Among all the recent books on Japan that have come my way, this one dealing with the whole national character explains in the most convincing manner the close bond between religious faith and political action in the nation, which of old, and at present perhaps more than ever before, is conscious of its divine mission to establish "the eight pillars," i.e., all the parts of the world, "under one roof," and to bring the millenium of peace to all mankind. This national-religious faith is a unifying instrument without equal, and as old as the nation's history, but at times it is stimulated afresh, as in 1921, when this nation became aware of being wrong in its isolationist politics.

The author, who was at home in China, Japan, and the Pacific area for decades, and is classed in Nippon among the "know-too-much" people, writes out of his long personal experience. Therefore there is much of unusual interest in the book welcome to the scholar in the field, and also much detail for which one would like to have available sources.

Some special points should be noted. From the remarks of Mr. Close the reader gathers the impression that in Shinto, more than in any other religion, the gods (of whom billions are registered though only three to five score are worshipped) are addressed not so much to win their help as to affirm a feeling of duty toward the nation and its ruler. This feeling of duty is based on the nation's obligation to the sacred person of the Emperor and his divine family. In this Mr. Close discerns the basic characteristic of the Japanese mentality, both in political and religious matters. Although the author does not deal in definite conclusions, he does stress the fact that the Japanese is a man complete

in his own strength. In religious life this signifies that communication with the deities means to enter the sympathetic sphere of the ancestors, or of the national unity as a whole, which reaches back through innumerable milleniums, and thus to realize the entire complex of national and patriotic responsibility. A Japanese may easily commit the unforgivable sin against the sacred motherland, personified in the divine person within the palace moat of Tokyo,—the more easily since he lives in a country of strictly constitutional thought control where all things betray a tendency to become nationalistic.

Some interesting pictures are given of private devotion as it is concerned with the visible (though practically invisible) divine manifestation on earth, for whom there is reserved the "Emperor's Seat," an empty chair in miniature, in almost every room of every house in Japan. We are glad to read about the Japanese Halloween, and about Ako's forty-seven ronin, who have become the saints of the patriotic societies. But, we wonder whether the deification of Tenno Ojin into a god of war is as clear in the light of history as is supposed, and why, in this connection, the year 283 is singled out of the forty-three years of this Mikado's rule.

Particular attention has been devoted to the two hero-saints, Shinran and Nichiren, who founded, in the thirteenth century, the largest Buddhist sects in Japan which still retain the original doctrine of salvation by grace. In this connection it should be mentioned that, according to the author's information, the Nichiren sect, which surpasses both Tendai and Shingon, seems to be numerically as strong as the aristocratic, that is, the more Japanized, Zen Buddhism of the *jiriki* type, the religion based on the development of one's own strength, rather than dependance on a divinity.

CARL BETH

The Gospel of Sri Ramakrishna, originally recorded in Bengali, in five volumes by "M," a disciple of the Master. Complete translation, with an introduction, by SWAMI NIKHILANANDA. New York: Ramakrishna Vivekananda Center, 1942. xxiii + 1063 pp. $7.50.

Before this book was written there was no dearth of lives of Ramakrishna. Among the more important Western books upon "the Master" were the following: *Ramakrishna, His Life and Sayings,* by Max Muller (1898); a little book by Swami Vivekananda entitled *My Master* (1903); *The Gospel of Ramakrishna,* a collection of some of the more important sayings from "M's" account of the Master selected by Swami Abhedananda and translated into English in 1907; *Sri Ramakrishna the Great Master,* by Swami Saradananda, in two volumes (1920-1921); *La Vie de Ramakrishna,* by Romain Rolland (1929); An account of Sri Ramakrishna and his teachings by Swami Nirvedananda, in Volume II of the *The Cultural Heritage of India.* This list does not pretend to be exhaustive, but the books named are the more important Western writings on the Indian saint.

Yet, though there was no dearth of books about the Hindu saint, the present volume is very welcome. It is in fact two books: a brief new life of Ramakrishna, and a translation from the Bengali of the detailed and elaborate source on which all lives of the saint chiefly depend, the account of his daily doings and sayings written down during a number of years by Mahendranath Gupta, commonly known as "M." "M" is sometimes spoken of as the Boswell of Ramakrishna. The comparison is obvious, but the similarity not too close. He has simply lumped together an enormous collection of notes concerning the sayings and doings of his Master, which run in the English translation to some 931 pages. The very length of the translation, as well as the careful nature of the life, show that this is a work of love on the part of Swami Nikhilananda. In other ways, as well, no pains have been spared to make this both a definitive and almost a sumptuous biography of "the Master." The book is beautifully bound and printed, contains twenty-four authentic photographs, as well as an analytic table of contents, two appendices, a chronology of Ramakrishna's life, a glossary, an index of Songs and Hymns, and a general index. The reviewer must herewith confess that he has not studied all of "M's" 931 pages, nor would he urge the reader to do so. Fortunately the excellent table of contents enables one to single out the more important passages; fortunately, also, the Swami's excellent Introduction covers all important matters, so that the detailed accounts given us by "M" may be used chiefly as illustrations.

Upon one who is introduced to the Bengali saint for the first time he will make a startling impression. It is as if a Christian saint and mystic from the year 800 suddenly stepped into the nineteenth century. In some ways he is much stranger than any Christian mystic. A fervent devotee of the Goddess Kali, a reverent worshiper of images, an enthusiastic advocate of every known religion, equally devoted to the most personal of goddesses and to the absolute, impersonal Brahma—a man possessed of a great sense of humor, yet lapsing at the least occasion into deep *samadhi,* Ramakrishna is one of the most baffling products of baffling India. Some readers who come upon him for the first time will doubtless say the man was simply insane. It is probable that all western alienists would pronounce him definitely pathological, but while this is doubtless true one feels like exclaiming in the vernacular: "So what?" Long ago William James pointed out that little is said of and concerning the value of a saint or religious teacher by pointing out that he is abnormal. A saint who is not abnormal would not be a saint. To quote from James again: "By their fruits not by their roots you shall know them."

And the fruits of Ramakrishna's work have been considerable. Though like many other religious teachers he did no writing, he launched a movement in Calcutta which spread through Bengal, and finally throughout all India, and is now in lesser degree spreading throughout the world, a movement which is making its contribution toward the deepening spiritualization of world religion.

J. B. P.

The Christian Approach to the Moslem. By James Thayer Addison. New York: Columbia University Press, 1942. 365 pp. $3.75.

What the Christian world has done across the centuries to win Moslems to Christ by the methods the Master suggested amounts to relatively little. Islam is the only religion which has met and conquered Christianity on a large scale. Much of the Mohammedan world was formerly Christian, many of the great mosques were at one time churches. In the Crusades, Christian Europe endeavored to reclaim by the sword much that had been lost to the Moslems by the sword; the Crusades largely failed in their object, but they did leave deep scars upon the Moslem heart and deepen the misunderstandings which have always divided Christianity and Islam. This book makes a very definite contribution to the field of relations between the two great faiths. Anyone who desires to know something of the history of Christian missionary attempts to reach Mohammedans should read it, and the book will be a necessity to the student of Islam and Christian Missions in the Moslem World.

Dr. James Thayer Addison was for many years professor of History of Religion and Missions at the Episcopal Theological School at Cambridge, Massachusetts. More recently he has become a Secretary on the Episcopal Mission Board. He writes concerning missions to the Moslems, because he considers this a crucial field and the most difficult of the worldwide Christian enterprise, to use his own phrase, "difficult beyond all others of its kind."

The book first gives an account of typical examples which illustrate the historic contact of the two faiths. The second section of the volume gives a brief review of the Christian missionary work during the modern age in a number of leading Moslem fields (other countries are briefly considered in a valuable list of appendixes). The third section of the book takes up the presentation of the Christian message to Moslems and problems which it presents.

Since Dr. Addison is essentially a historian, the part of his work on this phase probably makes the greatest contribution to the field. He writes vividly, and both content and style contribute to interest in the great examples of Christian efforts to reach Moslems in past centuries, as well as the review of modern missionary work in this very difficult section of the enterprise.

Dr. Addison has traveled in Mohammedan lands but has not himself been engaged in actual missionary work for Moslems. The third section, on presenting the Message to Moslems, is not all that one might hope, and the title of the book, "The Christian Approach to Moslems," is not entirely fulfiled by the suggestion of a *modus operandi* for presenting the Gospel to Moslems—but, after all, this is one of the most difficult tasks that could be conceived. Historically the approach to Moslems is very well indicated by the typical examples given. Dr. Addison has favored us with one of the most valuable contributions in recent years to the great question he considers, and we hope the book may turn the attention of the Christian Church to the Moslem field, for, as the author says, "One of the great tasks which God has set before His Church for the generations to come—is the conversion of the Moslem World."

J. Christy Wilson

The Crux of Chronology. By FRANK HERMAN MEYER. Boston: Bruce Humphries, Inc., 1942. viii + 599 pp. $3.00.

An enormous amount of work has been devoted to the preparation of this volume, but unfortunately an almost equally enormous amount of work will be imposed on the reader who seeks to understand it. Mr. Meyer's purpose is to fix the chronology of the Gospel story, but in his attempt he travels so far afield and indulges at length in so many irrelevances that the thread of his argument is hopelessly submerged. Writers are cited by the dozens, but usually only in the vaguest fashion (e.g., "Prof. Totten"), and there is no bibliography by which his references can be identified. Nor is there any index nor even a tabular summary of his conclusions. He claims with great assurance that he has fixed the date of the Crucifixion in A.D. 29, but even to find this date in his book involves a desperate hunt through clouds of verbiage.

BURTON SCOTT EASTON

Aristotle and Anglican Religious Thought. Victor Lyle Dowdell. (Bohlen Lectures, 1941.) Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1942. xii + 103 pp. $1.50.

The purpose of the author is "to examine the body of Anglican divinity, to see the touch of Aristotle, and to exhibit the signs of his influence in representative thinkers of the Church of England." This is done in the belief that Aristotle has influenced the development of Anglican theology more profoundly than any other philosopher. Theology is looked upon as a science which treats of certain facts which are given form by the philosophical presuppositions of the theologian. An analysis of a theology, the author maintains, will thus reveal the philosophical framework which is responsible for the specific form which it assumes.

From this point of view a survey is made of the history of Anglican theology, displaying Aristotle's influence on individual thinkers. The limits of the book and the massive extent of the literature examined make it impossible to go much into detailed analysis. In spite of this limitation, the book will be useful to two classes of thoughtful readers: the matured student of historical theology who is at home in the material which is surveyed, and the younger student who may use the book as a guide in the selection of problems which will repay intensive study. The Reverend Mr. Dowdell has pointed the way for investigation of a prime theological problem—the extent and the way in which theology is formed, though not exclusively dependent upon, the philosophical backgrounds of those who engage in its study.

CLARENCE SHUTE

Nathaniel William Taylor, 1786-1858: A Connecticut Liberal. By SIDNEY EARL MEAD. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1942. xi + 259 pp. $2.50.

The ordinary reaction to a discussion of the theological controversies which

dominated the first half of the nineteenth century, is a sense of the overwhelming oppressiveness of an atmosphere of

"Old, unhappy, far-off things,
And battles long ago"

which no longer have significance for us today. But when they are approached sympathetically and understandingly, as they are in the volume under review, we are apt to experience a measure of excitement through our vicarious participation in the struggle on one side or the other.

The present work is "a study of the birth and growth of Taylorism, an offspring of the forced marriage of New England Calvinism with revivalism." We have quoted Professor Mead's own words, not only because they indicate his chief preoccupation in dealing with his subject, but because they describe with admirable accuracy what he has actually accomplished. In other words, this is not a biography in the proper sense of the word, although our author does succeed in giving us a fairly vivid and life-like representation of the New Haven divine, whose figure and features gradually emerge in the course of his scholarly reconstruction of the controversies which rocked Connecticut Congregationalism to its very foundations.

That Nathaniel William Taylor has a particular interest for us today, becomes clear with the realization that " 'his thought formed the main bridge from the inherited orthodoxy of the eighteenth century' to the liberal theology of the nineteenth."

One of the major theses of this study is that Dwight, Beecher, and Taylor, were not the theological heirs of Jonathan Edwards or the *Consistent Calvinists* of the pre-revolutionary period, as has been generally supposed, but of the *Old Calvinists* who preceded them. At least they were far more "temperamentally" akin to the latter. Theologically, the author admits, they are very hard to understand, as they were "never so concerned with building a coherent system of thought as in getting results." The development of this thesis is illuminating, to say the least, and is accompanied by a wealth of illustrations from the period in which Dwight first launched his attack against French infidelity, down through the literary and other attacks which Beecher and Taylor hurled against Unitarianism.

Professor Mead demonstrates a thorough acquaintance with his exceedingly complicated subject, having steeped himself in the contemporary literature, which is not nearly so dry as is ordinarily supposed, when approached sympathetically, as it is in the present case. His attitude is not that of one who has set out to prove a point, but of the impartial historian who seeks to understand and to make clear the diverse forces which were at work, and to set them in their true perspective.

Two glimpses of the titular subject of his work are indelibly stamped upon the mind of the reader. The first is that of the young Taylor, only twenty-six years of age at the time of his installation as pastor of the important Center

Church of New Haven, "uncommonly handsome," tall, his eyes expressive, his "habitual dignity verging on arrogance, so that the feeling of his congregation toward him was tinged with awe." The second is that of the final picture of the old man of nearly seventy, whose eyes still flashed with fire and spirit, reading to his seminary class the old lectures which had by then become dead issues, but still retaining his ability to awaken their enthusiasm and to win their love.

The book does not contain an exhaustive bibliography, but it is abundantly supplied with footnotes which enable the reader to become acquainted with all the more important works by contemporaries and the most recent discussions of the larger questions at issue.

THOMAS C. PEARS, JR.

A Realistic Philosophy of Religion. By A. CAMPBELL GARNETT. Chicago: Willet, Clark, and Company, 1942. ix + 331 pp. $3.00.

In this admirably written and stimulating book Professor Garnett takes up the task carried on by Macintosh, Wieman, and others interested in the development of an empirical philosophy of religion. His method of approach "combines the logical analysis of concepts with the phenomenological analysis of experience"—experience of value, will, and feeling, as well as of sense-data. From an examination of religious experience as it occurs in individual and social development, it is concluded that the genetic roots of religion are to be found in the experience of moral conflict, or conflict between the egostic and altruistic "tendencies" of human nature. The specifically religious datum is the altruistic will itself; God is empirically "that within us which goes beyond the seeking of our own good to seek the good of others."

The author then seeks to draw certain implications of this definition for social and religious practice. The "fact" that modern man rationally accepts the validity of the altruistic ideal is seen to render inadequate theories of personality and ethics based on the central significance of ego-drive or enlightened self-interest. Religious belief in an immortality which is not static perfection, and in divine transcendence interpreted as signifying the cosmic sovereignty of the altruistic will, is held to be morally wholesome and not discredited by humanistic criticism. Rather, it is strongly urged that humanists and liberal theists co-operate more vigorously, on the basis of a common faith in "the good will of the normal human being," in opposition to the "fascistic" view which the author feels to be implied in certain theologies, and which is religiously espoused by political fascists.

Traditional religious beliefs, such as the belief in immortality, are held to be also compatible with modern scientific knowledge, as interpreted in an activistic metaphysic. Such a metaphysic postulates a neutral monism of substance with a duality of process, revealed in spatial change and "a feeling-response to the shock, or pushiness" of spatial generation. Positive value-experience occurs when activity is progressively harmonious and constructive, and

leads to the development of more complex structures. If the mental structure of the human organism be defined as a system of acts, and personality be defined as a system of will, then the post-physical survival of such structures is held to be theoretically possible.

God may be viewed as personal, as a system of cosmic will, and also as transcendent with respect to our personalities, which are organically related to Him. Empirical reasons for postulating transcendence and personality with reference to God are found in the character of vivid moral conflict, wherein altruistic will is experienced as both personal and other than self. The metaphysical whole, as well as the definitive cosmic manifestation of divine will, may also be termed God; the question which then arises as to the extent of God's power over the parts should be answered, with Whitehead, in terms of the spontaneity and freedom of the constituent entities. Thus God "contains" limiting elements, but He is not finite in the sense of being less than the whole.

The detailed argument of the book is clear and forceful, but several questions may be raised concerning general presuppositions and particular conclusions. The theoretical justification of God's personal nature by analogy from the definition of human personality leaves much to be said. To this reviewer it is questionable whether the view of either God's transcendence or of His personal nature is as empirically penetrating as are the philosophically less coherent views of the crisis-theologians. Again, one wonders whether all of the implications of the actual depth and seriousness of "moral conflict" are fully considered; many of the most forceful religious figures have found impossible on religious grounds the type of "integration" which Professor Garnett holds to be normal. (Paul and Augustine are described as "semineurotic," p. 174.) It is interesting to find the author saying that "for the most part a man's theory of human nature is an expression of his experience and temperament" (p. 174), and the relation of such a view to the procedure and conclusion of a broad empirical study is significant. May it not be asked with reference to any empirical philosophy of religion, whether both the historical data surveyed and the working hypotheses of the analyst are not bound up with cultural context and existential decision in a manner which makes it difficult to distinguish between hypothesis and conclusion?

J. A. Martin, Jr.

The Spiritual Life. By Edgar Sheffield Brightman. New York: Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 1942. 218 pp. $2.00.

The title of this book calls to mind a remark made to me by an Anglican professor of systematic theology: "I never permit my students the use of the word 'spiritual' in my classes. It is a cover-up for pious ignorance." Brightman is conscious of this obfuscation, and he is out in this book to make the term "spiritual" once more respectable.

In his typically analytic way he tears apart the variety of meanings and then

reconstructs the word with what are to him its healthy ingredients. "There is no point," he says, "in using a term without defining it." And so here are the characteristic marks of spirit: It is power, nonphysical, conscious experience, the experience of new ability, noble, a movement which transforms lower levels of life and all possibilities of experience into a completed personality, rich in ideals, courageous, free from the bondage of law and the body, rational (i.e., inclusive, orderly and consistent), a principle of control, true and personal. Spirit is not a vague something; it is crowded with a wealth of detail. The spiritual life is not to be identified with the person, although always implying a personality, nor with ideals, nor with anything impersonal. Rather, spiritual life is personality reaching for its highest levels, the commitment to the actual realization of potential values. It is the aspiration to be godlike. Persons are more than selves. Selves are the lower forms of consciousness. Persons are selves capable of developing ideal experiences. Mere consciousness is not spirit unless potential ideals are being actualized. Or, to a more formal definition: "Spiritual life is the conscious and purposive choice of man's personality to select and co-operate with some specific conscious and purposive energy of the divine mind." Inexhaustible in its possibilities, the nature of spirit is that it requires eternity. Spirit is a system of value, not isolated experiences however emotionally satisfying. Moreover, spirit is social, it is shareable and communicable; and it is grounded in the Divine, the Holy Spirit. We live in a spiritual universe, one that is not eternally static but one that is in eternal development. The Eternal Spirit is superhuman and personal. The development of spirit is not only an improvement in quality but an increase in quantity. Man's highest freedom is achieved by obedience to the laws of spirit.

Parts of this book read like a typical manual of devotion (e.g., the passages relating to family relationships, the power of worship, the society of the church, the social nature of man, and scattered sections written with a marked degree of religious fervor). One notes in the later works of Brightman, and here particularly, a deepening admiration for Hegel who, at one point, is called "the evolutionist of the spiritual life." The author has tackled a difficult theme in this philosophy of mind and, perhaps, has vindicated for subsequent philosophic thought the need for a continued use of a term which seemed destined to philosophical oblivion.

VERGILIUS FERM

Arabica and Islamica. By U. WAYRIFFE.

In the March 1942 issue of *The Review of Religion* (p. 346), in a notice of this book, our reviewer, supposing it to be a new edition of the work, which first appeared in 1936, expressed mild surprise that a new edition of a book of this kind should have been called for so soon. The author, through his publishers, Messrs Luzac & Co. of London, wishes to say that this is not a new edition issued

because of the exhaustion of the stocks of the first edition, but a largely revised one issued to replace the original edition, of which the remaining copies have been called in and destroyed, owing to adverse criticism.

Diálogos sobre Religión natural. By DAVID HUME. (Translated by EDMUNDO O'GORMAN; foreword by EDUARDO NICOL.) Mexico City: El Colegio de México, 1942. xlviii + 170 pp.

This first translation into Spanish of Hume's *Dialogues* is the fifth volume to appear in the University of Mexico's series of classical texts in philosophy, under the editorship of Eduardo García Maynez. In his charming introduction Dr. Nicol discusses the conditions under which talking about religion is psychologically feasible and analyzes the deeper significance of Hume's reluctance to accept theism.

HOWARD DAVIS SPOERL

The Road I Knew. By STEWART EDWARD WHITE. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1942. 253 pp. $2.50.

Another one of the "Betty books," in which Stewart Edward White reveals the extraordinary experiences of his wife, Betty, in the realm of spirit communication, both before and since her death. This book should be read in connection with the others for a complete and clear picture of Betty and her unusual gifts, as it does not stand alone very successfully. But to anyone seriously interested in the question of personal survival, the entire series is distinctly worthwhile, presenting as it does, one of the most intelligent and dignified accounts of the phenomena of mediumship available.

M. B.

A Chain of Prayer Across the Ages: Forty Centuries of Prayer from 200 B.C. up to the Present Day. Compiled by SELINA FITZHERBERT FOX. (Sixth Edition.) New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1943. xxviii + 320 pp. $2.00.

A unique collection of prayers which, from its first appearance in 1913, has been in continuous and ever-growing demand.

Voice of the Spirit. By AN UNKNOWN MINSTREL. New York: John Felsberg, Inc. 208 pp. 75c.

A book of brief inspirational talks intended for the young.

AMONG THE PERIODICALS

Primitive Religions

The Development of the Conception of God in Central Africa. By R. J. B. Moore. *International Review of Missions,* xxxi (1942), 412-20.

Ancient Religions

New Year's Day: An Inter-racial Survey. By Mahmud Barelvi. *Muslim Review,* xxx (1942), 24-30.

The Technique of Exorcism. By Campbell Bonner. *Harvard Theological Review,* xxxvi (1943), 39-49.

Visiting Epicurus' Garden. By Gustav E. Mueller. *Personalist,* xxiv (1943), 66-76.

Plotinus' Theory of Empirical Responsibility. By Gordon H. Clark. *New Scholasticism,* xvii (1943), 16-31.

Oriental Religions

Far Eastern Bibliography 1942. Prepared by Earl H. Pritchard. *Far Eastern Quarterly,* ii (1943), 227-45.

Wizardry in Ancient China. By Lionel Giles. *Aryan Path* xiii (1942), 484-89.

The Man and the Word. By Mrs. C. A. F. Rhys Davids. *Aryan Path,* xiii (1942), 535-40

The Buddhist Conception of the Absolute. By S. K. Maitra. *Vedanta Kesari,* xxix (1942), 139-43.

Vijnanavada. By Sri Krishna Prem. *Review of Philosophy and Religion,* xi (1943), No. 3, 51-68.

Tales of Tokuzan. Edited by W. J. Gabb. *Buddhism in England,* xvii (1943), 109-11.

Dharmapala Number. *Maha-Bodhi,* l (1942), 297-344.

The Meaning of the Word 'Hinduism.' By Swami Vivekananda. *Vedanta Kesari,* xxix (1942), 148-51.

The Aryan View of Life. By M. H. Syed. *Review of Philosophy and Religion,* xi (1942), No. 4, 5-13.

The Mother Divine. By Akshaya Kumar Banerjee. *Prabuddha Bharata,* xlvii (1942), 468-73.

Swami Subodhananda. By Swami Pavitrananda. *Prabuddha Bharata,* xlvii (1942), 573-79.

Mysticism as a Social Force. By the Editor. *Prabuddha Bharata,* xlvii (1942), 455-62.

Worship: Its Origin and Development. By S. V. Ananda. *Vedanta Kesari,* xxix (1042), 198-202.

Psychic Unfoldment. By Swami Paramananda. *Message of the East,* xxxii (1943), 3-12.

Sri Ramakrishna and Our Modern Tortured World. By Henry R. Zimmer. *Prabuddha Bharata,* xlvii (1942), 512-17.

Lest Religion Should Flounder. By THE EDITOR. *Prabuddha Bharata,* XLVII (1942), 501-7.

The National Significance of the Vijaya Festival. By AKSHAY KUMAR BANERJEA. *Vedanta Kesari,* XXIX (1942) 169-76.

Nationalism and Religion. By SWAMI ASESHANANDA. *Vedanta Kesari,* XXIX (1942), 145-47.

Lest We Vegetate. By THE EDITOR. *Prabuddha Bharata,* XLVII (1942), 551-57.

Whither Are We Going? By P. S. NAIDU. *Vedanta Kesari,* XXIX (1942), 235-42.

Emergent Evolution and Samkhya Philosophy. By T. S. MAHABALE. *Review of Philosophy and Religion,* XI (1942) No. 3, 21-35.

A Great Indian Artist. By GURDIAL MALLIK. *Aryan Path,* XIII (1942), 531-34.

The Quran—A Complete and Perfect Revelation. By S. ABID HUSAIN. *Muslim Review,* XXX (1942), 50-64.

The Forty-Third Treatise of the Ikhwān al-Ṣafā. Translated by D. H. YUSUFJI. *Moslem World,* XXXIII (1943), 41-49.

An Emperor Who Dreamed of Truth. By BHABANI BHATTACHARYA. *Aryan Path,* XIII (1942), 436-40.

The Zikr of the Rahmaniyah Order in Algeria. By WILLIAM S. HAAS. *Moslem World,* XXXIII (1943), 16-28.

Call to World Muslims from China. *Muslim Review,* XXX (1942), 17-23.

JUDAISM

An Historical Interpretation of Judaism. By LOUIS WOLSEY. *Current Religious Thought,* III (1943), 20-21.

The Hebrew Bible. By SOLOMON GOLDMAN. *Reconstructionist,* IX (1943), No. 1, 9-16.

The Apocalyptic Literature of the Old Testament. By GEORGE RICKER BERRY. *Journal of Biblical Literature,* LXII (1943), 9-16.

Jeremiah and War. By J. PHILIP HYATT. *Crozer Quarterly,* XX (1943), 52-58.

A Biblical Humanism. By COSSLETT QUIN. *Theology,* XLVI (1943), 1-3.

Pre-Maccabean Documents in the Passover Haggadah. By LOUIS FINKELSTEIN. *Harvard Theological Review,* XXXVI (1943), 1-38.

The "Jewish Execution" in Medieval Germany. By RUDOLF GLANZ. *Jewish Social Studies,* V (1943), 3-26.

Hirsch and Graetz—Two Interpreters of Jewish Tradition. By LEO TREPP. *Reconstructionist,* IX (1943), No. 3, 10-15.

Palestine and Jewish Survival in a World of Democracy. By ABRAHAM G. DUKER. *Reconstructionist,* IX (1943), No. 2, 15-18.

Realities and Illusions in Jewish Education. By WILLIAM CHOMSKY. *Reconstructionist,* VIII (1943), No. 18, 8-12; No. 19, 12-16.

The Meaning of Jewish Chosenness. By TRUDE WEISS-ROSMARIN. *Jewish Spectator,* VIII (1943), No. 3, 7-11; No. 4, 7-10.

Some Methodological Errors in the Study of Antisemitism. By SHLOMO BERGMAN. *Jewish Social Studies,* V (1943), 43-60.

CHRISTIANITY: HISTORICAL

Ecumenicity in the New Testament and in the Campbell Movement. By FREDERICK SOMMER. *Shane Quarterly,* IV (1943), 16-24.

Paul and His Persecutions. By WYATT AIKEN SMART. *Religon in Life,* XII (1943), 197-204.

In Caesar's World. By MATTHEW SPINKA. *Religion in Life,* XII (1943), 266-78.

Satan Returns from Holiday. By PAUL SEVIER MINEAR. *Religion in Life,* XII (1943), 187-96.

Apocalyptic Truth According to Jude. By JOHN FIELD MULHOLLAND. *Religion in Life,* XX (1943), 248-55.

The Name "Iscariot." By CHARLES C. TORREY. *Harvard Theological Review,* XXXVI (1943), 51-62.

Liturgy-making Factors in Primitive Christianity. By ALLEN CABANISS. *Journal of Religion,* XXIII (1943), 43-58.

Servant of the Servants of God. By EDWARD ROCHIE HARDY, JR. *Church History,* XII (1943), 3-27.

John Amos Comenius. By ANDREW PAUL SLABEY. *Crozer Quarterly,* XX (1943), 140-48.

Religous Backgrounds of Russian Culture. By GEORGE P. FEDOTOV. *Church History,* XII (1943), 35-51.

Traditio Lampadis. By OTAKAR ODLOŽILÍK. *American-Czechoslovak Fellowship,* I (1942), 47-57.

Bossuet and Leibnitz and the Reunion of the Church. By ROLAND H. BAINTON. *Chronicle,* XLIII (1943), 102-3.

The Two Sacraments of the Protestant Episcopal Church. *Chronicle,* XLIII (1943), 129.

The Capuchin Prefecture of New England (1630-1656). By JOHN M. LENHART, O. F. M. Cap. *Franciscan Studies,* XXIV (1943), 21-46.

The Poor Clares in Georgetown: Second Convent of Women in the United States. By GABRIEL J. NAUGHTEN, O. F. M. *Franciscan Studies,* XXIV (1943), 63-72.

The Association as It Affected Baptist Polity in Colonial America. By JOHN B. GATES. *Chronicle* (Baptist), VI (1943), 19-31.

John Kerfoot of Providence. By EUGENE B. JACKSON. *Chronicle* (Baptist), VI (1943), 3-10.

American Missions for Two Centuries. By W. T. WHITLEY. *Chronicle* (Baptist), VI (1943), 10-18.

Protestant Achievements. By KATHARINE SALTER. *Protestant,* IV (1943), No. 9, 40-44.

Of Phillips Brooks. By PHILLIPS ENDECOTT OSGOOD. *Chronicle,* XLIII (1943), 105-6.

The Christian Church in the Last Seventy Years. By KENNETH SCOTT LATOURETTE. *Church History,* XII (1943), 28-34.

The Attitude of the Baptists in the United States Toward the League of Nations. By IRA DURWOOD HUDGINS. Chronicle (Baptist), VI (1943), 64-74.

The Second Reformation. By Carl E. Grammer. *Chronicle,* xliii (1943), 150-52.

A Believer in the Future Life. F. W. H. Myers, 1843-1901. By J. S. MacArthur. *Hibbert Journal,* xli (1943), 122-30.

Christianity: Contemporary

St. Albert and St. Thomas Aquinas. Two Decrees by Pope Pius XII. *New Scholasticism,* xvii (1943), 87-92.

The Shoe Is on the Other Foot. By W. Stanley Rycroft. *Protestant,* iv (1943), No. 9, 5-8.

You Cannot Sit Down on Bayonets. By Pierre van Paassen. *Protestant,* iv (1943), No. 10, 10-19.

Papal Collaboration with Hitler. By Henry Walter Brann. *Protestant,* iv (1943), No. 10, 39-42.

The Prospects of Protestantism in the Church of England. By John F. Clayton. *Chronicle,* xliii (1943), 152-54.

Russia and Religion. By Pierre Lazareff and Waverly Root. *World Dominion,* xxi (1943), 41-44.

A Study of Theological Categories in the Indian Church. By Robert M. Clark. *International Review of Missions,* xxxii (1943), 88-95.

Great Achievements in India. By S. Maqbul Masih. *World Dominion,* xxi (1943), 21-23.

Tomorrow's Lutheran Church in America. By Ralph H. Long. *Current Religious Thought,* iii (1943), 22-26.

The Retreat to Tradition. By Bernard Eugene Meland. *Personalist,* xxiv (1943), 40-45.

Conference Addresses on "The Decay of Religious Faith and Worship in the Western World." *Religions,* No. 42 (1943), 6-24.

The Nature of the Christian Church. (Church Congress Syllabus No. 7, Part iii). By Lawrence Rose. *Anglican Theological Review,* xxv (1943), 149-60.

Church Union: Recent Progress and Present Obstacles. By Henry P. Van Dusen. *Christendom,* viii (1943), 87-96.

Liberal Catholicism in the Episcopal Church. By Sherman E. Johnson. *Christendom,* xii (1943), 207-16.

Will God Give Us Another Fifty Years? The Presbyterian-Episcopalian Negotiation for Union. By Angus Dun. *Christendom,* viii (1943), 168-82.

German Quietism and American Activism. By Carl E. Schneider. *Christendom,* viii (1943), 155-67.

The Churches Must Act. By E. Stanley Jones. *Religous Digest,* xvi (1943), No. 91, 28-32.

Drift or Mastery in a Changing World. Papers and Discussions at the Fiftieth Church Congress, Indianapolis, May 5-8, 1942. *Anglican Theological Review,* xxv (1943), 3-147.

Basic Principles. By Howard Chandler Robbins. *Chronicle,* xliii (1943), 80-82.

The Churches and Social Justice. By Sir Richard Acland. *Congregational Quarterly,* xxi (1943), 19-24.

William Temple, Archbishop of Canterbury. By CHARLES W. LOWRY, JR. *Christendom,* VIII (1943), 26-41.

The Malvern Conference Re-affirmed. By WILLIAM TEMPLE. *Current Religious Thought,* III (1943), 26-29.

A Symposium: The Importance of the Bible in the Present Crisis. *Journal of Bible and Religion,* XI (1943), 16-35.

The Timeless Christian Message and Its Immediate Meaning. By REINHOLD NIEBUHR. *Current Religious Thought,* III (1943), 10-14.

The Condition and Task of the Present-Day Church. By EMIL BRUNNER. *Religon in Life,* XII (1943), 172-86.

Racialism vs. the Spirit of Christ. By RALPH MARK GILBERT. *Religious Digest,* XVI (1943), No. 89, 74-76.

The Central Issue of World War II: Religious Freedom. By LUTHER A. WEIGLE. *Current Religious Thought,* III (1943), 11-14.

The Shaping of Things To Come. By HENRY BURKE ROBINS. *Colgate-Rochester Divinity School Bulletin,* XV (1943), 99-116.

Saint Joseph's Church, Canaan, Connecticut. Saint Edwards Catholic Chapel, United States Naval Air Base, Jacksonville, Florida. By MAURICE S. SHEEHY. *Liturgical Arts,* XI (1943), 24-29.

Religion and Art Follow Our Fighting Men. (Photographs) *Liturgical Arts,* XI (1943), 33-36.

GENERAL THEORY OF RELIGION

Human Destiny—Reinhold Niebuhr: A Symposium. *Union Review,* IV (1943), No. 2, 18-26.

Communication. By DOROTHY M. EMMET. *Theology,* XLVI (1943), 53-58.

Religion and the Issue of Ethical Relativism. By EDWARD THOMAS RAMSDELL. *Religion in Life,* XII (1943), 211-22.

The Religion of Science and the Science of Religion. By STANLEY COOK. *Hibbert Journal,* XLI (1943), 131-36.

God and History. By GEORGE W. DAVIS. *Crozer Quarterly,* XX (1943), 18-36.

The Doctrine of the Trinity: An Indispensable Norm. By CORNELIA LE BOUTILLIER. *Journal of Religion,* XXIII (1943), 33-42.

Theism and Hypertheism. By JOHN LAIRD. *Harvard Theological Review,* XXXVI (1943), 63-81.

The Problem of Divine Passibility and Prophetic Theology. By HAROLD KNIGHT. *Theology,* XLVI (1943), 25-32.

John Dewey and Jahweh. By ROBERT E. FITCH. *Journal of Religion,* XXIII (1943), 12-22.

The Maritain Volume. Dedicated to Jacques Maritain on the Occasion of His Sixtieth Anniversary. *Thomist,* V (1943), 1-374.

Happy Are the Meek. By O. T. MILLER. *Buddhism in England,* XVII (1943), 99-101.

The Ultimate Protestantism. By ROBERT WHITAKER. *Protestant,* IV (1943), No. 9, 25-30.

W. Stern and the Philosophy of Organism. By K. C. VARDACHARI. *Review of Philosophy and Religion,* XI (1942), No. 4, 14-19.

Little Used Keys to Religion. By GERALD HEARD. *Christendom,* VIII (1943), 42-50.

The Origin of Civilisation in Teaching. By HUGH BROWN. *Hibbert Journal,* XLI (1943), 155-61.

Concerning World Order. By TIMOTHY TINGFANG LEW. *Current Religious Thought,* III (1943), 17-21.

Religious Foundations of Democracy. By MORDECAI M. KAPLAN. *Reconstructionist,* IX (1943), No. 5, 10-15.

Whatsoever Things Are Lovely. By JAMES MCBRIDE DABBS. *Christendom,* VIII (1943), 145-54.

Flight to Atheism. By PAUL TILLICH. Protestant, IV (1943), No. 10, 43-48.

Predestination. By G. DE PURUCKER. *Theosophical Forum,* XXI (1943), 161-66.

The Best Possible World. By EDGAR S. BRIGHTMAN. *Journal of Bible and Religion,* XI (1943), 7-15, 72.

The New Place of Psychology in Religion. By B. ROY BROWN. *Christian Horizons,* V (1943), 5-7.

The Spirit of Continuity in the Liturgy. By DIETRICH VON HILDEBRAND. *Liturgical Arts,* XI (1943), 32, 37.

Sculpture, the Oldest of the Religious Arts. *Liturgical Arts,* XI (1943), 38-43.

INDEX

ARTICLES AND COMMUNICATIONS

Bolman, Frederick de W., Jr., Christianity and Philosophy 135
Cleve, Felix M. L., The God of Anaxagoras 124
Coomaraswamy, Ananda K., On Being in One's Right Mind 32
Fowler, Murray, Polarity in the Rig-Veda 115
Gray, Louis Herbert, Brythonic Christianity 5
Krapp, Robert M., A Note on the Puritan "Calling" 242
Löwith, Karl, On the Historical Understanding of Kierkegaard 227
Manasse, Ernst Moritz, Conversion and Liberation 361
Marti, Fritz, Religion, Philosophy, and the College 41
Patterson, Robert Leet, The Significance of the Notion of Revelation for the Philosophy of Religion 127
Reichard, Gladys A., Human Nature as Conceived by the Navajo Indians 353
Shana, Paul, The Meaning of Sacrifice 252
Werner, Eric, Notes on the Attitude of the Early Church Fathers towards Hebrew Psalmody 339

Adams, James Luther, review of Hough, 193
Addison, James T., *The Christian Approach to the Moslem*, 430
Adler, Cyrus: Newman, 210
Albright, William Foxwell, *Archaeology and the Religion of Israel*, 389
American Academy for Jewish Research, Proceedings, Vol. XI, 282
American Catholic Philosophical Association, Proceedings: Philosophy and Order, 106
Anaxagoras: Cleve, 124
Ancient religions: Cleve, 124; Heidel, 425; Prentice, 271; Solmsen, 384; Steindorff and Seele, 64
Anderson, Nels, *Desert Saints*, 182
Andover liberals: Williams, 79
Anglicanism: Dowdell, 431; Gloyn, 170; Sanders, 296
Anti-Semitism: Curtiss, 198; Eisenstein, 105; Pinson, 201
Aristotle: Dowdell, 431
Augustine, St.: Manasse, 361

Beissel, Johan Conrad: Klein, 165
Beth, Carl, review of Close, 427
Bible: Butterworth, 103; *Cambridge Senior Bible*, 323; Johansson, 284; Wallis, 278; Willoughby, 103; Worrell, 205
O. T.: Heidel, 425; Jacobson, 278
N. T.: Booth, 206; Cadoux, 71; Clark, 102; Glover, 209; Langton, 392; Lund, 325; Meyer, 431; Olmstead, 293; Sikorsky, 208
Blau, Joseph L., reviews of Jacobson, 278; Wallis, 278
Block, Marguerite, reviews of Lancaster, 326; White, 436

Bokser, Ben Zion, review of Neuman, 210
Bolman, Frederick deW., Jr., Christianity and Philosophy, 135
Booth, Edwin Prince, ed., *New Testament Studies,* 206
Braden, Charles S., review of Morrison, 421
Bradshaw, Marion, J., *Philosophical Foundations of Faith,* 88
Brann, Henry Walter, review of Pinson, 201
Branscomb, Harvie, review of Cadoux, 71
Breasted, James H., Jr., review of Steindorff, 64
Brightman, Edgar S., The *Spiritual Life,* 434
Brythonic Christianity: Gray, 5
Buddhism: Davids, 322; *Studies on Buddhism in Japan,* 68
Buschman, Harold, review of Tsanoff, 415
Butterworth, Charles C., *The Literary Lineage of the King James Bible, 1340-1611,* 103
Buttrick, George Arthur, *Prayer,* 96

Cadoux, Cecil John, *The Historic Mission of Jesus,* 71
Cambridge Senior Bible, The, 323
Cassady, Maynard, review of Bradshaw, 88
Catholicism, Roman: *American Catholic Philosophical Association Proceedings,* 106; Maynard, 76; O'Connor, 168; Walsh, 214; Woodlock, 330
China: Mencius, 426
Church and state: Coomaraswany, 275
Church history:
  Europe: Comenius, 398; Curtiss, 83; Dowdell, 431; Gloyn, 170; Gray, 5; Keller, 329; O'Connor, 168; Russell, 401; Sanders, 296; Werner, 339
  America: Cunningham, 173; Davis, 211; Dunham, 327; Greene, 74; Klein, 165; Maynard, 76; Mead, 431; Pope, 186; Russell, 401; Sweet, 326; Williams, 79
Clark, Kenneth W., *Eight American Praxapostoloi,* 102
Cleve, Felix M. L., The God of Anaxagoras, 124
Close, Upton, *Behind the Face of Japan,* 427
Coleman, Michael, *Faith under Fire,* 217
Coleridge: Sanders, 296
Comenius, John Amos, *The Labyrinth of the World,* 398
Coomaraswamy, Ananda K., On Being in One's Right Mind, 32; *Spiritual Authority and Temporal Power in the Indian Government,* 275
Coptic texts: Worrell, 205
Crownfield, Frederic R., review of Glover, 209
Cunningham, Charles E., *Timothy Dwight, 1752-1817,* 173
Curtis, William Redmond, *The Lambeth Conferences,* 83
Curtis, John S., *An Appraisal of the Protocols of Zion,* 198
Davids, C. A. F., *The Minor Anthologies of the Pali Canon,* 322
Davis, J. Merle, *The Church in New Jamaica,* 211; *The Church in Puerto Rico's Dilemma,* 211; *The Cuban Church in a Sugar Economy,* 211

Day, Richard W., review of Cunningham, 173

Deku, Henry, review of *American Catholic Philosophical Association,* Proceedings, 106
Dobbie, Elliott V. K., reviews of Butterworth, 103; Willoughby, 103
Doty, Joseph D., review of Gloyn, 170
Dowdell, Victor L., *Aristotle and Anglican Religious Thought,* 431
Drama: Prentice, 271
Dubs, Homer H., review of Giles, 426
Dunham, Chester F., *The Attitude of the Northern Clergy toward the South, 1860-1865,* 327
Dwight, Timothy: Cunningham, 173

Easton, Burton S., reviews of Meyer, 431; Olmstead, 293
Education, religious: Bolman, 135; Marti, 41
Egypt: Steindorff and Seele, 64
Eisenstein, Ira, *The Ethics of Tolerance,* 105
Ely, Stephen Lee, *The Religious Availability of Whitehead's God,* 409

Ferm, Vergilius, reviews of Brightman, 434; *Science, Philosophy and Religion,* 213; Woodlock, 330
Ferré, Nels F. S., *The Christian Faith,* 405
Field, Jay C., review of Davis, 211
Finkelstein, Louis, *Faith for Today,* 214
Fowler, Murray, Polarity in the Rig-Veda, 115
Friess, Horace L., review of Kroner, 98

Garnett, A. Campbell, *A Realistic Philosophy of Religion,* 433
Gastonia, S. C.: Pope, 186
Giles, Lionel, tr., *The Book of Mencius,* 426
Glover, T. R., *The Disciple,* 209
Gloyn, Cyril K., *The Church in the Social Order,* 170; reviews of O'Connor, 168; Sanders, 296
Graham, Holt, review of Coleman, 217
Grant, Frederick C., review of Lund, 325
Gray, Louis Herbert, Brythonic Christianity, 5
Greene, Evarts B., *Religion and the State in America,* 74; review of Maynard, 76

Hallowell, A. Irving, *The Role of Conjuring in Saulteaux Society,* 323
Hamilton, Clarence H., review of Davids, 322
Hamilton, Kenneth G., review of Klein, 165
Hardy, E. R., Jr., review of Curtis, 83
Heidel, Alexander, *The Babylonian Genesis,* 425
Heschel, Abraham, review of *Rashi Anniversary Volume I,* 105
High, Stanley, *Faith for Today,* 214
Hinduism: Coomaraswamy, 275; Fowler, 115; Nikhilananda, 214, 428; Ramana, 215; Roy, 102
Hocking, William Ernest, *What Man Can Make of Man,* 218
Homrighausen, E. G., review of Keller, 329
Hough, Lynn Harold, *The Christian Criticism of Life,* 193; *Patterns of the Mind,* 193
Hume, David, *Diálogos sobre Religión natural,* 436

Islam: Addison, 430

Jacobson, David, *The Social Background of the Old Testament,* 278

Japan: Close, 427; *Studies on Buddhism in Japan,* 68
Jefferson, Howard B., *Experience and the Christian Faith,* 90
Jeffery, Arthur, review of Worrell, 205
Johansson, Nils, *Parakletoi,* 284
Johnson, F. Ernest, review of *Faiths for Today,* 214
Judaism: Albright, 389; *American Academy for Jewish Research Proceedings,* 282; Curtiss, 198; Eisenstein, 105; Finkelstein, 214; Langton, 392; Neuman, 211, 395; Pinson, 201; *Rashi Anniversary Volume I,* 105; Werner, 339. See also Bible

Keller, Adolph, *Christian Europe Today,* 329
Kierkegaard, S.: *Concluding Unscientific Postscript,* 143; *Fear and Trembling,* 300; *Philosophical Fragments,* 143; *Repetition,* 300; *The Sickness Unto Death,* 300. See also Löwith, 227; Lowrie, 300; Manasse, 361
Kingdon, Frank, *Faith for Today,* 214
Klein, Walter C., *Johann Conrad Beissel,* 165
Knox, John, ed., *Religion and the Present Crisis,* 215
Knox, Raymond C., reviews of Osborn, 189; Sockman, 418; Tigner, 219
Kraeling, Emil G., review of Heidel, 425
Krapp, Robert M., A Note on the Puritan "Calling," 242
Kroner, Richard, *The Religious Function of Imagination,* 98
Krzesinski, Andrew J., *Is Modern Culture Doomed?* 94

Lambeth Conferences: Curtis, 83
Lancaster, Charles M., *Saints and Sinners in Old Romance,* 326
Langton, Edward, Good and Evil Spirits, 392
Liturgy: Werner, 339
Lowe, Victor, review of Ely, 409
Löwith, Karl, On the Historical Understanding of Kierkegaard, 227
Lowrie, Walter, *A Short Life of Kierkegaard,* 300
Lund, Nils W., *Chiasmus in the New Testament,* 325
Lyman, Eugene W., review of Williams, 79
Lyman, Mary Ely, review of *Cambridge Senior Bible,* 323.

MacDonald, Lois, review of Pope, 186
Manasse, Ernst Moritz, Conversion and Liberation, 361
Manning, Clarence A., reviews of Curtiss, 198; Krzesinski, 94; Timasheff, 403
Marcus, Ralph, review of Johansson, 284
Marti, Fritz, Religion, Philosophy, and the College, 41
Martin, J. A., Jr., review of Garnett, 433
Maynard, Theodore, *The Story of American Catholicism,* 76
Mead, Sidney E., *Nathaniel William Taylor, 1786-1858,* 431
Mecklin, John M., *The Passing of the Saint,* 86
Mencius: Giles, 426
Mendelsohn, I., review of Albright, 389
Meyer, Frank H., *The Crux of Chronology,* 431
Miller, Randolph C., reviews of Jefferson, 90; Trueblood, 196
Missions: Addison, 430; Davis, 211

Moelhman, Conrad H., reviews of Greene, 74; Knox, 215
Moffat, James, review of Clark, 102
Morehouse, Andrew R., review of Waterman, 162.
Mormonism: Anderson, 182
Morris, Charles, *Paths of Life*, 317
Morrison, Charles Clayton, *The Christian and the War*, 421

Nathanson, Jerome, review of Eisenstein, 105
Neuman, Abraham A., *Cyrus Adler: A Biographical Sketch*, 210; *The Jews in Spain*, 395
Nichols, Robert H., review of Dunham, 327
Nikhilananda, Swami, *Faith for Today*, 214; tr., *The Gospel of Sri Ramakrishna*, 428

O'Connor, John J., *The Catholic Revival in England*, 168
Odložilík, Otakar, review of Comenius, 398
Olmstead, A. T., *Jesus in the Light of History*, 293
Osborn, Andrew R., *Christianity in Peril*, 189
Outler, Albert C., review of Ferré, 405

Pacifism: Morrison, 421
Pardue, Austin, *Your Morale and How To Build It*, 331
Pascal: Waterman, 162
Patterson, Robert Leet, The Significance of the Notion of Revelation for the Philosophy of Religion, 127
Pears, Thomas C., Jr., review of Mead, 431
Periodical literature: 107, 220, 332, 437
Pinson, Koppel S., ed., *Essays on Antisemitism*, 201
Plato: Solmsen, 384
Pope, Liston, *Millhands and Preachers*, 186
Pratt, James B., reviews of Hocking, 218; Nikhilananda, 428
Prentice, William K., *Those Ancient Dramas Called Tragedies*, 271
Primitive religion: Hallowell, 323; Reichard, 353; Shana, 252
Protocols of Zion: Curtiss, 198
Psychic phenomena: White, 436
Puritan "Calling": Krapp, 242

Quakerism: Russell, 401

Ramakrishna: Nikhilananda, 428
Ramana Maharshi, Sri Bhagavan, *Ulladu Narpadu or Sad Vidya*, 205
Randall, John Herman, Jr., review of Solmsen, 384
Rashi Anniversary Volume I: Text and Studies, 105
Rath, George E., review of Pardue, 331
Reformation, Protestant: Comenius, 398
Reichard, Gladys A., Human Nature as Conceived by the Navajo Indians, 353
Reischauer, A. K., review of *Studies on Buddhism in Japan*, 68
Revelation: Patterson, 127
Rig-Veda: Fowler, 115
Roberts, David E., reviews of Kierkegaard, 143, 300; Lowrie, 300
Roy, S. C., *The Bhagavad-Gītā and Modern Scholarship*, 102
Russell, Elbert, *The History of Quakerism*, 401
Russia: Timasheff, 403

Sacrifice: Shana, 252
Sanders, Charles, *Coleridge and the Broad Church Movement*, 296

Schneider, H. W., review of Sweet, 326
Science, Philosophy and Religion, 213
Scott, Ernest F., review of Booth, 206
Seele, Keith C., *When Egypt Ruled the East,* 64
Shana, Paul, On the Meaning of Sacrifice, 252
Shute, Clarence, review of Dowdell, 431
Sikorsky, Igor I., *The Message of the Lord's Prayer,* 208
Smith, Marian W., review of Mecklin, 86
Sockman, Ralph W., *The Highway of God,* 418
Solmsen, Friedrich, *Plato's Theology,* 384
Sperry, W. L., review of Buttrick, 96
Spiegelberg, Frederic, review of Morris, 317
Spinka, Matthew, tr., *The Labyrinth of the World,* 398
Spoerl, Howard Davis, review of Hume, 436
Steindorff, George, *When Egypt Ruled the East,* 64
Stowater, S. A., review of Anderson, 182
Studies on Buddhism in Japan, Vol. III, 68
Sweet, William W., *Religion in Colonial America,* 326

Tigner, Hugh S., *No Sign Shall Be Given,* 219
Timasheff, N. S., *Religion in Soviet Russia,* 403
Trachtenberg, Joshua, review of Langton, 392
Trueblood, D. Elton, *The Logic of Belief,* 196; review of Russell, 401
Tsanoff, Radoslav A., *Religious Crossroads,* 415

Voltaire: Waterman, 162

Wallach, Luitpold, review of Neuman, 395
Wallis, Louis, *The Bible Is Human,* 278
Wallis, Wilson D., review of Hallowell, 323
Walsh, Gerald G., S. J., *Faith for Today,* 214
Waterman, Mina, *Voltaire, Pascal and Human Destiny,* 162
Werner, Eric, Notes on the Attitude of the Early Church Fathers towards Hebrew Psalmody, 339
West Indies: Davis, 211
Westbrook, H. Theodric, review of Prentice, 271
White, Stewart Edward, *The Road I Knew,* 436
Whitehead, Alfred North: Ely, 409
Williams, Daniel Day, *The Andover Liberals,* 79
Willoughby, Harold R., *The First Authorized English Bible and the Cranmer Preface,* 103
Wilson, J. Christy, review of Addison, 430
Woodlock, Thomas F., *The Catholic Pattern,* 330
Worrell, William H., ed., *Coptic Texts in the University of Michigan Collection,* 205
Wunsch, William F., review of Sikorsky, 208

Zimmer, Henry R., reviews of Coomaraswamy, 275; Ramana, 205; Roy, 102